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In the wake of extreme xenophobic violence, which swept South Africa in 2008, a group of Somali 
refugees resident in Cape Town formed the Somali Retailers’ Association (SRA) as a mutual support 
network made up of those who were targeted by xenophobes most: Somalis involved in informal sector 
trade in the townships. This study investigates the networks of targeted populations, analysing how this 
Association helps to mitigate the impact of xenophobia on the lives of its members. The SRA, at first 
glance, seemed to be exclusively a trade network for mutual-benefit amongst Somali. These Somali 
entrepreneurs in Cape Town formalised their pre-existing informal co-national network ties. In doing 
so, I argue, they were actually mobilising existing social capital, exercising their agency and attempting 
to realize their legal and human rights. Many of the Association’s functions are actually the mobilization 
of social capital to fill the gaps in national and city-level governance – providing assistance, critical 
services and fulfilling obligations where the State has failed to uphold their constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. The SRA appears to have a positive impact upon the quality of life for its members in the four 
areas under investigation (safety, livelihood, housing and health). In terms of responding to violence 
and negotiating with South Africans, the SRA has a positive impact on safety although not in terms of 
prevention. It has, at times, a positive role in conflict resolution with South African communities. One 
discovery was that the Somali network in Cape Town is less cohesive than it seemed initially; the 
divisions within the greater Somali society are exaggerated in this smaller network. The SRA altered the 
perception of the Somali community by outsiders and the agencies providing assistance, but internally 
the community is still divided by family and clan. The SRA’s network is good for business not in terms of 
financial gain, but as a lobbying and negotiating party with South African government and business-
owners who are actively preventing the expansion of competitive Somali enterprise in the townships. 
The SRA does not appear to have a direct impact on housing for its members, although general network 
ties are helpful for those displaced by the violence that need a temporary place to stay.  Mutual 
assistance provided through the SRA and general co-national networks helped in cases of physical 
attacks, but the overall impact on Somali retailers’ health was indeterminate. This study serves as a 
foundation for further research into how forced migrant populations utilize their networks to improve 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Throughout most of the 20th century, South Africa – in law, legislation, policy, practice and everyday life 
– was a country predicated upon the segregation, limitation of rights and disenfranchisement of the 
majority of the population.  Rights, particularly after 1948, were a luxury of the few.  As a pariah in the 
international community, the apartheid government stood outside the norms of behaviour, even as 48 
of the 56 members of the United Nations General Assembly declared human rights ‘universal’.  Under 
apartheid, the white minority government manufactured identities to suit its needs by dividing and 
separating the majority population (Mandami, 1996) and effectively created foreigners out of the native 
population, while setting up a clear urban-rural divide (Mandami, 1996; Neocosmos, 2009).  These 
manufactured identities still haunt the country and its inhabitants – citizens and non-citizens alike. 
Sixteen years after the historic elections of 1994, the majority of South Africans have yet to reap the 
promised benefits of the nation’s celebrated transition from the racialised authoritarian regime to 
democracy or realize their rights to a healthy environment, safety, education, 
profession/trade/occupation, housing, dignity and 30 other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
(Worby, Hassim & Kupe, 2008).  The primary ‘ethic’ of this transition was inclusion (Ibid: 7) based upon 
a human rights regime.  The foundation for the newly inclusive nation is a Constitution that explicitly 
states that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” and a Bill of Rights that “enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country” (SA Constitution).  If that is the case, how can we comprehend the continued 
assault, exclusion and violence levied upon foreigners?  Are political rights, freedoms and entitlements 
enough to guarantee the safety, human rights and dignity of every person who lives in South Africa?   
As many studies of attitudes of South Africans and experiences of African foreign nationals 
demonstrate, the answer to the last two questions is a resounding NO.  Whether you call it Afrophobia, 
negrophobia, xenophobia or simply prejudice against a perceived ‘other’, the negative attitudes, 
behaviours and violence unleashed against ‘foreigners’ is racist in practice (Warner & Finchilescu, 
2005) and violates the human rights of not only the victims but also those who experience the 
psychological damage of being under siege.  The victims are almost exclusively Africans from outside 
South Africa’s borders – which is alarming in a country whose transition was to ‘deracialise’ difference,1  
a country “where skin colour has always served as an excuse for whole catalogues of discriminatory 
policies and practices” (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 49).  
The vulnerability of refugees and asylum seekers is a universal trait of their existence and not at all 
unique to South Africa; in fact, "racism aimed at foreigners is a common trend in Europe and America, it 
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 Deracialising difference is not the same as eliminating difference.  Culture, religious and linguistic difference are 
protected in the Bill of Rights (SA Constitution); thus difference and race are not eliminated but race is no longer the 












has received particular attention in societies undergoing transition, such as that of post-unification 
Germany" (Harris, 2001: no page numbers).  What does make South Africa exceptional in this anti-
foreign sentiment is the magnitude of the violence and large-scale citizen action.  Those committing acts 
of murder, torture and violations of human rights see their 'work' as legitimate, rational and above all, 
necessary (Landau, 2010c: 216).  With tacit consent from government, ordinary South Africans are 
demonizing and attempting to eradicate African foreigners (Ibid; Landau, 2008).  Even more frightening 
is that the state plays a role in "encouraging and empowering the citizenry to alienate and liquidate in 
the name of political self-actualization" (Landau, 2010c: 219).   
In May 2008, a wave of violent xenophobic attacks swept South Africa leaving more than 60 people 
dead, around 670 wounded, and over 100,000 displaced (Cape Argus Supplement, 2009; IOM, 2009).  
Although this certainly was not the first violent expression of xenophobia in this country, it was by far 
the worst on record in post-apartheid South Africa.  During these assaults, the devastation in Western 
Cape was relatively light compared to that of Gauteng.  Daily violence against foreigners continues 
across the country long after xenophobia was declared ‘over’ by the government.   
The vast majority of the intimidation, ‘eviction notices’, looting, beatings and other violence 
experienced in Western Cape in 2008 – particularly in Cape Town and the surrounds – was and 
continues to be levied upon the Somali community.2  This violence against Somalis is practiced daily in 
the townships and informal settlements across Western Cape.  Whether it is because they are easily 
recognized as looking physically different (appearing slightly lighter or more Arab looking than black 
South Africans) or because of their increased visibility and vulnerable positions as informal traders 
with a reputation for carrying cash, Somalis appear to be the favourite target for xenophobes and 
opportunistic or professional criminals in Cape Town.3   
As the World Cup in 2010 – South Africa’s highly successful global event during which the nation, and 
thousands across the globe declared ‘we are all African’ – drew to a close, rumours spread like wildfire 
that all foreigners (African foreigners) were to leave by the end of the final match or be killed.  Foreign 
nationals in the townships across the country, but particularly in Cape Town, were threatened with the 
language of genocide – foreigners were told that their presence would only be tolerated until the 
Closing Ceremony and those who remained would be subject to a ‘cleansing’ of the townships, 
eradicated, rounded up and expelled or executed.  Although many foreigners fled the townships, most 
have since returned since the genocide threats of these rumours was not ultimately borne out in reality.  
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 Attacks in Cape Town are also heaped upon the Zimbabwean community, but Africans of all nationalities have felt the sting.  See 
Misago, J.P. “Violence, Labour and the Displacement of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape.” December 2009. Migration 
Policy Brief #2. University of Witwatersrand Forced Migration Studies Programme. 
3
 This is based upon interviews as well as several articles in the local print media.  See Underhill, 2010; Johnston, 2010; Vegter, 2010; 












Instead, ‘small-scale’ daily murder of Somalis in Cape Town’s townships is carried out in order to kill 
the competition in business, deter more Somali from settling here and intimidate all those who remain.  
Extreme acts of hideous and torturous violence have been levied upon the Somali community in Cape 
Town and the surrounds for years.4  During the four months of fieldwork for this dissertation (August – 
November 2010), approximately 22 Somalis were murdered in the locations surrounding Cape Town, 
countless more were injured, harassed or otherwise subjected to xenophobia and not all of these 
murders appear in print or in official statistics (observations/discussions during fieldwork; interview 
with Aden 011811; discussion with translator 170111). 
Statements by Somali participants as well as large-scale opinion surveys (Crush & Pendelton, 2004; 
Crush, 2000) demonstrate that the sentiment behind the rumours and the frequency with which these 
threats are lobbed at foreigners residing in South Africa demonstrate the truth: anti-foreign sentiment 
is pervasive in this country and people are willing to kill to ‘rid their country of the foreign menace.’  
The ANC government has a strong record of accomplishment of denying the existence of any problems 
until they cannot hide from them any longer. The current government is no exception with Ministers 
and other civil servants repeatedly denying that xenophobia is a problem after the 2008 attacks.5  The 
last 16 years saw a great deal of change and progress, but none of that was accomplished by ignoring 
the problems at hand. 
South Africa’s transition to democracy has not been perfect and sixteen years after the country’s first 
democratic elections, the nation is still learning how to live up to the lofty goals set out in its rights-
based Constitution.  The relationship of the government to its people, indeed the relationship of the 
state to all those who live in the country, is still in flux.  One consequence of democratization is that the 
country now respects the basic human right of freedom of movement, not only for its citizens, but also 
for the many foreigners who flocked to South Africa since it reengaged with the world and opened its 
borders in keeping with international standards (Amnesty International, 2008; Crush, 1999; Harris, 
2001; Vigneswaran, 2007b).  This study takes the transition from racial autocracy to inclusive 
democracy – a process of transitional justice – as its point of departure and focuses on a small group of 
individuals at the municipal level.  The process, a rocky and unfinished one, affects not only South 
African citizens, but also those who were born elsewhere and presently call South Africa home.  The 
realization (or lack of realization) of those rights for some of the country’s most vulnerable inhabitants 
– forced migrants living amongst the poor in townships and informal settlements – at the analytical 
level of the city (specifically Cape Town) should provide insights into the nation’s social contract with 
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 No formal data exists as to the number of attacks, lootings, murders etc. on Somali traders or other foreigners 
because there is no specific category for xenophobic violence.  See Appendix 2 for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
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all who live here.  More specifically, we will develop a more nuanced understanding of an association of 
Somali entrepreneurs’ efforts to fulfil these obligations where the state has failed to do so.    
Networks are defined across various social sciences according to different definitions that fit broadly 
within three main categories: social, industry or organisational and market-bound (Rindoks, Pinninx & 
Rath, 2006: 2).  For the purposes of this study, the lines are blurred between the former two categories 
as it examines an immigrant association: the Somali Retailers' Association.  Although this Association is 
represented in multiple cities across Western Cape, this thesis is geographically located in Cape Town, 
specifically with those Somalis who trade in informal settlements (the site of the most xenophobic 
violence against Somalis over time, inclusive of the May 2008 attacks and those following the World 
Cup in 2010).  
This specific Association is but one part of the greater network of Somalis within South Africa – and as 
will be discussed later, Somalis are considered highly networked examples of transnationals as they 
"live a life that spans across  geographical borders because they have ended up all over the world when 
they fled Somalia" (van Liempt, 2010: no page numbers).  The Somali Retailers' Association is by no 
means the only Somali organisation in South Africa.  The Somali Business Owners Association, the 
Somali Association of South Africa and the Somali Community Board serve various facets and 
components of the Somali community in South Africa; the recently formed Somali Youth League also 
supports the Cape Town region.   
As this study will illustrate, through extensive in-depth interviews with 8 members of the SRA and 10 
other Somali traders in the townships, the Association serves many functions, several of which are 
actual substitutes for effective national and city-level governance and are indicative of the insecurity 
that pervades the migrant experience here in Cape Town.6  With this study, I am attempting to examine 
the nature of a single network in the Somali community of Cape Town and investigate the impact that 
this has on their ability to withstand the "orgy of xenophobic attacks" (Nieftagodien, 2008; 65) in post-
transition South Africa.  This study helps to shed light on the shifting perceptions of the Somali 
community by the UN and city-level governance, which resulted from the formation of a semi-formal 
network. 
In a climate of continued xenophobia, which often manifests itself through violent outbursts, seeking 
out alternative and non-violent means of addressing these underlying issues and identifying groups 
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 Although the focus is on traders, this study is not an analysis of the financial or economic contributions to South Africa 
by Somali informal traders, migrants or migrant networks – this has been extensively studied in the European and 
North American contexts and debated amongst academics and policy makers here in South Africa (Ehrenreich, 2003; 
Jacobsen, 2002; Jacobsen, 2006; Macchiavello, 2003).  Across the board, data routinely supports the conclusion that 
migration promotes economic growth in the country of settlement (Glover et al; 2002), although the issue is so 












within both the Somali and South African communities that could potentially manage the conflict is a 
critical task.  As most of the attacks against Somalis are levied against shopkeepers or informal traders 
and money/jobs are used as 'excuses' for the violence, the Somali Retailers Association would seem 
ideally poised to help negotiate and reduce the number of violent physical attacks.7  Their capacity to 
function as such came up incidentally throughout the interview and observation process.   
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Investigating the nature of this group's ties with both the Somali broader community and South 
Africans generally in the townships surrounding Cape Town is one aspect of this study which also seeks 
to understand how these ties help them manage conflict and impact their experience with the liveability 
(quality of life) of the city.  What are the functions and roles that this Association plays in the lives of its 
members?   Has this group of traders in Cape Town, by coming together under a single umbrella, been 
able to realise their constitutionally guaranteed rights and enhance their experience of liveability in 
terms of safety, securing livelihoods, health and housing?  Are the lives of Somali traders significantly 
better because the Somali Retailers Association exists?  In addition, what is the role of a particular 
community network in responding to xenophobia or related conflict?  I set out to investigate the 
structure of the association, understand what activities it undertakes, and the role it plays in 
community, governmental or other organizational involvement that at its core seeks to mitigate the 
issue of xenophobia between the South African and Somali communities.   
DEFINING TERMS 
Prior to exploring the world of the Somalis in Cape Town, it is necessary to explain and define several 
terms, which will be used widely in this dissertation.  Some of these terms are controversial, highly 
politicized, or used interchangeably (Kirkup and Evans, 2009).8  Thus, it is necessary to agree on a 
neutral definition for each of the following terms. 
Migrant: In the most general terms, a migrant is someone who crosses a border.  In this, the most 
general and broad definition, we could speak of rural to urban migration within a country or crossing 
international borders.  Throughout this paper the term ‘migrant’ or ‘migrants’ will be employed as a 
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 We must acknowledge that this conflict is not simply about looting stores and violence levied upon Somalis (or any 
other non-South African foreigners) but is a much deeper undercurrent within society that cannot be dealt with simply 
through community-level conflict resolution.  This will be dealt with and scrutinized extensively in Chapter 2.   
8
 “This confusion *between migrant and refugee+ plays into the hands of irresponsible politicians whose rhetoric draws 
upon and feeds the fears of those who see foreigners as taking jobs, who might be terrorists or criminals, who might 
upset the ethnic balance, or who might just stay too long…Refugees and migrants are becoming confused in the public 
mind, the policies of government and the laws of states.  As the distinction starts to disappear, so does the line 
between migration control and refugee protection… The confusion is not only dangerous, it is also legally unsound” 












general category of foreign-born people, non-westerners who are in South Africa on a medium- to long-
term basis.9  Migrants do not legally exist as a specific category of persons who are not entitled to 
specific rights in the South African Constitution or international legislation.   
Forced Migrant is defined by the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration as “a 
general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced 
by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear 
disasters, famine, or development projects” (FMO; 2010).  As a field of study, it is more of a catchall 
term to include refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people.  There are three basic reasons 
why we separate out forced migrants out as a sub-category of migrants in general: 1) they have distinct 
needs; 2) there are millions of them globally and 3) they make special claims on rights or entitlements 
(Turton; 5-6).  The term forced migrant will be used in this study when speaking of Somalis and other 
groups from refugee-producing countries or similar situations.10 
Asylum Seeker: An ‘asylum seeker’ is “someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has 
not yet been definitively evaluated” (UNHCR, 2007).  In addition, in South Africa, this term is delineated 
in the 2008 Refugee Amendment act as “a person who is seeking recognition as a refugee in the 
Republic” (2008).  Asylum seekers may hold a Section 22 permit, but as with refugee documentation, 
these may be lost, destroyed or simply disintegrate.  Thus, the possession or lack of legal documentation 
does not have bearing on the definition of such persons.11  Thus, in the context of this study, asylum 
seekers are persons who see themselves as refugees, and seek recognition by the government as such. 
Refugee: The term ‘refugee’ is the most specific category; they possess (or at some point possessed12) 
official, legal status and documents that differentiate them from other migrants and entitle them to 
international protection.  According to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee 
is someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
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 By defining it thus, we exclude expatriate workers here on temporary or long-term visas; Western tourists who chose 
to remain after their visas expire; retirees and others who settle with considerable foreign-earned capital; international 
students on study-permits; and other categories of visitors or immigrants.   
10
 According to the UNHCR Statistical Online Database, the top refugee-producing countries as of 2009 are: Afghanistan 
(1,905,804), Iraq (1,785,212), Somalia (678,308), Democratic Republic of Congo (455,852), Sudan (348,500), Vietnam 
(339,289), Myanmar/Burma (206,650), Eritrea (197,313), Serbia (195,167) and China (180,558).   
11
 See definition of ‘refugee’ or CoRMSA, 2008; Klaaren & Ramji, 2001; Landau, 2004; Landau, 2005b; Landau, 2009; de 
la Hunt, L.A. 1998; de la Hunt, V.L.A, 1998; Peberdy, 2010, among others for more on the complications of these 
permits. 
12
 As will become apparent later in the paper, in South Africa, status documents expire frequently and they are often 
destroyed or confiscated by police officers.  Thus, someone may possess an official refugee identity document that 
expired or have it taken by the police but they would still qualify under this definition as a ‘refugee’ for the purpose of 












country” (UNHCR, 1950).  South Africa defines refugees according to the Refugees Amendment Act of 
2008: 
“(a)owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, gender, tribe, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the 
country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her 
former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or 
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other events seriously 
disturbing [or disrupting] public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge 
[elsewhere] in another place outside his or her country of origin or nationality; or 
(c) is a spouse or dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b)” (2008). 
 
Refugees formerly were given Section 41 or 28 Permits, whereas under the Refugees Act of 2000 (and 
Amendment in 2008), they too have Section 22 Permits (Harris, 2001). 
Community/Network: Although Castells’ social network theory is considered the seminal work in this 
area (Castells, 1996), a great deal has been done since to expand upon network theory and identify 
certain aspects that are specific to migrant networks.  Some may define it as connections beyond that of 
familial or kinship ties (Gottdiener, 2006) that are not necessarily spatially bound (community without 
locality) (Wellman, 1988).  They can be created purposefully and formally, as with the Association 
studied here, or entirely “unpurposeful and unplanned” (Olsen, 1968) but most are formed for at least 
one of five reasons: 1) expectations and obligations; 2) personal satisfaction; 3) common interests and 
goals; 4) force; or 5) mutual interdependence (Ibid).  The Somalis in this study and in the 2004 UNHCR 
study refer to the “Somali community” to mean in a general and broad sense most Somalis living in 
South Africa or in a specific city or area; I will utilize their meaning in the inclusive sense, while 
recognising it is a problematic term. 
Liveability: The term has variously been used in regard to economic and marketplace indicators for 
socioeconomic comparisons amongst cities (Savich et al, 2002) or as a two-sided coin with livelihood 
and environmental sustainability on either side of the coin (Evans, 2002).  Most of the World Bank 
materials concerning liveability centre on environmental sustainability, the brown agenda, and the 
provision of infrastructure and services such as water and sanitation (Bigio & Dahiya, 2004).  These 
definitions neglect key components of the liveability of a city.  To preserve life, one must have the basics 
of clean water, food and shelter.  Access to healthcare facilities and education as well as the protection 
of person (and in the case of refugees or asylum seekers, protection against refoulment) must be 
guaranteed to maintain a minimum standard for quality of life.  While a clean urban environment and 
pleasant green spaces are desirable and important, without the fundamentals required for life, a city 












line with Vuchic’s work and Meyer’s work on “quality of life” (Vuchic, 1999; Meyrs, 1987).  The 
components chosen for the purpose of this dissertation are safety, economic opportunities, housing and 
health.  Essentially, these four components translate into the some of the most fundamental needs and 
human rights of all people.   
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW & REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The lofty goals and vision for an all-inclusive, rights-respecting South African nation remain unfulfilled 
when it comes to their most vulnerable inhabitants – asylum seekers and refugees.  This section covers 
the development and changes in South African immigration and refugee legislation with an assertion of 
a human rights perspective.  Tracing the creation of legal rights for immigrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa and contrasting this with notions of human rights as guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights of the country’s Constitution and international human rights regimes, this section highlights the 
abuse of rights of refugees and asylum seekers in both positive and human rights.  It also serves to raise 
serious questions both about the dynamics of this legislative and policy history and the legacy it created 
as well as the possible limitations of a national-level human rights perspective.   
FRAMING THE ISSUE – THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S IMMIGRATION REGIME  
A rough understanding of the history of South Africa’s immigration legislation is relevant to the current 
study.  By detailing the historical development and framing the legal rights and entitlements of forced 
migrants, we have a better contextual grasp of the issues presented in this dissertation, particularly as 
structural causes of xenophobia are addressed in later sections.  In the words of Harris, “the law itself 
can be read as an institutional site of xenophobia… an overview of South African immigration legislation 
highlights xenophobic discrimination at work across time” (2001; 19), therefore understanding its 
development is essential.  Other studies such as Peberdy and Crush (1997), Peberdy (2010) Harris 
(2001), Crush (1996 & 1999), de la Hunt, L.A. (1998), and de la Hunt, V.L.A (1998) among others give 
detailed historical accounts and analysis of each relevant piece of legislation.   
For this dissertation, we will acknowledge that from at least 1910 -1991 every piece of immigration 
legislation was racially discriminatory and each one was in support of what Crush and McDonald call 
the four pillars of South Africa’s 20th century immigration policy: “racist policy and legislation; the 
exploitation of migrant labour from neighbouring countries; tough enforcement legislation; and the 
repudiation of international refugee conventions” (Crush & McDonald, 2001: 2).  Table 1.1 provides a 
timeline of immigration legislation through 1991.  Not one of these pieces of legislation dealt directly 
with refugees, although several of these laws were crafted in response to shifts in international 
migration trends.  These policies helped to construct the present immigration regime in South Africa 












Table 1.1 Legislation pre-199213 
Year Legislation 
1913 Immigrants Regulation Act 
Land Act 
1930 Immigration Quota Act 
1937 Aliens Act 
1939 Aliens Registration Act 
1949 Aliens Registration Amendment Act 
1952 Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act 
1962 Commonwealth Relations Act 
1963 Aliens Control Act 
1964 Republic Regulations Act 
1967 Border Control Act 
1972 Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 
1978 Aliens Amendment Act 
1984 Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act 
1991 Aliens Control Act 
 
Immigration and the Transition to Democracy 
The political negotiations that took place in the closing decade of the 20th century, which led to the 
dissolution of the apartheid state and eventually to the new Constitution, and historic elections of 1994, 
were extensive and it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully describe and explain them.  In 1993, an 
Interim Constitution was drafted and agreed to by the National Party and the liberation movements of 
the ANC and others.  In effect, this Constitution was a kind of peace treaty, which laid out the process of 
transition to fully-fledged democracy that would take place.  The new Constitution that followed was 
characterized by a) an inclusive and non-discriminatory conception of equal citizenship – an explicit 
and deliberate outcome of the political negotiations, and b) a recognition of equal human rights of 
citizens and non-citizens alike.   
Unlike most Constitutions or Bills of Rights throughout the world, South Africa’s foundation documents 
protect the rights of all people in the country, citizens or not.  With the exception of political rights (i.e. 
the right to join a political party and vote); citizenship; and freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession, everyone in South Africa obtains the rights laid out within the Bill of Rights.  Thus, the Bill of 
Rights contains both negative and positive rights to which every person within its borders is entitled, 
regardless of their nationality, gender, race or any other distinction.14  Due to the emphasis that the 
                                                             
13 Smith, T. R. “The Making of the South African (1998) Refugees Act,” 2003.  Forced Migration Working Paper Series #5. University 
of Witwatersrand. P. 35 
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 According to the Constitution, Chapter 2, Clause 9 (3): “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 













constitutional drafters placed on rights and also as consequence of rights being denied to the majority 
of citizens for so many years, and because the struggle for democracy/liberation was a struggle for 
rights as much as for power (Seekings, 2000), “one of the dominant features of post-apartheid social 
movements is the extensive use of the language of rights to articulate needs, make social demands and 
secure legally enforceable commitments from the government.  Rights have become a way of defining 
fairness and social justice” (Amisi & Ballard, 2005: 1).   
South Africa today remains a fissured society, marked by racial and economic schisms.  As this 
dissertation demonstrates for only one small population, there remains a disturbing undercurrent 
within South Africa that either lacks respect for human rights or the democratization process has yet to 
fully penetrate society and confer the deeper meanings of these rights. In particular, the way in which 
South Africans, young and old, white, coloured and black, rich and poor have come together in hatred 
and resentment of foreigners – united against the ‘other’ – is but one example of this lack of full 
understanding of the implications of the post-transition rights-based nation (Crush & Pendelton, 2004).  
While refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa have legal rights, respect for their ‘universal’ human 
rights continues to founder – from government and civilians alike (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 
2005).  South Africans generally do not recognize non-citizen rights (Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh & 
Singh, 2005; Crush, MPS#22).  Although some may see the xenophobia as a new phenomenon (Harris, 
2001) and other as a continuation of apartheid racially based discrimination (IOM, 2009) or as a 
function of identity construction (Neocosmos, 2009), it is fairly clear that xenophobia intensified after 
the elections of 1994 and it "runs parallel to the country's process of transition from apartheid to 
democracy" (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 55).  Rights of citizens in any nation also function in some ways to 
purposefully exclude non-citizens, however in South Africa it was the transition and its rhetorical 
emphasis on nationalism and indigeneity where the seeds of xenophobia in its current violent form 
were sown (Neocosmos, 2009; xi).   
In the past twelve years since the Constitution came into effect, the Constitutional Court has upheld 
these rights and their application to non-citizens in multiple cases.  This often does not flow down to the 
lowest levels of society, however, as legal or human rights on paper do not necessarily equate with the 
daily exercise of those rights.  Particularly in terms of immigration legislation – more specifically those 
acts that protect refugees and asylum seekers – the new human rights approach had little to no 
historical precedent and were more or less parachuted in; this may account for the subsequent limited 
impact that these rights have on daily practice.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”  Notice that 












During the process of negotiating a new system of non-racial and democratic government in South 
Africa, the legacy and framework of exclusionary immigration regime remained in place.  As the country 
was in the process of developing a new, inclusive, human rights respecting Constitution, it became party 
to many international conventions for human rights and refugees.15 16  For many years, the principles of 
international law were not absorbed into the policies and practice of the immigration regime of the new 
South Africa.   
Post-Apartheid Immigration Legislation 
As the previously described developments took place, and particularly after the new Constitution was 
implemented in February 1997 the Aliens Control Act – even as amended in 1995 – was no longer 
constitutional or a sufficient mechanism for controlling the new migration patterns (Crush, 1996; 
Crush, 1999).  A new piece of refugee-specific legislation had to be adopted in order to provide refugees 
and asylum seekers with the three main rights they should be guaranteed:  
 right to asylum (right to seek asylum),  
 non-refoulment (freedom from this fear; this bars physical eviction, rejection without grounds 
and non-admission),  
 freedom of movement, right to work and repatriation (de la Hunt, 1998).   
Table 1.3 provides a timeline of relevant legislation and policy developments from the adoption of the 
South African Interim Constitution in 1993 to the Refugee Amendment Act of 2008. 
Table 1.3 Relevant Legislation and policy developments post-199217 
Year Legislation  
1993 Interim Constitution, Tripartite Agreement, Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Illegal Aliens established 
1994 South Africa signs OAU Convention, first (unofficial) Refugees Act drafted 
1995 Aliens Control Amendment Act 
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 Specifically: the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa (OAU Convention), the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
16
 As stated previously, South Africa is not party to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights as it was one of the 
eight abstaining member states when it was adopted in 1948.  The Declaration is believed to be the foundation of many 
customary international laws (although it is not law itself) and South Africa’s Constitution does provide for the 
adherence to many of the articles, particularly those considered customary laws and those which conform with its own 
Bill of Rights, as per Chapter 2, Article 38 of the Constitution: “The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill.”  In addition, Chapter 14, Article 232 addresses the issue of customary law’s 
applicability to the Constitution and Republic of South Africa as a whole is dealt with directly: “Customary international 
law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 
17
 Smith, T. R. “The Making of the South African (1998) Refugees Act,” 2003.  Forced Migration Working Paper Series #5. 
University of Witwatersrand. P. 35 & Crush, J.S. and McDonald D.A. (2001). “Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating 












1996 South Africa adopts new Constitution (not implemented until Feb 1997), South 
Africa signs 1951 UN Convention & 1967 UN Protocol on Refugees, DHA publishes 
2nd draft Refugees Act, Green Paper Team established 
1997 Green Paper published 
1998 White Paper Task Team established, White Paper published, Refugees Act debated & 
signed into law by President Mandela 
2002 Immigration Act 
2008 Refugees Amendment Act 
 
The 2002 Immigration Act devolves responsibility for policing immigration to the local and community 
level (Nyamnjoh, 2006) where South Africans are supposed to enforce the law, “even considering it 
their patriotic duty to take action against ‘illegal aliens’” (Harris, 2001).  This could be seen as 
government-sponsored xenophobia, or at the very least it amounts to a “tacit endorsement of mob 
justice” (CoRMSA, 2008; 29) by encouraging the community to root out and expel anyone they deem to 
be an illegal alien/criminal.  Between the passage of the Refugees Act in 1998 and its Amendment in 
2008, South Africa also passed a slightly more progressive Immigration Act in 2002 (which was 
amended in 2004); refugees were finally provided for specifically.  These Acts represent an overall shift 
from obstructing immigration to the regulation thereof.   
URBAN REFUGEES & INTEGRATION18  
South Africa chose to sidestep “some of the hallmarks of African asylum policies (e.g. camps, group 
determination, delegation of responsibility to UNHCR) relatively early on, opting to administer its own 
self-settlement model of protection accompanied by individual status determination procedures” 
(Vigneswaran, 2008: 42).  In doing so, South Africa accepts the burdens involved with integrating 
refugees and asylum seekers into its cities.  Most western democracies – and in this case, South Africa 
finds itself in this category – allow r fugees or asylum seekers freedom of movement within their 
countries and legally allow migrants to live in urban centres (Gibney, 1999; OECD, 2006; Vigneswaran, 
2007b).  Refugees and asylum seekers tend to flock to urban areas to gain access to various services and 
most of the attributes of urban concentration (health, education, humanitarian assistance, skills 
training, jobs, anonymity etc.) (Buscher, 2003; Grabska, 2006; Ray, 2003).  As South Africa’s Refugee 
Reception Offices (RRO) are exclusively found in cities, asylum seekers and refugees have little other 
choice but to remain in urban areas as their flimsy and short-term permits require continual visits to 
the RROs. 
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 Migration, particularly amongst irregular movers, refugees, asylum seekers, and those entering illegally or for 
economic reasons are notoriously difficult to measure (Allen, 2008; Bruff, 2007; Price & Benton-Short, 2007; 
Vingwarasan, 2007; Landau, year unknown; Buscher, 2003; Crisp, 1999; Crush & Williams, 2001; among others).  As 












While it is impossible to provide a complete profile of urban refugees and asylum seekers throughout 
the world, the following quote from Dryden-Peterson provides a good overview of their plight: 
“Refugees who live in urban environments are… some of the world’s most vulnerable citizens. Urban 
refugees are predominantly self-settled, living outside formal assistance structures, and often unable 
to access their rights of protection through either the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) or through host governments.  Their living conditions are overcrowded and squalid; and 
while they are not poorer or better off than the citizens in whose midst they live, they persist without 
legal status, without support networks and often as victims of xenophobia”(2006). 
Urban refugees are not a homogeneous population and the profile of a ‘typical’ urban refugee varies 
from country to country or even city to city (Ibid).   
RIGHTS & ENTITLEMENTS 
As McKnight states, there is an “extensive gap between refugee law in theory and the law as 
implemented in practice in South Africa [which] unfortunately results in many refugees not 
experiencing the rights and protections guaranteed to them” (McKnight, 2008).  The problems of 
refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa are not exclusively about the legal rights guaranteed by 
these pieces of legislation or the human rights ascribed to them by the Bill of Rights.  Human rights 
advocates, lawyers and policy makers could debate endlessly to create perfect legal protections, but 
unless the agents of government and civil society enforce and practice these regulations and the citizens 
are willing to respect them, the aspirations articulated in the Constitution will not be realized.  The 
legislation is clearly flawed, government practice is inconsistent, but the rights and entitlements are 
there. This section explores the gap between policy/law and implementation/practice.  No matter how 
clearly articulated their rights may be in law, migrants continually have difficulty or encounter the 
impossibility of translating these to everyday experiences. 
Fundamentally, through its signatory and ratification of various international agreements, through the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, South Africa is committed to upholding and protecting both legal and 
basic human rights of all who may find themselves in the country.  This runs in direct opposition to the 
“primacy of civil and political rights” (Kirkup & Donnely, 2009; 225) which exist in most of the rest of 
the world, Western democracies especially.  Whereas there are little to no consequences in terms of 
international approval or law for South Africa if it continues to fail refugees and asylum seekers 
(Jacobsen, 2002; 592), the country’s Constitution actually enshrines positive human, economic and 
social rights, meaning that they join the ranks of political and civil rights as inalienable instead of simply 
entitlements or aspirations (Kirkup & Donnely, 2009; 225).  There is a tremendous gap between the 
legal obligations and protections afforded by the State and the actual experiences of refugees and 
asylum seekers (McKnight, 2008).  Throughout the history of South Africa, exclusion has been a primary 












of rights employed by foundational documents has yet to be fully translated into legal entitlements and 
effective protection, resulting in a failure to “meet its domestic and international obligations” (Landau, 
2006).  This begs the question, what good are these rights if it is impossible to claim them?   
In one piece of legislation after another, through the unchecked behaviour of civil society and barbarous 
behaviour by citizens, South Africa continues to trample the human rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers (CoRMSA, 2008; Handmaker, de la Hunt & Klaaren, 2001; Khaito, 2007; Landau, 2006b; SAHRC, 
2000).  It has not always been the case that South Africa was committed to the respect of rights of 
migrants, but now it bears these commitments.  The State is obliged to follow through with a 
regularized and effective protection regime – even when it means enforcing these by arresting its own 
citizens and holding them to account for infringing the human dignity of foreigners.   
URBAN CITIZENSHIP & LIVEABILITY  
Evans, in his seminal work on the liveability of urban centres in the global South, argues, “Communities 
consistently appear as the motivating force in struggles for liveability.  They take on problems and 
powerful adversaries with remarkable tenacity” (Evans, 2002).  He later tries to uncover what gives a 
community this kind of power to be agents of change within their urban areas.  One of his many 
answers is that “shared longevity of residence and common cultural ties are associated with the ability 
to work collectively” (Ibid).  Although these attributes may prove to be powerful forces for change in 
many cities – including South Africa’s cities – it is the curse of South Africa’s migrants that they lack the 
common ties and political capital to stand up for change and advocate for the realization of their rights.  
As Khaito points out in her study of migrants in Johannesburg, “psychologically they have no 
investment in the city and do not see themselves as part and parcel of it… immigrants are likely to live 
in enclaves which are outside the reach of the state with little sense of responsibility towards their host 
society“(Khaito, 2007).  While the state, citizenry and civil society continue to push migrants to the 
outer physical and social edges of society, migrants retreat further and contribute less for the overall 
benefit of the city – investing little, paying no taxes and being forced to live outside the law – making the 
city less liveable for all of its inhabitants.  As will become apparent with those interviewed for this 
study, without social membership within the fabric of the city of Cape Town or their local communities, 
migrants are rarely able to translate their constitutional rights into practical claims or entitlements; 
they live half-lives at best, always waiting for some kind of disaster and their existence is in a constant 
state of insecurity (Nyamnjoh, 2006, 13).  
 
Whether the policies and practices of city governments simply cannot or choose not to see the 
foreigners who live in their midst, the result is the same for the refugees, asylum seekers and other 
migrants: they exist as phantoms (HRW, 2002; Khaito, 2007; Vigneswaran, 2007a ;).  This quality of 












refugees and asylum seekers a ghost-like quality in the cities of South Africa.  They are there and yet are 
somehow invisible.  They have rights but very little recourse to demand them.  The civil institutions that 
are set up to protect them seem hell-bent on stripping them of what remains of their dignity (Landau, 
Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 2004; HRC, 2000; Landau, 2004, Landau, 2006b; Khaito, 2007; Harris, 2001).  
The city becomes barely liveable by any definition or scale of measurement.  Cities develop their plans 
and write long-term visions but ignore the migrants who exist within those cities.  With the will to work 
and drive to make their lives better, they are forced to the very edges of the informal economy no 
matter their skills or capacity (Bailey, 2004).  They “draw on a variegated language of belonging that 
makes claims to the city while positioning them in and ephemeral, superior, and unrooted condition” 
(Landau & Haupt, 2007).   This will become highly apparent as the Somali experiences with Cape Town 
are explored in Chapter 3.   
 
Even more perplexing, however, is their invisibility in the city despite their tendency for ‘clustering’ 
which many migrants favour.  Asylum seekers and refugees, in particular, are forced into South Africa’s 
cities due to the perpetual quest for documentation that sends them back to the RROs on a regular 
basis.  Clustering usually happens to ease the transition from their former country, “due to safety 
concerns, shared language, culture and economic status” (Harris, 2001).  If it is easy for anyone to walk 
around these neighbourhoods and see the diversity, how can they remain invisible to city-level policy 
makers? 
 
Western Cape hosts a relatively low percentage of foreign-born residents in comparison to the rest of 
the country (Marindo, 2007)19.  Somalis see Cape Town as the best city in South Africa because life here 
is relatively cheap due to their network ties, there are business opportunities, the potential to get 
documentation is perceived to be higher than in Port Elizabeth and the existence of many of their 
compatriots is an additional pull factor.20  Since South Africa’s refugee policy pushes migrants into cities 
and yet provides no formal assistance for them, they must seek their own means for supporting their 
livelihood, making employment itself “a crucial element of basic dignity and welfare” (CoRMSA, 2008; 
52).  Without legal documentation they are unable to legally access the formal labour market, leaving 
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 ‘Residents’ in the largest sense of the term, in only that they reside, dwell or live here, not that they possess legal 
residency.  As of the 2001 census, there are approximately 108,906 foreign-born persons in the Western Cape with 
1,025,077 foreign-born people in South Africa overall but this does not necessarily include all “illegal” immigrants or 
other groups which are notoriously difficult to count (Marindo et al, 2007).  According to the authors of The State of the 
Population in the Western Cape Province, “the composition, structure and characteristics of legal and illegal immigrants 
(excluding involuntary migration due to war or natural disasters) usually mirror those of foreign-born and non-citizen 
populations” (Ibid: 152).  Thus, we go back to the near impossibility of providing accurate statistics on all foreign-born 
persons in the country taking into account asylum seekers and other migrants. 
20
 Based on interviews with Somali participants in this study as well as the 2004 UNHCR study in which I served as lead 












them to the informal sector, usually as hawkers, grocery merchants or other informal traders (Landau, 
2004; Landau 2005a; CoRMSA, 2008; Harris, 2001; SFM, 2006; Bailey, 2004). 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND NETWORKS  
Traditionally, migration research focused on the push and pull factors of an individual’s decisions and 
motivations to move from their home to a new place, whether as rural-to-urban migrants within their 
own country or those moving from one nation state to another.  The field was dominated by 
assumptions of rational choice theory – individuals make choices after assessing the information and 
seeking to maximize their gain or minimize loss (Esser, 1985; Richey, 1976; Massey, 2001; Mazzucato, 
2006; Bruff, 2007; Pries, 1999).  Other classical migration theories focused on one of the following four 
approaches: 
- Behavioural or interpretive approach/bounded rationality; 
- Theory of structural and anomic tensions; 
- Social scientific labour market research; 
- Politico-economically oriented world system theory (Pries, 1999; Kunz, 1981). 
All of these saw individuals taking in information and making a rational, one-way decision and the 
realist focus on states and power played a central role.  However, as van Liempt and many others 
explain, migrants rarely make decisions in isolation from their family, community or other identity 
group and the livelihood of all concerned is part of the decision making process (2010; Pries, 1999; 
Horst, 2006; Portes, 1999; Akcapar, 2009; Al-Ali, 2001; Bauer et al, 2002; Boyd, 1989).  Those with 
input into these decisions are not necessarily all residing in the country of origin either.  Decisions 
incorporate the “role of complex networks of family members and friends in the home country as well 
as abroad in affecting potential migrants’ decisions to migrate; the role of both formal and informal 
networks in providing assistance with finding housing and employment; facilitating adjustment to new 
surroundings (Koser and Pinkerton, 2002); and spearheading ethnic community development in the 
destination country (Castles and Miller, 2003)" (Akcapar, 2009; 162).  Now, those concerned with 
migration in academia speak often about these decisions in terms of ‘social networks’ and ‘social 
capital’ (Portes, 1995).  Social capital is defined as the "the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that 
accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
119).   
Network theory and social network theory in the area of migration studies emphasises the importance 
of the above mentioned familial, kin, and friendship ties (Ritchey, 1976; MacDonald & MacDonald, 1964; 
Tilly and Brown, 1967; Parks, 2006; Crisp, 2004; Parker et al, 2003; Gelderblom & Adams, 2006) in 
facilitating cross-border migration.  Currently, these theories focus almost entirely on the role that 












(e.g. Koser, 1997; Boyd, 1989; Pries, 1999; Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992; Bauer et al, 2002; Gurak and Cases, 
1992; Castels & Miller, 2003; Klvanova, 2009; Tilly, 1990; Hamer & Mazzucato, 2009; Koser & 
Pinkerton, 2002; Crisp, 1999; Guarniso, Portes & Haller, 2003).  Gelderblom and Adams tell us that 
migrant networks are formed for three reasons – to facilitate, discourage or channel migration (in Kok 
et al, 2006) but this only accounts for networks at the initial decision phase of migration and does not 
take into account networks established in the host country for other purposes. 
Building upon the concept of social networks is the idea of transnationalism and transnational 
networks, which grew in popularity around the same time as the study of globalization (Horst, 2006; 
Hedetoft, 2002).   These are not new concepts, but they are the au currant topics in migration studies.  
Various scholars are attempting to stake their claim in order to identify the most relevant aspects of this 
concept.  Many scholars are busy splitting hairs to prove that transnational network theory is 
underdeveloped in transit countries21 (Akcapar, 2009); that transnationalism only holds true in the 
initial integration stage just following arrival in the destination country (Hamer & Mazzucato, 2009; 
Faist, 2004); that some nationalities exhibit stronger transnational networks than others (Boyle & Ali, 
2009); that time is an important determining factor in the strength of transnational ties (Glenn, 1998); 
or that cultural transformation is the most striking effect of these networks (Hirsch, 1999).  This study 
will go into detail regarding a particular network of Somali in Cape Town and examine how these 
various views of transnational networks fit with the Somali Retailers’ Association.  In a wider study 
conducted on secondary movement amongst Somalis in South Africa in 2004, it is clear that Somalis are 
highly networked migrants with global reach (SFM, 2006). 
Underlying all of these theories is a basic understanding that when migrants arrive in a new place, they 
bring with them ties to their country of origin, with those they met along their journey, friends and 
family in other countries (Hamer & Mazzucato, 2009); they “rely on mutual-aid links and sustain strong 
ethnic [or national] networks across borders while establishing social and economic ties with the local 
community” (Balbo & Marconi, 2005: 5) in the country they find themselves in.  This dual existence – 
                                                             
21 However, one note about transit countries is important here.  By definition, it would seem that most Somalis are in 
transit in South Africa because they desire to move elsewhere and do not see South Africa as their final destination.  
Somewhat paradoxically, they seek to obtain documents that allow them to live here, travel freely and be legally 
eligible for employment.  They have an interest in being legally declared ‘refugees’ to obtain the rights and entitlements 
that this label comes with, even if Zetter’s contention that this kind of label actually turns human beings into ‘policy 
objects’ “defining a client group in stereotypical, clear-cut ways and then prescribing its assumed set of needs” (in 
Horst, 2006).  However, by the generally accepted definition of migrants in transit (‘transit migrants are defined as 
aliens who stay in the country for some period while seeking to migrate permanently to another country’’ 
(International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2003: 7)) we can assume most Somalis in South Africa are indeed in 
transit.  Although Akcapar's case of Iranian migrants in Turkey may lead us to believe that migrant social network and 













simultaneously to another place with ties around the world while establishing connections in their 
present home – is what we refer to as being a ‘transnational migrant’ (Ibid; also see Hedoft, 2002). 
Transnationalism as a theory violates former definitions of what it means to be part of a community.  
Olsen (1968) contended that a community is not self-sufficient, although it can be self-contained, that it 
always occupies a definite geographic area with strict spatial patterns (Olsen, 1968: 91).  Somali 
migrants’ community and network ties span the globe.  They are connected through a vast web of 
remittances, telephone and electronic correspondence, mutual aid and a mind bogglingly swift 
information network upon which they depend for news of refugee reception policy, news from Somalia 
and rumours regarding their safety.  While the structure of a community may be primarily based on the 
networks which make it up, but due to their ever-changing nature, networks are not necessarily 
sufficient to establish a true community (Dorals, 1991).   
A more critical and nuanced appreciation of social networks and to the theory of social capital is 
necessary if we are to uncover their potential to provide assistance and critical services to their 
members – “mobilization of social capital” – to determine their usefulness as conflict management 
entities and uncover any negative effects they have in terms of integration or community relations 
(Ackapar, 2009: 171).   
As Horst (2006) and van Liempt (2010) assert, Somalis are the quintessential transnational migrants 
and perhaps due to their nomadic existence back in Somalia, they quite possibly always have been: 
“Somalis have lost their homeland and the security of living in a place they can call their own.  As a 
‘nomadic people’, mobility, including mobility that crosses borders, is and has always been an 
essential part of their livelihoods and identities.  The Somali are a particularly interesting 
transnational community because of the challenges they pose to existing concepts of the nation-
state and categories of migration… Somalis can be found in every country in the world, but they 
largely operate past or above nations” (Horst, 2006). 
Thus, by taking a look at the networks of Somali in South Africa, specifically Cape Town which is the 
second-most popular destination for Somali (behind Port Elizabeth), we are not necessarily looking at 
transnationalism as it facilitates migration, but rather at how these networks can be a form of mutual 
support in the destination city or country.  The Somali community in South Africa is considered by 
those outside the community (scholars, civil society organizations, NGOs) to be a highly organized, 
cohesive and isolated refugee community (SFM, 2006; Horst, 2006; Jones, Ram & Theodorakopoulos, 
2009); it is also seen by scholars as highly networked as individuals may have connections with Somalis 
in their area, but also in other South African cities and abroad (Horst, 2006; Harris, 2004; SFM, 2006; 
Boyle & Alk, 2009).  They are isolated in the sense that they live with and communicate almost 
exclusively with other Somali – whether this is due to cultural, language, or other barriers is something 












choosing to remain separate.22  This tendency to congregate in certain areas – in Cape Town it is easiest 
to observe the interactions of large groups of Somali in Bellville and Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre – can 
bring with it safety in numbers, but also fuels the perception that they are ‘flooding’ the country thereby 
leaving themselves vulnerable to acts of xenophobic violence.  Observing the activity of groups of 
Somali congregating in different areas of the city to observe the network was part of this research, but 
the transnational nature of their connections was only explored in conversation with willing 
participants. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This is a qualitative research project and interviews were conducted with eight members of the Somali 
Retailers’ Association in their places of residence or businesses.  To increase the value of the responses 
and obtain information for comparison with Somalis outside of this Association, nine interviews were 
conducted with non-SRA members operating businesses in other locations around Cape Town.  In-
depth interviews with members of the SRA and other Somalis living in Cape Town’s informal 
settlements and townships were conducted only after the relevant secondary research was completed 
in July 2010; interviews took place from August – October 2010.  The interview schedule consists of 
mainly open-ended questions broken down into eight sections: personal details, family, history, the 
Association and experiences with xenophobia, general safety, housing, health and other liveability 
issues.  Participants were encouraged to tell stories in detail, thus the semi-structured interviews 
resembled each other, but no two were the same.  Interviews were conducted in the homes, businesses, 
temporary residences of the participants as well as in the parking lot of Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre.  
This study does not represent the experiences of all Somalis in Cape Town, let alone in South Africa.  
Nor was this study designed to be generalizable to whole populations of forced migrants in South 
Africa, but as an in-depth investigation of the experiences of one semi-formal network.  Given the lack of 
information about this particular network in Cape Town, this study is primarily descriptive -- positive 
and negative attributes are on display.  Full details of the Research Design and Methodology, including 
limitations and problems encountered, can be found in Appendix 2. 
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 However, as Sichone points out, identifying a person from Somalia as simply ‘Somali’ is an oversimplification and 
many divisions – political, ethnic and cultural – exist.  As he states, “Somali, and other African migrants in Cape Town, 
do not exist as individuals but always as holders of various group identities. Any one person has obligations to several 
other people and loyalties divided between Greater Somalia, different states within the dismembered Greater Somalia, 
states outside Greater Somalia that they find themselves living in, as well as clans and sub-clans. Full citizenship is thus 
an ideal never achieved whether they are in their homeland or in a foreign country. This is not peculiar to the Somali as 
most Africans have strong loyalties to moral and political communities other than the nation-state. Although Somali are 
entitled to and obtain the support of the corporate clan network this is not always available and they thus have to 
develop relationships outside of their clans, learn new languages and adopt a cosmopolitan identity to supplement 












‘CAUSES’ OF XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
Xenophobia is “a deep antipathy to foreigners” (Oxford, 2009) or “hatred or fear of foreigners or 
strangers” (Collins, 2003).  Xenophobia can be latent or overt; it can be expressed with words or deeds.  
Some contend that it is all of the above – “a discourse concerned with a process of social and political 
exclusion of some groups of the population…. Xenophobia is about the denial of social rights and 
entitlements to strangers, people considered to be strangers to the community (village, ethnic group, as 
well as nation) not just to ‘foreigners’ as conceived by the law” (Neocosmos, 2010; 13-14).  In keeping 
with Neocosmos, Landau and other prominent scholars in this area this study takes a global view of the 
phenomenon and considers all discriminatory attitudes, physical actions or verbal abuse directed at 
foreign nationals (Landau et al, 2005). 
Seen through the lens of social identity theory, one could argue that xenophobia is only natural. These 
theories argue that "ethnocentrism, or in-group bias, is a natural outgrowth of a person's identity 
formation and under certain conditions, feelings of hostility toward out-groups and a consequent 
discriminatory behaviour favouring the in-group at the expense of the out-group" (Isajiw, 2000, 109 
citing Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taylor & Moriarty, 1987).  Defining oneself as different or 
separate from the ‘other’ is a natural developmental or social phenomenon, but the violent expression 
of that fear is neither natural nor acceptable.    
The fact that xenophobia exists in South Africa is undeniable.  In general, South Africans dislike, fear or 
reject foreigners.  In the widely circulated and oft-quoted South African Migration Project (SAMP) 
survey,  South Africans have little understanding of the rights that refugees, asylum seekers and other 
migrants are entitled to, even going so far as to hold the opinion that refugees should actually be denied 
basic ‘universal’ human rights.  Nearly 70% of South African respondents “feel that refugees in the 
country should never have the rights of freedom of speech and movement, with only 3% feeling that 
these are automatic entitlements” (Crush et al, 200123).  These feelings directly contradict the fact that 
these rights are constitutionally guaranteed to everyone in South Africa.  According to these surveys, 
not only do South Africans generally dislike foreigners, but also they actively want to deny their rights 
as human beings.  Perhaps it is not quite that cut-and-dry though.  As the Jooste, Muyeba, Coqui & 
Russell study revealed more nuanced opinions of foreigners living in their midst; of the 41 respondents 
in Delft South, Deft North, Delft Leiden and Thambo Square about one quarter had a generally positive 
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 This negative attitude toward non-South Africans is pervasive and not limited to refugees.  For instance, Crush states 
that, “The South African Constitution guarantees basic rights and freedoms to everyone living within the boundaries of 
the nation-state. Many South Africans are clearly in disagreement. Around 40% are opposed to Africans from elsewhere 
enjoying the same access to health and educational services as South Africans. Rather more (54%) oppose giving the 
same right of access to housing. On the positive side, the survey found that 47% of respondents feel that Africans from 
other countries should still be allowed to vote in elections. Whites are significantly more negative than black South 












view of foreigners, and another quarter had a negative view, slightly more had a neutral view or said 
they had no problem with them (3 respondents were not asked about them at all) (2010).  Of the 23 
respondents who were asked directly whether foreign nationals have a right to live in these 
neighbourhoods, 11 said they definitely had the right to stay, 10 responded that they did not and two 
expressed no opinion either way (Jooste, Muyeba, Coqui & Russell, 2010). 
The language of xenophobia denies foreigners their unique identities, lumping African foreigners24 into 
the same category: they are all called ‘Makwerekwere’ or ‘quirigamba’.  These terms indicate the 
indecipherability of the languages spoken by foreign nationals; they are not innocent or benign 
monikers.  Bullion points out that these terms are frighteningly similar to those of the Boers who, in 
former times, called South Africans ‘hottentots’, which roughly translates to 'stutterers'.  By calling 
foreigners ‘Makwerekwere’ or ‘quirigamba’, they “deny African migrants an intelligible language.  All 
they claim to hear is 'gibberish' – a 'barbaric' form of 'stuttering' – hence the tendency to classify them 
as Makwerekwere, among other onomatopoeic references to the strange way they speak" (Boullion, 
2001b; 113-122, as referenced in Nyamnjoh, 2006; 39).  As Mngxitama and others have pointed out, 
there are no white Makwerekwere25 (Hassim, Kupe & Worby; 2008); Asians or Latin American are less 
likely to be labelled as such either although they are also subjects of xenophobia (Landau, 2009; 
Landau, 2010c).  When looked at from a different perspective, we see that apartheid social stratification 
is still in effect with rich whites and wealthy blacks on top, black foreigners in the absolute lowest 
depths denied even of their humanity, reduced to caricature (Nyamnjoh, 2006).   
The existence of xenophobia in South Africa, although problematic, is certainly not unique.  South 
Africa's current obsession with the 'other' and expelling or denying rights to those it sees as illegitimate 
is not even an anomaly in the world at present as many nations are grappling with anti-foreign 
sentiments.  That xenophobia and hatred exist in South Africa (indeed in all societies) is not a crime as 
all people in the free world are guaranteed the right to hold their own beliefs.   That xenophobia turned 
violent and has a human cost, which continues to threaten the lives, livelihoods and rights of people 
living in South Africa (including South African citizens) is the frightening, unacceptable and criminal 
part.  Appendix 3 explores both the enabling conditions/roots of xenophobia and its impact on the lives 
of those interviewed for this study.26   
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 As some South Africans have been caught up in the violence, it is important to note that this is a subjective definition 
based often on language and colour (Harris, 2001; Neocosmos, 2008; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Peberdy, 2010).  See Appendix 2 
for more details on the topic of race, language and other attributes of the bio-cultural explanation of xenophobia. 
25
 This is not to say that negative attitudes toward white foreigners do not exist, but that they are not called 
Makwerekwere and are not the target of xenophobic attacks. 
26
 For a detailed account of the triggers to violence on a country-wide scale, refer to the IOM study, the primary findings 
of which take xenophobia, violence and economic problems as a given but point to “the micro-politics of township life 












Different theories exist as to why South Africa is so xenophobic; volumes have been written on the 
subject and this study does not offer any new theories.  In her extensive literature review and in-depth 
research on the experience of foreigners with violence in South Africa, Harris points to the three 
predominate explanations for xenophobia here: “’the scapegoating hypothesis’, ‘the isolation 
hypothesis’ and ‘the bio-cultural hypothesis’” (Harris, 2001) which roughly translate into socio-
economic issues, the historical development of identity and racism.  Several other scholars put forth 
additional hypotheses, which include the culture of violence (Simpson, Mokwena & Segal, 1992; 
Hamber, 1998; Hamber & Lewis, 1997 all quoted in Harris, 2001), and the role of the government or 
media (Danso & McDonald, 2001; Vingneswaran, 2007b).   
Black foreigners are seen as scapegoats for many of the country’s social problems and crime, thus they 
are blamed and targeted intensely by South African citizens and the State in an attempt to rid the 
country of these ills.  Reviewing several other scholars’ work in this area, Harris explains that the 
isolation hypothesis points directly to the country’s separation from the international community, 
particularly during the waning days of apartheid, as engendering a suspicion, fear and ultimately 
hostility toward the unknown.  Also, the isolation theorists bring in the apartheid government’s focus 
on boundaries as an underlying cause of xenophobia; “because of the creation of strict boundaries 
between South African citizens, as well as between the country and other nations, South Africans in this 
argument are unable to accommodate, and indeed, tolerate difference” (Harris, 2001).  The third 
general hypothesis puts xenophobia down to racism; it points to the unequal treatment of white versus 
black foreigners and the ease of picking out African foreigners because of their distinct visible and 
audio characteristics (Ibid).  And finally, to these three theories we add the influence of the government 
and media in shaping public opinion on this matter, as Landau reminds us that “exclusive nativist 
sentiments are not only an organic or spontaneous response to street-level tensions, but have been 
shaped by politicians and bureaucrats” (Landau, 2006c; no page numbers).  The latter theory is one of 
the weakest on its own but makes more sense as a mechanism working throughout the other three.   
There are many competing theories, most of which have merit in explaining the various causes of 
xenophobia. It is unlikely that there is only one true cause of xenophobia.  Those who possess these 
sentiments may be able to explain why they dislike or even hate foreigners so much that they will resort 
to violence.  Objects of the hatred can also shed light on the reason for xenophobia.  It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to proffer up a final answer, although based on my research; the cause of this 
phenomenon is complex and very likely contains elements of each theory when examining South Africa 












emotions, personal histories and psychosocial makeup.  As this limited study shows, a country as 
diverse and large as South Africa accommodates evidence of at least four of the theories.27   
Whatever the underlying cause of the xenophobia is in South Africa, it presents a clear threat to the 
perceived and actual physical safety of the country’s marginalized and vulnerable forced migrant 
population. Indeed, as Crush and Pendleton point out, “xenophobia undermines social cohesion, 
peaceful coexistence, good governance and human rights observance” (2004; 1) – what is bad for the 
country’s most vulnerable is bad for the whole country.  Instead of continuing the debate on causes, 
scholars could accept the multivariate causes of xenophobia and devote future research to how it can be 
neutralized or diminished.  This study was not conclusive as to whether the creation of semi-formal 
networks amongst migrants helps to foster integration, thereby diminishing xenophobia or whether 
these formations actually add fuel to the fire of xenophobia, but this is certainly an area for further 
investigation.  
SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced important terms that will be utilized throughout this dissertation and was 
meant to provide some theoretical and historical context for the explorative case study which follows.  
In doing so, it gives a broad overview of the historical developments of the burgeoning human rights 
culture with particular emphasis on the rights of immigrants and foreigners.  This discussion includes 
the development of an immigration regime that, for most of the country’s 20th century history was 
designed almost exclusively to keep out minorities or other undesireable populations.  Within a few 
years in the 1990s the shift was a dramatic one to a regime that (at least on paper) is highly inclusive 
that respects the rights and freedoms of non-citizens in South Africa with specific claims on rights being 
awarded to refugees and asylum seekers.  This chapter also introduced the important historical context 
of apartheid and how this regime effectively created foreigners of native South Africans, particularly 
blacks; this discussion was necessarily brief, but will be revisited later in the body of the dissertation.  
Some scholars point to this as one of several causes of xenophobia and the denial of rights of foreign-
born Africans today.   
Other concepts explored in the first chapter include integration and liveability – two of the dominant 
topics in scholarly and development literature for poor, urban environments today.   These allow us to 
turn our focus toward quality of life for urban inhabitants instead of simply looking at income levels as 
an indicator of opportunity.  Two other important concepts introduced here – transnationalism and 
networks – are also very current topics and forces for change.  These are also two mechanisms or 
avenues to agency that migrants use to take control of their situations or bring about favourable 
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 See Appendix 3 for more details and a more complete discussion of how these theories are borne out in the lives of 












conditions in their new homes.  As this dissertation will illustrate though extensive in-depth interviews 
with members of the SRA, the Association serves many functions to its members, many of which are 
actual substitutes for effective national and city-level governance and are indicative of the insecurity 
that pervades the migrant experience here in Cape Town.   The next few chapters will explore the ties 
that bind these men together and motivate this particular network of Somalis; along the way we gain a 
better understanding of how these ties help them manage conflict and impact their lives in Cape Town’s 













CHAPTER TWO: NETWORK & COMMUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE SOMALI 
RETAILERS’ ASSOCIATION 
HISTORY & STRUCTURE 
The Somali Retailers Association (SRA) was established in the Sweetwater Safety Camp in 2008 in 
response to the xenophobic attacks. The SRA’s founders saw that “we Somalis were scattered and 
whenever there were problems like xenophobic attacks we went to talk to government or other 
organizations without a title and that made the message difficult to convey to government or the media 
especially.  The message simply was not heard.  We were talking with too many voices” (interview with 
Aden, 120910).  Presenting a unified message on behalf of the Somali community meant that they could 
negotiate with South African community leadership, access assistance and have their needs met by 
various agencies.  The atavistic rejection of migrants by South Africans during the xenophobic violence 
and the reluctance of the government to attend to their needs provoked this group of traders to 
formalize their ties by creating a network for collective representation that swiftly became a mutual-
support network.  This chapter explores what the Somali Retailers’ Association is, the ways they, as 
agents, create their own separate networks and this semi-formal association.  Included in the chapter is 
a discussion of mechanisms that enable the functioning of this network in terms agency, social capital 
and transnationalism.  The chapter concludes with two brief illustrative sections on the SRA’s 
interactions with institutions that facilitate (or hinder) refugees’ access to their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights.  I rely upon interviews with the 18 Somali respondents (no South Africans were 
interviewed as part of this project) and secondary sources for discussion of how South Africans ‘other’ 
the Somalis.    
The Association has written bylaws and the governance structure is organized in two different 
‘streams,’ according to Aden (see Figure 5.1: Organizational Chart).  The top stream is the Board of 
Governors (BOG), which is made up of about 10 elders in the Somali community living in the Cape Town 
area.  The BOG contains respected older men from all of the six major Somali clans; the clans with larger 
populations in Cape Town have two representatives.28  The BOG is consulted “in time of difficulty to get 
solid advice” (Aden, 120910).  They provide advice in emergencies that affect the community as a whole 
and mediate in the case of intra-Somali community disputes (Aden, 180111).  The second ‘stream’ is the 
Executive, made up of a Chairperson, Secretary General, Spokesperson, Trustee, Public Relations Officer 
and Treasurer.   
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Branch Managers: Khayelitsha (Site B, Site C, Makaza), 
Kraaifontein, Philippi, Nyanga, Mfuleni, Somora Machel, 
Strand, Gugulethu, Grabo, Sir Lawries Pass, Fish Hoek 












Mr. Aden was previously the Secretary General, but there was a reshuffle of the Executive 
around the time of the xenophobic upsurge that followed the football World Cup 2010.  The 
resurgence of violence meant that they needed a Spokesperson with an excellent command of 
English and political/media savvy to ensure their message was clear and well presented.  All 
members of the Somali community supposedly nominate the Executive; the decision-making 
responsibility rests with the Chairperson who selects among the nominees, then approves and 
confirms the group (i.e. it is not a highly democratic process).  The Executive meets at least once 
a month, with ‘emergency meetings’ on an ad hoc basis.  There are no paid or permanent staff 
members for the Association. 
In addition to the Executive, there are Branch Managers for the various areas, informal 
settlements and townships across the Western Cape; these serve to connect the Executive to 
both local South African leadership and as a conduit for information with members of the 
Association.  There are at least 10 branches across Western Cape with an estimated 
membership of 3,000 Somalis (see Figure 5.2 for locations).  There are no fees to join the 
Association.  While reviewing the SRA interviews conducted with Mr. Aden as a translator29, all 
male Somali workers in the region are assumed to be members unless they explicitly tell the 
leadership that they do not elect to take part (Male, Philippi, 170910, A#3).  As formal and 
informal groups are defined by Hamer and Massucato, the SRA fits in between as they have a 
mandate but it is not fully institutionalised (2009; 42).  The SRA is thus a semi-formal migrant 
association, despite the above-mentioned formalities of a hierarchical structure and written 
bylaws.  
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Figure 5.2: Location of all Somali Retailers Association Branches 
 
Branch managers should maintain lists of members, but not all managers have done so.  Female 
members are “not many because many more men migrate in general” (Aden, 120910).  The 
subtext of this discussion was that Somali women do not usually operate small businesses in the 
public sphere.  Although no women were interviewed during this study, I observed a few shops 
that were at least operated by Somali women, one textile shop in Mitchell’s Plain owned by a 
Somali woman and at least one respondent spoke of Somali women who operate micro-tailoring 
enterprises (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B#2).  Very few Ethiopians are members of the 
Association.  Membership in the SRA is assumed of all male Somalis of working age and is not 
particularly diverse in gender or nationality.  After discussions with those who did not identify 
themselves as SRA members, it became apparent that there might be some clan-based 
exclusivity as well. 
The literature speculates that refugees30 who share a common identity tend to be the most 
tightly woven communities who rely upon the community for survival of individual members 
(Sinclair, 1998; 347).  Thus, when examining the SRA, we are actually investigating a new 
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 Some Somalis may not fit the UN or South African definition of a 'refugee,' as a few may only have economic 
aspirations or may have been involved in fighting.  As discussed above, we assume that the vast majority of 












organization in an already highly networked community (SFM, 200631) made up of individuals 
with similar needs, cultural, religious and societal values (Sinclair, 1998; Harris, 2004).  
Specifically, the SRA was formed in response to a large-scale and highly traumatic event and it 
brings together the informal traders.  This semi-formal migrant association corresponds 
“analytically to a specific system of social relationships definable in relation to the particular 
issue or problem under investigation" (Burton & Dukes, 1990; p 172).  In this case, the 
perceived problem, according to the situation the founding SRA members were reacting to, was 
a small population of actively violent and xenophobic South Africans within Cape Town’s 
townships.  The newly structured SRA stems from the need for Somalis to form mutually 
protective alliances against that perceived (real or felt) threat. In the words of one of the SRA’s 
Branch Managers, the community came together after the 2008 out of fear: “When 2008 May the 
problem after xenophobic attack we think and we afraid to happen again like that.  So we came 
together and think ‘what must we do to help ourselves?’ basically.’  So we united to make like 
organization.  In addition, we go to the police station to register and we have got a meeting with 
the other Associations like Zenokayo [unknown organization, possibly related to the Social 
Justice Council] and SANCO [South African National Civics Organization] members… We stand 
up to help ourselves, to help our people” (Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A #9). 
The Association seeks to serve its members in various ways:  
 integrating Somalis into the informal economy, and providing solidarity amongst Somali 
traders and helping to advise traders on business practices such as how to treat 
customers; 
 presenting a unified voice for Somali traders to the media, government, NGOs and other 
groups;  
 connections with the local level South African government and political bodies (police 
precincts; local community leaders and councillors; community policing forums; SANCO 
representatives and unions); 
 following up with police in the event of attacks, looting or hijackings; 
 providing members with official letters of recommendation to present to NGOs or DHA 
that back-up statements or claims for assistance; 
 disseminating information amongst Somali and contribute to the well-being of the 
community; 
 assist in burial of victims of xenophobia and respond immediately in case of attacks, 
documenting cases;  
 assistance with registering shops; 
 among other functions (interviews with Aden, 120910 & Warasame 260910).   
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 The Somali diaspora are considered highly networked not only in South Africa, as the Swiss Forum for 
Migration Studies demonstrates, but also in most places they settle.  See Boyle & Ali, 2009; Harris, 2004; Ram, 













The intent of the Association as it stands now is to function as an empowerment mechanism for 
the Somali traders and to act as a form of conflict mitigation while also fostering a sense of 
solidarity for their members in a society that is antagonistic towards them.  According to Aden, 
this is all part of the social and cultural obligations that Somalis have to each other and there is 
no expectation of repayment (Aden 120910).  His statement corroborates both my observations 
of the types and degree of mutual assistance I witnessed during my two periods of fieldwork 
within the Somali community in 2004 and 2010, as well as the observations of many others 
working in Somali communities in different parts of the world (Horst, 2006; Jones, Ram & 
Theodorakopoulos, 2009; Farah, 2000).  This research was conducted exclusively with Somalis 
and focuses on how they, as agents, created their own network – or social enclave.  Both positive 
and negative aspects of this are explored in terms of mutual support to those inside the network 
and that by banding together they could be contributing to ‘othering’ by locals. 
TRANSNATIONALISM AS SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE SRA 
This section looks at network ties within the SRA and the Somalis in Cape Town more generally 
by making observations and presenting the views of the participants.  As Harris and others have 
pointed out, the word ‘community’ is highly problematized particularly when speaking of 
Somalis as it may imply more cohesion, uniformity and collective consciousness from shared 
experiences, language and religion than is actually present (Harris, 2004).  A ‘community’ of 
sorts existed for the Somali in Cape Town long before the SRA was created.  Social capital is an 
insufficient explanation for the Somali entrepreneurial network or the ‘entrepreneurial 
diaspora’ (2008).  When investigating the strength and extent of network ties, it is necessary to 
evaluate the forms of capital of the group and in the particular case of Somalis most of the 
literature emphasizes their transnationalism.  These two issues – forms of capital and 
transnationalism – also lead to the debates around agency in migration studies which will have 
to be explored before moving on to conclusions about the SRA’s network.   
The SRA is considering expanding its branches to cover more of the Western Cape, but at 
present, they represent primarily those Somalis trading in the townships – not in the city centre 
of Cape Town, in the affluent suburbs or more rural areas of the Western Cape (interview with 
AAA, 120910).  The participants in this study either were all involved in small business at the 
time of our interview or were in the past, but xenophobic violence currently prevented them 
from engaging in their trade.  Thus, they are all part of ethnic minority businesses (EMB), 
specifically, those involved in the SRA would be classified as ‘middlemen minorities’ because 
their type of EMB is to be found “in poor minority neighbourhoods or immigrant ghettos in 
urban areas deserted by mainstream retail and service industries or by business owners of a 












social structures and social relations of the local community in which they conduct economic 
activities” (Zhou, 2004; 1040).  This lack of ties with locals makes networks amongst Somalis 
essential to their survival. 
OBSERVED FORMS OF CAPITAL 
Bourdieu introduced the three forms of capital: cultural, social, symbolic and 
financial/economic (1986).  Financial capital is equated with wealth; cultural capital is made up 
of the knowledge and skills an individual possesses that they can use for labour in the 
marketplace.  There are examples in Cape Town of Somalis who possess these in abundance, but 
they are rare.  Only one of the participants in the study, Mr. Aden, owned multiple businesses 
and is currently in the process of obtaining a Master’s Degree; many who know him, call him 
‘The Professor.’  We see from other EMB literature that “immigrants who turn to self-
employment tend to be those who are not so much rich in social capital as poor in human and 
financial capital” (Ram, Theodorakopoulos & Jones, 2004; 430).  Thus, as with the majority of 
literature on immigrant networks, this section focuses on the SRA’s social capital, defined as 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 119).  The form that social capital 
typically takes is trust and reciprocity.  Immigrants such as the Somalis form tight knit 
relationships in part because they have (potential) social capital but they are low in human and 
economic capital (although traders have economic capital in their stock).  Put another way, they 
convert social capital into other forms of capital by working together. 
The Somali Retailers’ Association is technically a weak tie network, meaning that the 
connections within the network are primarily connections with ‘strangers’, but the complexities 
of kinship, clans and tribes within Somali society complicate this slightly.  As Mr. Aden related: 
 “each clan member knows all the other members of his clan, even if you don’t know them 
by name or physically.  When you go to South Africa and you will see someone you know or 
someone from your clan, (you can identify your clan members) and they will connect you 
with immediate family or extended family.  Then you get into the community.  Then they 
help get you work or you find something for yourself, that’s how we integrate ourselves 
[upon arrival] in the country” (interview with Aden 120910).   
One of the many functions identified by the SRA as within its domain, but which is widely 
regarded as a general function of community and networks, is that of helping to accept or 
introduce newly arrived asylum seekers.  However, as the interviews of ‘non-SRA’ members 












both the backbone and the bane of Somali society.  It is a source of major discord as clans fight a 
civil war for control over what is left of the country (Elmi, 2010)32.  Some experts think clan ties 
may be weakening in the diaspora (Boyle & Ali, 2009) but this could not be substantiated in this 
study.  Participants were not asked directly about their clan affiliation, but the issue of clans and 
discrimination against specific groups came up many times during the course of fieldwork.  
Somali clans and tribes are explained extensively in other literature and their details are not 
essential to understand here, only insomuch as the intra-clan strength of these kinship ties and 
the weakening effect that inter-clan connections can have is understood. 
Observing ‘trust’ proved difficult during fieldwork but it was detected in some of the retailers’ 
business practices.  For instance, upon first arrival in the country, Mr. Warasame worked in the 
restaurant of a fellow clansman in Mitchell’s Plain for two years.  During this time, he saved the 
funds to open his own shop (interview with Warasame, 260910).  Without the assistance of a 
fellow Somali, he would not have been able to raise the necessary financial capital to purchase 
the stock and rent a space of his own, although he had a background in business in Somalia.  
Only other Somalis work at his shop in Philippi, all of whom are younger Somali males who also 
sleep in the rooms attached.   
When conducting interviews in shops, there were never less than two Somalis working in even 
the smallest shops and they never closed the shop or ceased trading to speak to me.  In a few 
cases, they simply called a fellow Somali they knew in the area to take over for them 
temporarily.  Even the few who cited decent relationships with their neighbours or other South 
Africans never mentioned or seemed to consider inviting them to take over the shop for a few 
minutes.  Only two of the 18 respondents reported working with or employing South Africans in 
their shops.  It seems that interpersonal trust, at least in business, is the exclusive domain of 
Somalis relating to Somalis.  This high degree of trust amongst Somalis as a form of social capital 
that is convertible in business is in stark contrast to the observed low levels of trust amongst 
South Africans in townships (Ashforth, 2008; Ross, 2010; Joost et al, 2010).   
Both of the injured participants who were interviewed in a hostel in Bellville rely upon their 
networks to pay for that accommodation and assist them with transportation to and from the 
hospital while they continue to get treatment for their wounds (Male, Bellville, 170910, 
untapped; Male, Bellville, 170910, A#5).  One of these men was the victim of a petrol bomb and 
would not be able to return to work, perhaps ever.  The Somali Retailers’ Association, according 
to a discussion with Mr. Aden following that interview, is providing some assistance but cannot 
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do so for the long term as the organization does not have sustainable financing.  It relies upon 
gifts from individual members of the Somali community in order to help this respondent and 
others in similar situations.  There is a sense of social obligation to give back to the community 
which seems to motivate more prosperous individuals to contribute what they can to assist 
those in need.  These examples, among others, demonstrate the connectedness and social ties of 
mutual responsibility amongst Somalis; they are indicative of the ties that bind the network 
more generally and the SRA harnesses some of the social capital to give back to the community. 
The transnational nature of the SRA and its members was inconclusive.  While individual 
members exhibit varying degrees of transnationalism, as does the Somali population in Cape 
Town in a general sense, the SRA itself does not straddle any borders – real or imagined.  Only 
two notable aspects of transnationalism were prevalent in the sample group: the condition of 
inhabiting a physical space but ‘belonging’ in another and communication across borders – 
neither of which make these participants especially transnational and are arguably common 
traits of many first-generation migrants.  The constant exchange of money, goods, people and 
information across borders that Somalis in Leicester, UK exhibit (Jones, Theodorakopoulos & 
Ram, 2009; Mazzucato et al, 2004) is not as far-reaching with the SRA or other participants, 
although it is present.  The SRA itself is not necessarily a transnational network; although its 
individual members and leaders may have links globally with other Somalis, this is not part of 
its function; it is a geographically confined to the Western Cape at present.   
This sense of belonging to Somalia also comes from the fact that many of the men interviewed 
still have family back home, including wives and children.  A handful of participants admitted to 
sending remittances back home whenever they can and others still receive remittances from 
either back home or other relatives in Western countries.  In the words of one man: 
“even we didn’t call [South Africa] home, my home is still in Somalia, southern Somalia... I 
am staying Kismayo, my father, even I have wife, children; I don’t know if they still alive… 
Before, me, I am call [Somalia] when I have money… When I am call [my brothers and 
uncles abroad], they say ‘it is better here’ in Norway and London.  They are safe, 
everything… but we don’t have to go now to call, we didn’t call, we don’t have the money 
now” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#3).   
Their bonds with home may be strong, but poverty here in South Africa means that they are not 
always able to maintain those bonds with consistent contact or by sending remittances.  This 
underscores Horst’s point that income has a significant impact upon the degree to which a 













COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OVER SOUTH AFRICAN TRADERS? 
Despite popular perceptions, the SRA does not assist Somalis with bulk purchasing 
arrangements or other cost-saving mechanisms, which could provide them with a competitive 
advantage over their South African counterparts in the informal trade.  In a well-respected 
journal, one author normatively legitimatised the attacks against foreign traders because of 
their competitive advantages and networks.  He asserts that foreigners have: 
“access to a vast network, which seems better able to serve their interests than local 
government.  They have special places where they buy their stock.  They support shops 
owned or run by fellow country traders.  In some cases, this may entail access to organized 
crime.  A foreign trader may leave his or her site for two months with an assistant of 
‘brother’ (business partner or a front from the same country who gets paid) and set off as 
far away as Bangkok to attend to another business.  On their return, these traders have 
more resources to boost trade or even rent a shop…” (Thulare, 2004; 6).   
Aside from simply representing business savvy in the instance of knowing where to buy stock 
cheaply, this type of unsubstantiated claim is not backed up by the facts and potentially harmful.  
For instance, how is a population of approximately 3,000 (the estimated size of the Somali 
Retailers’ Association) able to have a competitive advantage – even if they only shop at their 
own shops – in comparison to the more than 3 million South Africans living in the Cape Town 
Municipality (Marindo, 2007)? Accusing foreign networks of being part of organized crime also 
has little traction as the between 130- 150 gangs in Cape Town are well-known and 
predominantly South African lead (Standing, 2005; McDougall, 2010).  By the estimate of Metro 
Police Chief Rob Young, these gangs are responsible for 80% of the city’s crime (McDougall, 
2010).  There are plenty of statistics to prove that overall, foreigners are less likely to be 
involved in perpetrating crimes (Landau, 2004; 14).  Finally, concerning the unsubstantiated 
story about flying to Bangkok, the average monthly income of an informal trader could not 
accommodate that type of luxury.  Being involved in informal trade is not a lucrative business 
and certainly does not lend itself to business trips to far-away destinations.33   
One of Thulare’s points – that local government does not serve their interests – aligns with Mr. 
Aden and Mr. Warasame’s view that most of the SRA’s functions are those that would be 
provided by the government if the South African government operated effectively or in the 
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 It must be state here that cross-border trade is an important part of the South African economy, particularly 
in cities near the borders.  People from neighbouring countries come here to ply their wares, purchase goods 
to bring back to their own countries to sell, etc.  This is certainly not the same as engaging in large-scale 
export/importing for the informal trade and does not have much bearing on the present study as Cape Town is 
a large port city but Somalis do not routinely report returning to Somalia from South Africa to engage in trade 
nor do they seem to import goods through shipping channels.  The illegal importing of khat or qaad (a 
stimulant plant classified as a prohibited substance in South Africa) may be the notable exception however it 












manner of other refugee-receiving countries.  In terms of their network being better able to 
serve their interests than local government, this is more a statement of the inefficacy of local 
government at upholding rights than an assertion of the strength of co-national networks.   In 
keeping with general community structure theory for migration, by forming this semi-formal 
association, the Somalis are attempting to respond to their own needs in the absence of another 
system that can do so effectively as is often observed with refugee populations with freedom of 
movement elsewhere in the world (Dorals, 1991; 567; Castelli, 2009; Al-Ali, 2001; Balbo& 
Marconi, 2005; Hamer & Mazzucato, 2009; Boyle & Ali, 2009; Grabska, 2006).   
If we look at Thulare’s historical perspective (which provides much more insight than his 
“analysis” cited previously which amounts to baseless assertions which lack evidence), informal 
street-level trading was illegal during apartheid, as urban centres were reserved almost 
exclusively as the domain of whites and a few people from other races who were deemed useful 
to keep around for labour.  Until 1991, anyone wishing to engage in informal trading in the city 
had to have a license or permit to do so (Thulare, 2004; 3).  In the waning days of apartheid, 
both black South Africans and an increasing number of foreigners began to flock to the cities.  
Since most of the migrants do not have proper documentation, work permits or legal status 
preventing them from joining the formal sector (Bailey, 2004), they also joined the informal 
street trade with locals who were only just beginning to assert their right to the cities of their 
native land.   
Mr. Aden understands that this puts them in direct conflict with South African traders seeking to 
scratch out an existence in the townships.  Policy, the law and the realities of daily life in the 
townships do not always mesh.  Competing for scarce resources and perhaps contributing to 
'entrepreneurial overpopulation' (Jones et al, 2000) which ensures low profit margins, Somali 
shop owners are in direct, daily competition and  conflict with locals.  Whereas some academics 
posit that transnational migrants have greater and stronger networks than locals that 
automatically translates into a competitive advantage (Jones, Ram & Theodorakopoulos, 2010), 
this is not the asset that it is usually assumed to be.  From observing the activities of the SRA, the 
strong network does not even balance (in financial or social terms for integration) the negative 
attitudes, discrimination in terms of obtaining legal documentation, harassment by police and 
exclusion from the community that the Somali traders face.  Without these restrictions, the 
common thinking amongst forced migration research goes, refugees and other migrants may be 
able to provide for themselves and ultimately benefit the communities and cities in which they 












Just as Somalis in the UK are characterized as "highly dependent on the social capital embedded 
in tight-knit ethnic and especially kinship networks", the Somali community in Cape Town has 
long been highly networked and interconnected.  As one respondent explained, Somalis “are one 
nation one language and one religion.  And they make among themselves knowing (sic) each 
other, making themselves brothers” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#7).  The SRA merely 
formalised and organised these ties.  Those who already live and work here in Cape Town are 
culturally responsible for and relied upon for providing support to new arrivals.  Through the 
complex ties of tribe, clan, sub-clan and direct familial ties, the community helps with sheltering 
newcomers as well as helping them to access employment opportunities. Contrary to some 
popular perceptions of Somalis as rich or a community that provides "lavish financial backing" 
(Jones, Ram & Theodorakopoulos, 2010; 8), they mostly provide moral support, exchange 
information and occasionally modest financial assistance in emergencies, such as raising the 
burial costs for victims of xenophobic violence (interview with Aden, 120910).  
Thus, the Somali network, and the semi-formal nature of the Association are forms of social 
capital.  It is assumed to be an always positive thing, but co-national networks serve both to 
facilitate and constrain mobility of migrants, while "excluding them from access to resources of 
the dominant society and preventing their social mobility in later phases of their settlement" 
(2010; 103).  In the case of the Somalis who have been here for more than five years, as five of 
the participants were in this study, there is little to no feeling of integration with South Africans 
let alone a feeling that they are able to be upwardly socially mobile.     
AGENCY VS. STRUCTURE 
A good deal of older forced migration literature focuses upon the forced migrant as a hapless, 
powerless victim caught up in unforeseen and terrible circumstances thrown into the world, 
only to become a problem to solve for other governments or international agencies (see de Voe, 
1981; Winkler, 1981; Rose, 1981, Malkki, 1996; Horst, 2006 for some examples).  By looking at 
refugees as feeble defenceless ‘things’ instead of as human beings with choice, or agency, forced 
migration literature misses a great deal of their capacity and impact (Ram, Theodorakopoulos, 
Jones, 2004; Bruff, 2007; Crisp, 1999; Crush et at, 2001; Dryden-Peterson, 2006; Horst, 2006 to 
name a few).  This is one of the major flaws in forced migration research, since refugees, asylum 
seekers and other migrants are actually “active agents who, despite unfavourable conditions, 
will try to utilise the options open to them in order to be able to cope with life” (Horst, 2006;18).  
Thus, they can contribute to their own destinies as active agents, but also can provoke animosity 
in those who are either unable or unwilling to work that hard.   In that way, the SRA, with its 
intended purpose of mutual aid and representation for the Somali traders in Cape Town, is just 












helpless group of people.  By banding together in mutual support, they also can provoke 
resentment amongst host nationals – mutual support networks can have negative consequences 
(Caselli, 2009). 
In the course of my research, it was discovered that membership in the SRA is assumed rather 
than a choice that Somali individuals make, thereby reducing individual agency within the 
group.  The group of individuals who got together in 2008 to create the SRA did so to take 
charge of their lives and find ways to address the biggest issues facing Somalis in Cape Town, 
particularly xenophobic violence.  Those who were in the camps at that time (who fled from the 
townships after the outbreak of xenophobic violence in May 2008), saw that they could not 
communicate with the UN, the City of Cape Town or other bodies if they were hundreds of 
individual voices talking at once.  To get the attention they needed to access assistance or 
resources and facilitate returning to their locations, they banded together as the Somali 
Retailers’ Association.  They attempted to take some control back over their lives.  This 
honeymoon phase did not last long though.  As one respondent put it, at this time “the Somalis 
came together [through the SRA] at first, but then they started fighting against themselves [after 
leaving the camps]” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 270810, untapped).    
While their degree of representativeness may be disputable by some who feel their interests are 
not being served by the leadership of the SRA, the Association continues to attend community 
meetings, dialogue with various governmental and non-governmental bodies and lobby on 
behalf of Somali traders across Cape Town.  As discussed further in Chapter 3, the SRA helps 
with collective bargaining on behalf of the traders, engages in dialogue and sometimes makes 
peace deals with South African trade associations, and generally works to lessen the incredibly 
high safety and security costs/risks associated with informal trade in the townships.  In the 
context of a low opportu ity structure in Cape Town, the SRA (or Somali retailers more 
generally) rely “on the support provided by their co-nationals already living in the city.  The 
support is often called social capital, including material and emotional support, advice and 
connections with employment and financial networks"(Jacobsen, 2006; 282), doing their best to 
make the most out of difficult circumstances. 
 SOMALI BUSINESSES IN CAPE TOWN 
As this sample was very small and not representative of the entire Somali community in Cape 
Town, a full profile of Somali business is impossible.  However, based upon the data provided by 
participants, some additional resources, observation by the researcher and information 
provided by the SRA leadership, there is enough information to construct a broad overview.  












engaged in retail, primarily in the form of groceries and small shops referred to as ‘tuk shops’ or 
‘spazas;’ some retailers deal with textiles.  Other SRA members are engaged in service industries 
such as operating ‘backpackers’ or hostels for exclusively Somali clientele, restaurants and 
coffee shops, internet cafes, barbershops and also transport by sedan taxis or small trucks 
(bakkies) for the transport of goods. All of the eight Somali men interviewed as members of the 
SRA, were involved in at present or in the past, the operation of tuk shops. Four were owners of 
shops, with two respondents admitting to owning multiple shops; the other four were 
shopkeepers.  In the other sample (eight of whom Mr. Aden would classify as ‘members’) the 
split is three current or former shop owners, five shop keepers and the final respondent was a 
bakkie driver for Somalis to transport stock from large retailers to their shops.   
In terms of businesses operated, there is a lack of diversity in the types of enterprises started by 
Somalis in the townships of Cape Town.  Seven of the eighteen interviews were conducted 
inside Somali-owned spazas and I had the opportunity to visit at least half a dozen others in the 
course of my fieldwork.  There is some diversity in the small businesses, but not very much.  The 
diversity of products on offer in these shops was not vast, but without a full assessment of the 
needs of the community, there is only a general observation of minimal diversity in the products 
on offer.  For the most part, shops contained staple goods (maize, rice, flour, bread), limited 
perishable items (frozen meats, milk), toiletries (toilet paper, shampoo, soap) and a far greater 
variety of non-essential consumables (candy, potato chips, other ‘junk food’ snacks, soft drinks, 
cigarettes).   
Often, South African retailers accuse Somalis of selling their goods at prices well below normal 
retail price; at least four of the Department of Local Government and Housing report 
respondents stated this openly (10DNCM, 11DCNF, 14DNCM & 16DNCF).  Multiple Somali 
respondents in this study corroborated.  However, the contrary opinion is also there – that 
Somali shops are too expensive (9DNCF).  Informal small and micro enterprise in South Africa is 
characterized as highly competitive and not at all lucrative; most businesses in the informal 
sector are classifies as ‘survivalist’ by the Department of Trade and Industry: 
“Income generated from these activities usually falls far short of an even minimum income 
standard, with little capital invested, virtually no skills training in the particular field and 
only limited opportunities for growth into a viable business. Poverty and the attempt to 
survive are the main characteristics of this category of enterprise” (Department of Trade & 












Whether or not the accusations that Somalis trade at lower (or even higher) rates is true, they 
are not making very much money and rely upon moving volume rather than having higher 
profits on individual goods.34  
Another assumption about Somali business is that they purchase their goods collectively to 
obtain bulk purchase discounts.  As discussed in the previous section, groups of Somali business 
owners may do this on a case-by-case basis but the SRA does not facilitate this in any way, nor 
does the Association own wholesalers.35  Despite considerable probing on the issue of sourcing 
goods, not a single respondent spoke of or even alluded to the utilization of ‘transnational’ ties 
to source goods from abroad.  That does not mean it does not happen in the Somali business 
community in Cape Town, only that it was not observed in this study.   
BEYOND TRADE – SRA’S LINKS OUTSIDE THE SOMALI COMMUNITY 
The original mission of ‘speaking with one voice’ for the Somali community continues today 
through constant – formal and informal – contact with officials in government departments, 
liaising with the police force, connections with the UNHCR, various NGOs and donor 
governments here in Cape Town.  However, as this section makes clear, a unified voice 
presented by one organization that purports to represent a diverse and divided group of people 
means that some voices are still not heard. 
LINKS TO UNHCR, NGOS AND SPEAKING FOR THE WHOLE 
South Africa’s chosen strategy for accommodating refugees and asylum seekers – emphasizing 
self-reliance – essentially leaves them to their own devices, primarily in urban areas.  Most 
forced migration or refugee literature points out that the vast majority of these people are 
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 The interview schedule includes a question about monthly income. Mr. Aden requested in our initial 
meeting that this question be removed as it may offend the respondents or they would be reluctant to report 
on this, particularly as the interviews took place in his presence.  Although some scholars place a lot of 
emphasis on trust as a very strong form of social capital amongst Somalis (Horst, 2006; Jones, Ram & 
Theodorakopoulos, 2009; Harris, 2004; Ram, Theodorakopoulos & Jones, 2008), trust of fellow Somalis only 
goes so far – they are still business competitors at the end of the day. 
35 Several respondents referred to a particular traffic light where Somalis are routinely targeted for robberies 
and hijacking.  The significance of this particular traffic light in Philippi is that it is right next to the Philippi Cash 
and Carry, a warehouse discount store for buying in bulk.  Anyone travelling from across the Cape Flats must 
pass that traffic light to enter the Philippi Cash and Carry parking lot.  Somalis are robbed there on a daily basis 
(discussions with translator; Male, Khayelitsha, 170910, A #1 & 2; Male, Philippi, 170910, A #3; Male, Bellville, 
170910, A #5; Interview with Warasame, 260910)  as purchases can only be made in cash there (as the name 
suggests), thus they are carrying a lot of money with them as they head toward the store.  As one may be able 
to credit the criminals for seeing a money-making (albeit illegal) opportunity, the specific targeting of only 
Somalis at that traffic light is not simply a ‘regular crime’ since presumably everyone entering that parking lot 
would be carrying significant amounts of cash.  It is a crime motivated by hatred of or to specifically 
discriminate against people based on their foreignness: a xenophobic crime.  Pointedly, this traffic light is in 
plain view of the Philippi East Police Station giving some merit to the accusations that xenophobic violence 












fleeing traumatic and harrowing experiences (De Voe, 1981; Horst, 2006; Stein, 1981; Harris, 
2001; Harris, 2004; Malkki, 1995).  A hands-off attitude by the government leaves people 
already considered vulnerable even more exposed (SFM, 2006; Khiato, 2007; Harris, 2001).  
That does not mean all forced migrants should be painted as helpless victims, only that some 
may need to access further assistance.  Many NGOs in Cape Town exist to serve the specific 
needs of forced migrants and there are still others that serve these groups in addition to other 
vulnerable groups (a list of these organizations appears in Appendix 4). 
Initially, it was unclear to what extent the SRA spoke for the Somali community.  It was 
imperative to understand how much authority the Association has, how empowered it is to 
make decisions on behalf of retailers and how deeply are they embedded in the community 
itself.  Although the BOG was an advisory body, the power and scope of this unofficial body itself 
is little understood outside of the Somali community.  According to Caselli's reading of Carchedi, 
there are three possible scenarios about these kinds of immigrant associations: 
 "a) associations which are recognized as interlocutors by the local institutions but do not 
enjoy real recognition in their communities; b) associations recognised by the members of 
the immigrant communities but which are ignored by the local institutions; c) associations 
which are both recognized as legitimate representatives by the immigrant community and 
recognized as interlocutors by the institutions" (Castelli, 2009). 
Observing at the SRA through this framework, we are left without a classification.  The SRA has 
established ties with many formal institutions and is clearly recognized by these – regularly 
meeting with the UNHCR office in Cape Town, the US Consulate, officials at the City of Cape 
Town, local councillors, NGOs and others.  However, their recognition by the Somali community 
itself was less clear. 
One positive element of the SRA is that they have a direct line to those NGOs and the UNHCR 
where several thousand voices would neither resonate nor register, the UNHCR in particular.  
Many of the NGOs are intimately familiar with the individual problems, needs and issues of 
forced migrants as they attend to individual people and their complex cases daily.  As per its 
agreement with the government of South Africa, UNHCR takes a more ‘hands off’ approach than 
they would if administering a refugee camp; it relies upon ‘implementing partners’ – the NGOs – 
to deal with the day-to-day issues of persons of concern who are integrating, attending mostly 
to the caseloads for two other durable solutions: resettlement and repatriation.  With fewer 
than half a dozen staff in the Cape Town office, UNHCR can hardly be expected to hear the 
concerns of the thousands of Somali refugees in the city and surrounds, let alone the thousands 
persons of concern from other nations.  Having regular formal and informal discussions with a 
single organization – indeed two individuals – to represent the Somali population has obvious 












To illustrate the strength and extent of this working relationship, as well as the negative aspects, 
we turn to an important and pressing issue that surfaced during my fieldwork: an incident now 
referred to in the community as the “UNHCR lists.”36  In September, Mr. Aden was approached 
by the UNHCR to produce a list of the most vulnerable Somali refugees and asylum seekers in 
the Cape Town area, relying upon the SRA’s network and community ties to filter through the 
entire population of Somalis in the area.  Mr. Aden detailed the initial request and the process to 
me while we travelled to various interviews.  Mr. Warasame discussed the process, as did no 
less than three other participants.   The SRA was asked to identify approximately 40 Somali each 
in several categories such as the disabled, single mothers, the elderly, victims of xenophobic 
violence and orphans.  This process, as those outside the SRA perceived it, was described by one 
respondent:  
“You see, Somalia when they are fighting, they are fighting just only the family, you 
understand?  KLH: Yea, the family, the tribe, the clan. Respondent: Yes, you understand.  
Even those people, the Somali Retailers, there is no (sic) even one person in my family.  
Other people, the family. Even they are write… Even Mitchell’s Plain they are writing 40, 35 
person, they write in UNHCR those people.  They are working [for] UNHCR. When we are 
[unintelligible], they are call, they need 40, and they are only writing their own family.  
They didn’t help you.  KLH: So they only favour their tribes and families?  Respondent: Yea.  
Only family, yea.” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#3). 
Mr. Aden fully admitted that the process was a difficult one and that when word got out in this 
tightly-knit and highly networked community, his phone was ringing constantly night and day 
for over a week with people trying to get on the list in the hopes that they would be resettled.  
No one I spoke with ever confirmed that resettlement was even the purpose of the list in the 
first place, but that was what this community – desperate for resettlement whether they fit into 
the categories or not – believed.  The SRA thus became the ‘gatekeeper’ to the ‘gatekeeper,’ 
placing another level of bureaucracy in an already bureaucratic and complex process (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 270810 – subsequent conversation on 061010).  The positive aspect of this 
exercise was that the UNHCR recognized that its ability to identify the most vulnerable 
individuals, who are often the least connected or visible, within the Somali community was very 
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 Some background information is necessary first.  Due to the struggles, that many refugees and asylum 
seekers face in South Africa many believe that anywhere in the world would be better than living here (a push 
factor).  The appeal of living in the West, having family overseas or other reasons (pull factors), along with the 
impossibility of repatriation as a solution for Somalis, many of them would like to apply for (or already have 
applied for) resettlement in a third country.  This process is almost the exclusive domain of UNHCR in South 
Africa.  Although it is possible to apply directly to another refugee receiving country, most of them rely upon 
recommendations from the UNHCR; it thus acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ for resettlement in the West.  Without direct 
contact with all persons of concern in the country, UNHCR relies on implementing partner organizations, 
contacts with migrant organizations, and by processing direct applications on behalf of individuals.  Again, the 












low.37  The negative aspect, as we will see illustrated below, is that the Somali community may 
seem tightly knit to outsiders but is fraught with complex kinship and religious divides, which 
were exacerbated by this exercise. 
Mr. Aden's sentiments regarding the composition of Somali society and networks, their 
divisions according to tribe, clan, sub-clan and ultimately familial ties aligns exactly with the 
description of these ties given in Boyle and Ali, among others (Boyle and Ali, 2009; Luling, 2006; 
Horst, 2006).  However, using family ties to validate a person's history or standing in society is a 
double-edged sword where it binds them together as a collective with Somali identity, but also 
severely divides this group.  As Mr. Aden explained: 
 "We are a very connected community – sort of like a family – and we all know people in 
America and Europe too.  Somalis are organized by tribe and then clan and then sub-clan.  
A tribe all shares the same religion and language.  Then below that, there are clans and 
each clan member knows all of the others; even if you do not know them by name or 
physically, you still know one another because you are in the same clan.  When you go to 
South Africa [are newly arrived] and you will go to this place or that place where there are 
Somalis then you see someone you know or someone in your clan (you can identify your 
own clan members) and they can connect you with immediate family if they are here; if 
not, then they will help find extended family, you know fourth grandfather or uncle or 
cousin… Then you go to their community.  They will help you get work, or a job, or keep you 
in their place until you can find something for yourself, maybe two weeks or so.  That is 
how we integrate ourselves." (interview with Aden 120910) 
These ties do not always work to form positive bonds amongst Somalis.  As we know from the 
history of Somalia (Elmi, 2010), clan-based and religious-ties are also the source of divisions 
amongst the Somali diaspora (Harris, 2004; SFM, 2006.  Seen from the opposite perspective, the 
issue of creating a ‘simple’ list of Somalis is a virtual minefield: 
“They [the SRA leaders] go to the offices of the United Nations saying that they are 
responsible for all of the Somali communities.  Then maybe the United Nations will give 
them a program, like a seminar or a research or to write people [make a list of people].  
However, they only write their own people and the people they know.  They left the people 
who is sitting in the chair, like a child [people who are physically handicapped and in 
wheelchairs]; people who are wearing nappies like a child.  They are really suffering... They 
leave the mothers with seven children who is just a tailorer (sic); she is feeding her children 
through tailoring because her husband died…Then the youth vote and they started to be 
against the Retailers’ Association who are calling themselves the leaders of the Somalians 
(sic).. I see, there is an issue of biasism (sic) and corruptions towards the Somalians (sic).  
Somalia is a nation, but there is different types of people living there.  There is majority, 
minority, there is minority, majority.  Still that issue of minority, majority is here in South 
Africa…But Somalia is a nation, but a few elements cannot be responsible of them.” (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B#2). 
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 I never determined if the same exercise was conducted on other refugee and asylum seeker populations 












This respondent is not the only one who expressed indignation about the perceived bias of the 
leadership of the SRA nor is it the only example of the SRA working with the UNHCR or other 
NGOs, including South African retail associations, or the South African Government and coming 
up with a controversial or unpopular outcomes where accusations of corruption are rife.  This 
may or may not have to do with the actual corruption of SRA leadership and it is beyond the 
scope of this study to investigate these accusations.  In the words of one of several respondents 
who commented on fractionalization in the Somali community, “the Somalis came together 
[through the SRA in 2008] at first, but then they started fighting against themselves and there is 
a lot of fear against us going back to camps or from the UNHCR or NGOs.  We can agree as a 
community on a Saturday that no one will go back to the locations, then slowly some will go 
back… then all of us went back.  We cannot stay organized” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 270810, 
untapped). 
LINKS TO THE POLICE AND OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 
Another aspect of the SRA’s portfolio of services that they provide to their members is that of 
liaison with the police and other South African institutions, including other retail associations.  
These connections are an essential part of its mission and take up considerable time for the 
leadership and Branch Managers, as again, their primary reason for existence came in the wake 
of the xenophobic wave of violence in 2008.  Attacks, robberies, hijackings, and other forms of 
violent crime perpetrated specifically against Somalis are a daily occurrence in Cape Town, 
particularly in the predominantly black townships.  This was particularly the case in July 2010 
when rumours of extermination of foreigners swept the townships.  Unlike in 2008, the SRA 
were prepared this time around – ahead of government, NGO and UNHCR responses.  
Purportedly they were one of several groups of migrants that informed these agencies about the 
rumours, requested assistance and increased vigilance from these institutions (interview with 
Warasame, 260910).   
In their daily work, leadership and Branch Managers are expected to follow-up with police on 
crimes that are reported by Somalis, bringing the victims to the police to make statements, 
identify potential suspects, produce evidence (Ibid) and, according to Mr. Aden: “we connect 
with the local police and encourage vigilance with them.  When there are hijackings, for 
instance, we help and follow-up on the investigations with the police and try to push a bit and 
ask police to work harder; this was especially important during the post-World Cup xenophobia.  
Our continuous meetings with police – day and night—increases the visibility of Somali issues 
with the police…Also we help when Somalis are arrested to help with dealing with these issues, 
help with the courts for translation and such” (interview with Aden, 120910).  Mr. Warasame 












victims immediately after they have been shot or set on fire.  In these instances, the SRA goes to 
the scene immediately and occasionally gets there before the police or ambulance (these 
services have notoriously slow response times, particularly in informal settlements).  They 
sometimes elect to remove victims and dispatch them to hospitals themselves (interview with 
Warasame 260910).  In this way, the SRA acts as a go-between for individual Somali members 
and police or community policing forums, and provider of assistance where government fails.  
These are important and positive functions of the group.    
There is a flip side of the relationship that the SRA has cultivated with SAPS and law 
enforcement.  Continued dialogue between the SRA and these institutions breeds suspicion of 
corruption in some Somali community members.  Perhaps, said a few respondents, they are on 
the take or somehow in collusion with these institutions or paying for protection (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B#2; Male Mitchell’s Plain, 270810, untapped; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
121010, B#3).  In response to the question about what the SRA does, one respondent said, “they 
are writing [the list of vulnerable Somalis], they are working UNHCR and community of South 
African, Xhosa in Khayelitsha, commander police they are working.  All of them.  [said in an 
accusatory manner]” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#3).  This study offers no proof or 
judgment either way regarding corruption; the aim is only to present both sides of the story, as 
they were related during the interviews.  The SRA is open and up front about the fact that they 
are in regular, direct, formal and informal contact with the police and law enforcement.  
The SRA attends community meetings with various stakeholders on a regular basis.  The issue 
most often on the table for discussion when Somalis are involved is the rivalries between South 
African- and Somali-run businesses in the townships.  Competition between these two groups is 
extreme.  As reported by Special Assignment and many other news sources, in 2006 all Somali 
businesses in Masiphumilele were simultaneously attacked and razed to the ground, suggesting 
premeditation and collusion (SABC 3, 2006).  This was certainly neither the first nor the last 
time Somali shops have been attacked, looted and destroyed in a coordinated manner in the 
Cape Town area – and many of these ‘cleansings’ or ‘evictions’ took place way outside the 
periods of mass xenophobic violence; they are a regular occurrence (see IOM, 2009 for a 
timeline of major incidents).   
In July 2008, the recently formed Somali Retailers’ Association, still living in the safety camps, 
“made an agreement that no new shops can be opened in Khayelitsha, Philippi, Gugulethu and 
others.  Therefore, when they went back to their locations from the camps, any new shops that 
were put up were looted, burned and destroyed by landlords and the SRA. The SRA came with 












and there is fractionalization between each other” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 270810, untaped).  
The SRA works to change perceptions of the Somali community to outsiders, but internally the 
community dynamics contain the same old divisions, as one respondent explained: “Somalia is a 
nation, but there is (sic) different types of people living there.  There is majority, minority, there 
is minority, majority.  Still that issue of minority, majority is here in South Africa” (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B#2).  
In an effort to reconcile the demands of the South African business owners and police and 
others agencies responding to xenophobic violence, the SRA repeatedly tried to negotiate and 
broker a deal38 to prevent further conflicts and attend to what Thulare called the “scramble for 
the street” – a cauldron of conflict between South African and non-national traders which 
bubbles over in bloody conflict on a regular basis (2004).   In this climate, discovering an 
alternative means of addressing these underlying issues and identifying bodies within both the 
Somali and South African communities that could potentially manage the conflict is a critical 
task.  As many of the attacks against Somalis are levied against shopkeepers or informal traders 
and money/jobs are used as 'excuses' for the violence, the SRA is poised to help negotiate and 
reduce the number of violent physical attacks.39  By attempting to broker these deals, or peace 
treaties, the SRA is, on behalf of the entire Somali network, attempting mitigation or 
management of conflict with South African nationals, particularly in the townships.  There is 
potential for this group to serve in this capacity as a type of conflict resilience strategy.  The 
majority of network literature on migrants looks at social capital, particularly in terms of 
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 Mr. Warasame provided minutes of a conflict resolution meeting in September 2010 following the World 
Cup violence in attempt to curb the violence.  The meeting was attended by the SRA, Fire Department, 
Department of Justice, Department of Social Services, Department of Home Affairs, Law Enforcement, a South 
African informal traders association, land invasion, the South African Police Service, District Management, 
representatives from the taxi industries and sub-councils 9 and 10 for the City of Cape Town.   The output of 
the meeting were the following provisions and agreed upon items to which all present signed: 
 no new shops can be opened by Somalis; 
 Somalis are entitled to live or rent a house, but not to make any business; 
 SAPS & Law Enforcement will deal with the process; 
 All Somali shop owners will have to pay tax; 
 Among other issues. 
The SRA Chairman who signed on behalf of the Somali retailers said that there was no way, the agreement 
would ever work properly due to lack of enforcement by the government and police who came back after the 
agreement saying that they were not authorized to close the borders or private shops.  He insists that this 
agreement among others made by the SRA underscores that they have rights and actively pursue their 












securing economic livelihoods and the provision of financial safety nets for network members.  
This study demonstrates that a semi-formal association fulfils greater roles in this conflict.   
During the course of fieldwork, I attended multiple community meetings in Khayelitsha where 
the topic of shops came up as the most important issue, despite attempts by other Somalis not 
affiliated with the SRA to raise other non-retail related issues affecting the community.   
Conversation always returned to business, particularly the proliferation of ‘illegal’ Somali 
shops.40  The SRA gave the police a list of five ‘illegal’ Somali shops that would be given one 
week eviction notices before they were to be destroyed, proving that not much changed since 
the 2008 agreement where the SRA collaborates with the authorities in the interest of Somali 
traders collectively by reducing the number of shops, thereby reducing competition in order to 
achieve peace with South African business owners.  This kind of ‘peace’ comes at a high price for 
the individuals whose shops are razed.  Clearly, this undermines the Association’s ability to act 
on behalf of all Somali retailers in pursuit of peace with South Africans in the townships.  
As recently as October 2010, another group claiming to represent the Somali community, the 
Somali Youth League, emerged in response to the SRA’s focus on only those involved in trade, 
the perception of corruption and the perception that the Association may only favour specific 
clans or kinship networks.  This group formed only one day prior to the inception of the 
community meetings attended and could be an interesting new organization to investigate in 
pursuit of further understanding of the Somali network in Cape Town. 
SUMMARY 
The Somali Retailers’ Association is a semi-formal mutual support network formed in response 
to an acute perceived external (outside the Somali ‘community’) threat – xenophobic violence.  
Although initial impressions from the media and even the organization’s name had me believing 
that this was an organization founded principally to further Somali economic interests, after 
extensive participant interviews with two of the founding members as well as other current 
members, it became clear that this is a network whose primary functions revolve around 
mutual support, protection, and assistance.  Although a literature regarding Somalis elsewhere 
in the world, particularly those studies focusing on EMB, highlight the transnational nature of 
their networks as being one of their greatest strengths, this did not prove to be the case with the 
SRA.  In fact, at least in the participant group, transnational links were minimal at best, as they 
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 It must be acknowledged, as it is in Appendix 3, that this conflict is not simply about looting stores and 
attacking Somalis, but is a much deeper undercurrent within society that cannot be dealt with simply through  
community-level conflict resolution. 
40
 As noted above, the majority of survivalist informal businesses are not registered with the government – 












generally did not have financial resources to conduct business or other transactions across 
borders (with the exception of remittances).  What was perhaps most interesting was that by 
strengthening the ‘community’ and becoming a more formal mutual-support network also 
allowed for better networking and formal relationships with NGOs, local leadership and 
government representatives.  The perceived (at least from an outsiders’ perspective) stronger 
Somali network has also helped to lobby for better access to their rights and recognition by 
government.  However, the formation of such a group – even when it is formed against a 
perceived outside threat – has not yielded a truly unified Somali ‘community’ and internal 













CHAPTER THREE: REALISING RIGHTS 
The policy and practices of urban governance have a direct impact on the lives of their citizens.  
Such responsibility does not always come with the necessary power to determine impact.  As 
Bollens points out, "one of the major roles of urban policy is to ameliorate urban conflict 
through an acceptable allocation of urban resources across ethnic groups and neighbourhoods" 
and in South Africa there is a responsibility to ensure distribution more evenly across classes, 
which are highly segregated in terms of space within the city.  When this role is neglected, the 
potential for conflict is high and the liveability of the city declines rapidly for all of its residents.  
As it will become apparent, the experiences of this group of Somali migrants in Cape Town, 
neglect is the most benign form of failure to fulfil this responsibility and their rights are being 
compromised daily. 
In their study on the developmental state in an ever-globalizing, urbanizing world, Parnell and 
Pieterse argue that in order to achieve the realization of rights, we must operate on various 
scales, the most important of which is the urban/city scale (2010).  They point out the inability 
of cities to provide or enable the realization of third generation rights, those they identify as the 
'right to the city' such as "a safe environment, to mobility or to public spaces.  While the right to 
freedom of movement, safety, environmental protection and economic opportunity are 
recognized in both the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996) and the International Declaration 
on Human Rights, the urban planning and enforcement mechanisms that protect or enable these 
rights are poorly understood" (2010; 148).  They assert that first generation rights may one day 
be accessible to all but that cities in the global South wracked by spatially segregated urban 
poverty, that third generation rights will likely never reach the poorest and most vulnerable.  
Where is the freedom of movement when walking on the street means you live in fear of your 
life simply because you are different (Vingneswaran, 2007b)?  As one respondent explained: 
“You can’t walk.  You scared every time you walk.  Every time you doesn’t (sic) have the money 
to go the transport, you know.  So if you walk, you scared every time” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
121010, B#6).  When men fear leaving their homes or even staying inside because they do not 
have documentation that they have the legal right to obtain, mobility is not only hampered, but 
also earning a living is risky, accessing health care or housing becomes difficult.  Consequently, 
they must live in the shadows, their very existence becoming illegal.   
For the rights-based agenda to work for everyone, there must be a twofold effort by the state 
and the citizenry.  The most vulnerable urban residents cannot and do not have the ability to 
form organizations that can actively hold the State accountable for oversight or guaranteeing 












for Somali residents of Cape Town.  Liveability and a reasonable quality of life are only 
achievable in a city when the population mobilizes at the grass roots level to bring about change 
(Evans, 2002).  As an organization, the Somali Retailers Association actively pursues the 
realization of the rights of their members but as a semiformal network with little traction or 
political power, they gain little purchase.  By banding together – knowing that Somalis are 
unlikely to assimilate and that South Africans do not encourage integration in their communities 
either – they utilise the only avenues that are available to them: relying on their fellow Somalis 
and approaching the government, UNHCR and other bodies to access their rights. 
It is not a large leap in logic to see that there are many “negative by-products of preventing 
significant segments of the population from accessing safe accommodation, jobs, and social 
services.  These include heightened rates of crime, corruption, poverty, social tensions and 
greater risk of communicable diseases.  Problems that affect all residents" (Landau, 2006; 16).  
Forced migrants present multiple challenges to urban policy implementation and rarely are 
they on the agenda for planning or urban development.  By ignoring them or refusing to 
acknowledge the impact they have on South Africa’s cities, it is not only their quality of life, but 
also everyone’s that declines.  According to South Africa’s former UNHCR Representative, 
"UNHCR's expectations for asylum seekers and refugees in structured urban environments have 
always been for governments to play a significant role in protecting them and searching for 
durable solutions to solve their problems” (Rulashade, 2006).  Neither the national, provincial 
nor municipal levels of government has adequately adopted strategies for its urban migrant 
population (Turok, 2001) – rural to urban South African migrants and forced migrants from 
other nations.  With an anticipated population growth of over 15% in the next nine years, which 
will predominantly occur in the poorer areas, competition for land, resources, jobs and public 
services will be challenged.  The potential for conflict will only increase. 
This section examines the degree to which the SRA and this network of Somali have affected the 
lives of its members in the absence of effective services from the State and how it helps them to 
achieve their rights.  In so doing, we are looking at the urbanism of the city – examining the 
patterns of daily life of one group of urban citizens, how they adjust and integrate, how they 
access their rights and respond to conflict and trying to determine the meaning they derive from 
their place in the city (Gottdiener & Hutchison, 2006; 45).  In other words, the ‘geopathology’ – 
place as a problem and the problem of place – of Cape Town is under scrutiny (Chauduhuri, 
1995). 
Examining the respondents’ and the SRA’s roles in facilitating integration, we get a better idea of 












Before proceeding with an analysis of their experiences and comparisons with dominant 
discourses on integration, it is necessary to understand precisely what the participants 
understand when they hear the word ‘integration’ (which turns out to be a difficult word to 
translate into Somali). One respondent said that despite all his efforts, he was unable to “get 
inside” South Africans the way he can with his Somali compatriots (Male, Makaza 26/09/10, 
#9).  Most respondents, when asked about integration or their involvement within their 
neighbourhood with South Africans, spoke of their relations with South Africans as extremely 
limited to business transactions or exchanging a few pleasantries but virtually nothing else on 
the neutral to positive end of the spectrum.  Only one respondent even hinted at a desire to 
befriend or socially integrate with South Africans (Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A #9); this is most 
likely because they see South Africa as a temporary destination and hope to go elsewhere (SFM, 
2006; interview with Aden; Male, Khayelitsha, 170910, A # 1& 2; Male, Philipi, 170910, A #3; 
Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B #3; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #5; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
121010, B #7; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #9).  All other interactions mentioned were 
limited to violence, verbal abuse or even well meaning questions as to why they do not just go 
home to Somalia. 
However, it was the Chairman of the SRA, Mr. Warasame, who was most expressive about what 
integration means and why Somalis find it so difficult to undertake: 
“it is good when the community living together.  They must integrate each other. They 
must interact.  They must mix.  It is good to be integrate to (sic) each other.  When you tell 
the Somalians mix to the other people, go to the meetings, they don’t respond, they don’t 
care … When you tell them to speak with the community leaders, they will tell you they 
don’t know the community leader or the area.  That is the major issue.  Example, it is 20 
years since Somalia was destroyed. You see, the fact that many Somalis have been in a 
crisis in their country for almost 20 years.  They have not been exposed to these kinds of 
processes, these kinds of social interactions, they are used to living in different 
communities.  So it’s basically a bit difficult for them when they come to Cape Town to 
integrate with the local people because they still think that they are in the same kind of life 
they had in Somalia” (interview with Warasame, 260910, A#7).  
Local integration is not defined in refugee law, but it is used in the vernacular (Crisp, 1999).   
Integration is also distinct from assimilation; the latter implies the loss of a person's distinct 
identity or features that come from their community of origin (Castelli, 2009; 69; Neocosmos, 
2009; Jacobsen, 2006; OECD, 2006; Polzer, 2004; Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, among others).  
Very few migrants are interested in integration or assimilation (Nyamnjoh, 2006; 75; Landau, 
2008).  Some scholars and the UN see integration as the absolute ideal (Jacobsen, 2006); Polzer 
demonstrates that it may be easier in rural areas (2004) and that it can happen organically 
rather than as a result of policy interventions (Polzer, 2008).  Certainly, none of those who 












respondents cited religious differences and language as the main reason why integration or 
even friendship between Somalis and South Africans was impossible. The three-fold process of 
integration entails: 
 Legal Process –  refugees get rights and entitlements; if there is no possibility of 
repatriation (as is unlikely in the foreseeable future for Somalis) this should eventually 
lead to permanent residence and ultimately legal citizenship with the requisite identity 
and travel documents; 
 Economic Process – the ability to work and earn a living legally; along the process one 
would go from a dependent of the state (although in South Africa, refugees do not get 
state assistance) to a self-reliant, legally employed person with a sustainable livelihood; 
 Social Process – living amongst the local population “without fear of systematic 
discrimination, intimidation or exploitation by the authorities or people of the asylum 
country”; personal, cultural or historical identity does not need to be forsaken and 
replaced with local identity (Crisp, 1999; 1-2); “process of negotiating access to local 
legitimacy and entitlement on the basis of a variety of value systems determined by local 
power holders in dialogue with refugees” (Polzer, 2008; 3). 
 
With only three durable solutions to choose from, the UNHCR and the South African government 
are caught in a precarious and tricky position from a policy perspective.  All three 'solutions' 
make for bad policy.  For Somali refugees, repatriation is simply not an option; the situation in 
Somalia is too dangerous to send people back.  The solution looked most favourably upon by 
many refugees -- sending them to a safe third country, known as resettlement -- would prove 
disastrous for South Africa for several reasons: 1) by rejecting refugee reception, the country's 
image as a tolerant and human rights respecting country would be thrown out the window; 
2)border control would have to be stepped up considerably and camps would have to be set up 
across the country to house all current/future asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants at 
considerable cost to the government and UNHCR -- this would only increase public outcry that 
the government expends more money and cares more about foreigners than its own people; 3) 
word would get around that if a forced migrant made it to South Africa they would be 
guaranteed resettlement.  If South Africa feels inundated by foreigners now, one can only 
imagine how the floodgates may open if most of the African continent found out they could get 
safe passage to the West via South Africa.   
Thus, the third solution, integration, is the only real option for South Africa.  This too is an 
untenable and unrealistic expectation.  The government does nothing to make sure this can 
happen – it is not something that can just happen.  Without active facilitation, “neither does 
proximity nor exposure simply reduce conflict.  These ends must be actively pursued… tension 
is reduced between groups only when there are mutually beneficial reasons to cooperate in 












Communities within the townships violently oppose integration, more or less with tacit consent 
from government (see Appendix 2 for a full account of the participant’s experiences with this).  
In such circumstances, integration or reintegration is nearly impossible.  As mentioned in 
countless other studies, police practices make it illegal for migrants to even live in the locations, 
encouraging citizens to root them out (Baliely, 2004; Khaito, 2007; Landau, 2009; Landau, 
2010b; IOM, 2009; Harris, 2001).  Migrants themselves reject integration, choosing to "continue 
to sit just outside (or above) South African society, emotionally orienting themselves elsewhere.  
Instead of seeking integration and recognition within South Africa's society and politics, 
many[migrants] will strive for a kind of usufruct rights: a form of self-exclusion that is at least 
partially compatible with the kind of social and political marginalization they have experienced" 
(Landau, 2008; 117).  The Somali involved in this study cling reflexively to their own 
compatriots because of religious or linguistic differences and in reaction to the repulsion from 
the South African communities and government institutions with which they have contact 
(Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #5; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #6; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
121010, B #8; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #9; Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A #9; interview 
with Warasame).  It is a catch-22: They – Somali and South Africans alike -- do not favour 
integration because they do not relate to one another, but they cannot relate to one another as 
long they do not attempt to break down the barriers to integration. 
The interview schedule contained several questions about the details of their lives in four key 
areas that correspond with their guaranteed rights: safety, livelihood and work, housing and 
health.  They were asked at various points to comment about the safety of their living situation 
(in terms of both their relationship with the local community and their relationships with those 
officially tasked to protect them), working and livelihood, housing, and health.  Essentially, these 
four components translate into the some of the most fundamental needs and human rights of all 
people: security of person, the ability to earn an income, shelter, and access to clean water and 
essential health services.  Without these, life is basically unliveable.   
SAFETY 
Some of the communities within the townships and locations across Cape Town violently 
oppose integration of non-nationals, more or less with tacit consent from government.  Only one 
of the 18 respondents had no direct experience with violence in his place of residence; this was 
reported by Mr. Aden who lives in student accommodation at the University of Western Cape.  
On a daily basis, he is called to respond to township violence against SRA members.  Under 
apartheid, “the threat of violence – whether ‘vertical’ (state against citizens) or ‘horizontal’ 












Africans residing in the volatile, tightly policed townships” (IOM, 2009;10); post-transition, 
violence is seen predominantly as a symptom of greater structural inequalities and criminal 
predation (Ibid).  Cape Town has one of the highest rates of murder in the entire world, and is 
the murder capital of South Africa (Gie, 2009).  In 2007/08, the city has records for 2,018 
murders which were reported to SAPS in Cape Town and surrounding areas; during the same 
period, 4,009 property-related crimes were reported41 (Ibid).  Perhaps it is a coincidence, but 
following closely behind the CBD as the site of most business-related crime in the city are the 
two areas associated most with Somali business – Bellville and Mitchell’s Plain (Ibid).    
These statistics reflect only the crimes reported to the police or those crimes that the police 
officially open cases for (hence the unreliability of these statistics).  Forced migrants and non-
nationals are often reluctant to report crime to the police for various reasons as the 
respondents suggested: 
 the notorious unreliability of the police in pursuing cases (Male, Bellville, 170910, A #5 
& Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #3 & Interview with AAA); 
 police asking for bribes (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B #10); 
 people wearing police uniforms actually perpetrating the crimes (Male, Philippi, 
170910, A #3 & Male, Khayelitsha 170910, A #1&2); 
 ineffectiveness or fear inherent in the police force – making the decision not to pursue 
criminals out of fear of reprisals (Male, Makaza, 260910, A #8 & SRA Chairman); 
 knowledge that even if the criminals were apprehended that they would be released 
again a few days later without charges or a trial (Interview with SRA Chairman) ; 
 if the police are called to the scene of a violent crime then procedure dictates that the 
victim must be taken to the hospital in an ambulance but as response times are slow, 
this may result in death of the v ctim (Interview with SRA Chairman). 
The SRA actively encourages its members to report all crimes and works directly with the police 
to follow-up on cases on behalf of members.  Having an organization makes this process more 
streamlined and effective than it was prior to the formation of the SRA, according to Aden, as the 
leadership and Branch Managers cultivate a working relationship with the various police 
precincts.  This leads to suspicion in the community about corruption and collusion between the 
police and the SRA, which contributes to intra-community tension (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
061010, B #2).  In the view of SRA leadership and some members, having a police force with 
knowledge of and exposure to the Somali community and an Association to lobby for equal 
treatment under the law is seen as a positive outcome, overall (interview with Aden; Interview 
with Warasame; Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A #9; Male, Philippi, 171910, A #3; Male, Bellville, 
170910, A #5).  Violence is an everyday occurrence in the townships and crime statistics in the 
informal sections of the city are notoriously unreliable.  This country’s history is a violent one 
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 Including ‘business crime’ and robbery, under which most of the non-violent crimes against Somali business 












and Cape Town has a violent, gang-ridden reputation that is sadly well earned.  It is not the 
intention of this study to assert that foreigners should be better off than other residents of the 
townships or that their needs should be placed above South Africans.  In an ideal world, the 
crime statistics would be drastically reduced overall.  The focus on safety in this section 
specifically refers to crime, which these Somali men are victims because of their foreignness. 
It is sometimes those who are entrusted to give, respect, and enforce the protection of rights 
who are often the worst abusers of the rights and entitlements of forced migrants.  As 
mentioned in countless other studies, police practices basically make it illegal for migrants to 
live in the locations, encouraging citizens to root them out, which some see as government- 
endorsed xenophobia.  To complicate matters, when the police harboured non-nationals in the 
police stations during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks, the police felt they were losing the 
trust and cooperation of the community.  They felt that if they were to be seen to be helping the 
migrants that the community would then turn against them (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; 
139).   
Instances of police being involved in robberies, tearing up Home Affairs documentation and 
other illegal activity were reported regularly by the sample group.42  The lack of assistance for 
Somali victims of xenophobic crime by the police is yet another form of violence.  One 
respondent spoke of his personal experiences with xenophobic violence and the role that the 
police play: 
“The shop has been robbed at gunpoint many times… apart from that, there is also car 
hijackings, and the even take the cars sometimes.  They even take all your money.  
 KLH: When this happens, do you report it to the police?   
Respondent: Yes.  But they are not doing anything. It is better us than the police [us 
meaning Somalis themselves].  Because if you call the police when the people are robbing 
you… then the police cannot even follow them…  Many of the police men do not have the 
power because when you call him and tell him ‘this is the man who is robbing me’ even the 
police is scared to follow them... They will come to you and ask you ‘where is the gun?’ It is 
better you to protect yourself.  The police are very strong or powerful to us, not to the 
South African.” (Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A#8).  
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 Participants were also asked about their experience gaining documents at the RRO offices which are 
notorious as sites of violence and opportunistic crime against asylum seekers (UCT Law Clinic, 2009; SFM, 
2006; observations by Hoeflich at Nyanga RRO in 2009 related to UNHCR research; Harris, 2001; Klaaren & 
Ramji, 2007; Landau, 2004; Landau, 2009;) in addition to the problems that flimsy documentation, lack of 
proper documentation and related issues cause for vulnerable forced migrants.  This lack of paperwork or 
having documents that are not recognised by employers also means they are unable to access the formal 
employment sector, are vulnerable to abuse by the police, etc.  However as DHA is a national body and the 
issues of rights being abused by this Department are well documented and the SRA cannot influence these, I 












Those tasked with the prevention and investigation of crime and upholding rights for these 
vulnerable people are seen as taking advantage of their weakened positions, knowing that they 
have little to no recourse for action.  The SRA holds responding to violent xenophobic crime 
against its members as one of its most important roles.  On several occasions, Mr. Aden had to 
reschedule our appointments as he was at a police station or in court with members who were 
victims to a crime.  Mr. Warasame who pointed out that they are often on the scene of a crime 
before the police arrive, in itself, this is an example of how strongly networked this group is.  He 
also explained that in the case of the robberies perpetrated by criminals wearing police 
uniforms, the SRA and members were instrumental in identifying the men who were, at the time 
of our interview, in jail awaiting prosecution.  One respondent explained his experience being 
robbed by civilians wearing police uniforms: 
“It was 2010 I think May.  Three guys, wearing the uniform of police.   
KLH: In a police uniform?   
Respondent: Yes, a police uniform… he knock my shop, he say, “open please.”  I come here 
and I say, “What you want?”  “I am police man, I want to search here for firearms and 
something drugs.”  Me, I say, “I don’t have fire arms, I don’t have something drugs.”  OK, 
[the ‘policemen’ said] “must open please, I want to search inside.”  Another friend I am 
working with – that guy now is gone to Somalia – but that guy I wake up, I say “come 
please” to that guy because we are working together at that time. That guy, that police 
guy, is giving me a ‘search warrant’, a search warrant, he said “open” and we opened [the 
store].  He come in, if he’s come in and me, I think he’s the police.  We are we opened, if he’s 
coming in.  He say “my friend, if you have got some money, some airtime or some 
cigarettes, please put it.”   
KLH: Airtime, and cash and cigarettes?   
Respondent: And cigarettes.  “You must put it separate.  Put it separate.”  He say we must 
go in [gestures around back store room to indicate that the ‘police’ sent them to the 
storeroom].  We are two guys.  If I go, he take the guy and he make me this way [gestures, 
puts his hands behind his back to indicate that they were tied up].  And the other guy also.  
He took all the money.  He took it that time, and that time the money is 19,000.   
KLH: 19,000 [rand]?  And he made you put your arms behind your back?   
Respondent: Yes, my back.  He… when we feel he’s gone, me, I take the scissors.  Me, I cut my 
friend [loose], my friend he also cut me [loose] (Male, Khayelitsha, 170910, A #1&2). 
Those in this study were particularly adverse to reintegration with the community after violent 
episodes, which is also in keeping with the findings of the IOM study (2009).   Reintegration is 
particularly unlikely when 1) goods and property were looted or seized by the community, 
thereby making it impossible for the businessmen to start over and pursue a livelihood; 2) 
where violence was extreme, as was the case with several respondents who were burned, shot 
or otherwise severely physically harmed; and 3) when police or other officials were actively 
engaged in the violence.  For instance, one respondent explained that after his five-day hospital 
stay that followed his shooting in Philippi, he was discharged and opted to move to a hostel in 












I cannot go back to that place because of also, I do not want that [those] people to see that [I am] 
scared [or] that [I am] wound[ed].  You know, if they see here that [indicates his gunshot], you 
understand, that I got shot?  I don’t want that people to see because I am scared I may be a 
target” (Male, Bellville, 170910, A #5).  By appearing weak and wounded, he feared he would be 
an easier target for criminal predation or subject to elimination by xenophobes.  Each one of the 
respondents was affected by xenophobic violence – only one of whom managed to escape being 
a victim himself.    
The other significant issue brought up in the sample group regarding their lives in the township, 
was the issue of race.  The Somalis felt less safe in black townships than those regarded as 
predominantly coloured townships.  This coincides with other research in Cape Town – the city 
with the largest coloured population in South Africa – including research conducted by this 
researcher in 2004 with the Swiss Forum for Migration (SFM, 2006).  Two of the participant’s 
responses capture this fear in different ways: 
“I don’t know.  Every time they say us, ‘you are foreigner, you can go home.’ ‘You are 
Makwerekwere.’  I don’t know what means [when they call us] like that.  You know, our life 
is same.  You know.  Everyone, if you see us he’s talk like that.  If I go with another guys 
friend homes if he stay the black areas, he talk us like that.  ‘You can go home’, what.  He 
treat us… I don’t know.  KLH: They treat you very badly?  Respondent: Very badly.  KLH: 
And its mostly in the black areas, you say?  Respondent:  The black areas, yea.  KLH: Not so 
much in the coloured areas or white areas?  Respondent: Coloured areas,  he rob you if he 
want.  He don’t threat you, he don’t say ‘you go’ what what...  If he say, ‘do you have 
something?’ he can take whatever you have.  He can’t treat you, like the way those black 
people…They [coloureds] just leave you.  He don’t hurt.  Those [points at black man] people, 
they rob you, and you know and if he see you, you know, he call you ‘Somalia, Somalia!’”  
Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#6). 
“It’s like this, you know, the way we live in South Africa.  I don’t know what can I say.  
Scared for safety.  Every time, you can’t sleep you know.  If you stay like this area 
[Mitchell’s plain town centre], you have the rent or money maybe to house here, maybe it’s 
better.  Now I’m sleeping the black side because I ask them guys to sleep them that side, 
you know. I don’t have the rent [to get my own place].  So, that side [in the black areas], 
sometimes, you don’t know… he can burn your house sometimes you know, if you stay that 
side.  Many thing happening.  Sometimes he come to your house, you can’t wake up at night 
to go to the toilet.  It’s difficult… Yea. Anytime, you can expect something bad.”  (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#6) 
The previously cited SAMP survey on xenophobic attitudes did not exhibit a notable difference 
between the attitudes of blacks and coloureds,43 but the Somalis clearly fear living amongst one 
group more so than the other (Crush, year unknown).  The prospect of making a living often 
outweighs their concerns for personal safety and they settle in all the different areas.   
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In addition to ‘normal’ violence of township life, the Somali are under siege by township 
residents, business competitors and the police.  Respondents universally feared for their lives 
and felt completely unsafe.  Many of them cited the violence in Somalia as less than or equal to 
the way they experienced township life as they are targeted directly in Cape Town, rather than 
accidental victims of general warfare.  Contrasting their responses with those in the Department 
of Local Government and Housing survey, who generally felt safe as long as they stayed out of 
the way of gangs or did not go out at night, there is a marked difference in the level of perceived 
safety amongst South African and Somali respondents.  The latter experiencing a less safe and 
less liveable city.  The SRA may not necessarily increase the safety of the Somali community, but 
is there to help respond when its members become victims, assists them with accessing their 
rights to treatment in the hospital, liaises with police and – as is explored in the next section – 
negotiates with South African retail associations to minimize business related conflict that can 
and does result in violence. 
LIVELIHOOD AND WORK 
Africans from Nigeria, the Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and elsewhere on the continent each 
have a negative stereotype (see Mattes, 1999 for specific stereotypes and opinions according to 
region; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2008; Harris, 2001; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 
2004; IOM, 2009; Misango, 2005).  Somalis seem to have an entirely different reputation – not 
as criminals or drug-addicts; the stereotypical Somali is a hawker, trader or a businessman.  
They are rarely accused of “stealing our women.”  In some instances, particularly following the 
xenophobic rumours which followed the World Cup, communities have even begged the Somalis 
to return to their shops while continuing to scare off Zimbabweans and Mozambicans from their 
midst (Prince & Jassiem, 2010; Dolley, 2010).   
Despite being looked upon as slightly better than other groups, they are easily identifiable 
(physically) as Somali and easily targeted because of their business activities.  Morris' study 
from 1998 concluded that foreigners in the townships are usually from SADC countries or they 
have lived in South Africa for a long time (Morris, 1998).  This was echoed in a recent CoRMSA 
study which asserts that most refugees prefer to live in inner city neighbourhoods because of 
the perception that townships and informal settlements are too dangerous or xenophobic 
(CoRMSA, 2008; 50). Although this may be a case on a national scale, the Somali presence in the 
townships is highly visible.  During fieldwork, driving through the townships – even some of the 
smaller, rougher or more out-of-the-way areas – had a visible Somali presence in the form of 












One Somali respondent cited their tendency and decision to locate their businesses and live in 
the townships as one of the things that make them most vulnerable to attack.  When asked why 
he thought that South Africans target foreigners, especially Somalis, he said:  
 "They see Somalians, they see money.  That’s [the] problem.  There’s Somalian, they see 
money.  I think those people, they don’t work hard.  They just something, want something 
to grab from the foreigners.  Most [other] foreigners go that way, they do business here, 
they do their business whatever, rightly or wrongly, here in a town.  But most of the 
Somalian they go that area [waves in general direction of townships] to open small tuk 
shops, that way they are winning.  So, they [South Africans] come to the tuk shops and start 
to loot or rob…I don’t know why all Somalis like to go to that place.  But other foreigners, 
they stay [points down to indicate in town], they don’t go.  They get contracts.  Also, in the 
town.  Somalis, they go [to the townships]." (Male, Bellville, 170910, A #5) 
As businessmen, they see the potential market is in the townships and they go there, knowing 
the risk to their own personal safety and that violence is much more pervasive in the townships.  
The SRA does not have a branch specifically in Cape Town CBD, according to the Spokesperson, 
because those retailers with shops, restaurants or businesses in town are not as likely to be 
victims of violence.    When asked about the Somali community in Cape Town, whether they 
work together and what he thought of Somalis in general, one respondent explained “what I 
know [of] Somalis [is] that they are working and having a jobs and they are losing they 
properties, again building.  This is how they are…mostly they get robbed and they take away 
their belongings and this is why they lost (sic), that they are risk at lose their things, that’s the 
only way they lose their things. They are a community of businesses and they are working 
together (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#8).  They characterize themselves by clan and as 
Somali, but here in South Africa many of these men recognize and embrace the stereotype of 
themselves as tuk shop owners or businessmen.   
Somalis may not be accused generally of stealing jobs, but their position as businessmen and 
entrepreneurs creates a tension between the local, largely unemployed township residents, 
local business owners and the Somali businessmen (Warner & Finchilescu, 2005).  The problem 
of xenophobic violence is certainly not limited exclusively to Somalis but their businesses place 
them at risk as the Makaza Branch Manager pointed out: “the problem [of xenophobia] is with 
all these guys from Africa except the South Africans.  The only reason the eyes are on the 
Somalians (sic) is because the Somalians (sic) are the business people and the businesses have 
been looted.  So that is why all eyes on Somalian people.  But the problem have reached the 
other African people from other countries” (Male, Khayelitsha, 260910, A#9).  Although Mr. 
Aden and Mr. Warasame spoke of their attempts at mediating these problems with local hawker 












not acknowledge that by making businesses they are making themselves targets, thereby 
accepting some of the responsibility for making changes.  
The IOM study data confirms that business competition was a stimulant for xenophobic violence 
in Masiphumelele, Du Noon and other locations where Somalis were the primary target (IOM, 
2009; 21).  This has continued long after the two large-scale incidences of xenophobia, as 
Landau points out that the expulsions, evictions and discrimination against foreign shopkeepers 
continues and that "where words are not enough, business associations and gangsters have kept 
on killing foreign shopkeepers and residents.  Since the violence 'ended' in June 2009, dozens of 
foreigners have been targeted and killed while mass expulsions continue" (2010; 214).  One 
respondent pointed out that this did not have to be the case for all Somalis in the future and that 
small business is not necessarily where they see themselves, but there are barriers to entry in 
the formal sector.  He contends that “if the legal problems were not there and we had the right 
paper work this would not be the case and there would not be this kind of problem… we are 
doctors, teachers, mechanics, engineers and we could fill many positions where there is a 
scarcity and we would not all have to be in competition” (Male, Bellville, 121910, untapped).  
There is more to the issue of Somali livelihood in Cape Town being threatened – it is not just a 
case of being held-up at gunpoint or other violence.  This gets back to the issue of opportunity 
structure briefly mentioned in Chapter 5.  Kloosterman & Rath explain that “access to markets 
and their growth potential differ not only from city to city but from neighbourhood to 
neighbourhood within cities" (2001; 197).  In my first connection with the Somali community 
this year, I was shown around the town centre in Mitchell's Plain.  During this tour, my 
translator showed me the vast numbers of empty spaces, which are demarcated in yellow for 
informal trading.  Although there were a dizzying number of un-manned yellow boxes drawn 
across the pavement, he explained that most Somali traders who applied for space were told 
that there were no available permits or that it was full.  By excluding them from the prime 
trading locations, they are effectively denied a chance at enhancing profitability of their 
businesses and their livelihoods.  This is a prime example in "graphic concrete terms how the 
sheer banality of the local can crush the high promise of the transnational" (Jones, Ram & 
Theodorakopoulos, 2010; 16).    
No matter how strong their connections are with other Somalis, there are barriers to entry in 
business – formal and informal – and outright discrimination by those who control trading 
space.  Going back to the community meetings and various ‘peace treaties’ witnessed during 
fieldwork, the government and South Africa business are actively involved in preventing the 












forcing them to fend for themselves and create a livelihood while putting up barriers to their 
entry in the market while encouraging (or at least doing little to prevent) citizens from seeking 
out redistributive ‘justice’ by looting or robbing informal foreign businessmen. 
Somali mutual aid networks appear to help to offset some of this discrimination and structural 
opportunity cost, but it does not go far enough to level the playing field.  Even with the semi-
formal SRA in place to tie together the retailers, the strength of their social capital is not enough 
to offset the toll that violence takes on their businesses or provide the Somalis with full access to 
work and livelihood.  In some cases, the SRA’s efforts to diminish competition – such as the 
peace treaties and other negotiated settlements – actually come back to directly harm Somali 
businesses or put up (illegal) restrictions on opening additional shops (interview with Aden 
180111).  Barriers to earning a livelihood in the formal sector – namely the lack of proper 
documentation – coupled with discrimination, exclusion and violent opposition in the informal 
sector render earning a sustainable livelihood extremely difficult (Bailey, 2004).  Without an 
income, access to government assistance in the form of grants or an alternative place to live 
where they are kept separate, the city is again less liveable for this vulnerable group despite 
their efforts and tendency toward entrepreneurship. 
HOUSING 
Although there were several questions relating to housing in the interview schedule, very little 
information resulted.  As an important measure of liveability, the lack of information on housing 
was disappointing and leaves a gap in this study.  The liveability of Cape Town’s townships in 
terms of housing is incredibly poor for most of its inhabitants.  Thus, the dearth of participant 
experience in this area does not significantly affect the study overall.  There are a few salient 
points which set their exper ences apart in terms of quality of life. The issue of housing is a 
contentious and asserting that non-nationals have a right to housing is an explosive issue.  The 
South African Constitution does not place the restriction of citizenship on the positive rights of 
housing and shelter – Section 26 of the Bill of Rights clearly states that “everyone has the right 
to have access to adequate housing” (SA Constitution).  The National Housing Code limits 
subsidies to citizens, despite the fact that refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those who 
are disabled or otherwise unable to provide for themselves, often cannot afford housing options 
in urban areas (CoRMSA, 2006).  Over 25% of the residents of the City of Cape Town live in 
unsatisfactory or irregular housing (Boraine et al, 2006; City of Cape Town, 2006) and many 
forced migrants are among that quarter of the population.44  The rights of non-nationals should 
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not be placed above those of citizens; instead, the rights of all must be upheld without 
discrimination.  The expectation that a highly politicized issue such as housing will be resolved 
without discrimination based on nationality is highly unrealistic, as several participants 
recognized.   
Whether they are rural South Africans moving to a city to seek out employment, a refugee 
fleeing to South Africa seeking protection or most any other class of poor migrant, the 
townships and informal shack settlements are likely to be their first destination, in search of a 
dwelling.  Simply showing up with a few raw materials and erecting a shack when you are a 
foreigner is not likely to go over well with neighbours.  Despite their ‘informality,’ shack 
settlements have their own complex patronage systems, and “access to shack settlement is 
heavily contingent on membership of a social network.  This could be a local network or a 
network of people who come from the same country and who are all living in the same 
circumstances… Shack settlements often become physically and socially impenetrable to 
outsiders, ghettos of sorts” (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; 153-54).  Thus, the issue of housing – 
renting space from willing South Africans to put a roof over their heads – is a complex issue for 
Somalis who generally do not make attempts to penetrate or ingratiate themselves with South 
African social networks and South Africans are generally reluctant to allow non-nationals to live 
in their spaces.  Other reports document landlords forcing non-nationals to pay higher rents in 
Cape Town, Johannesburg and other cities but this was not observed as part of this study 
(Banks, 2008; SFM, 2006; Khaito, 2007; Pennix, 2004; Landau, Ramjathatn-Keogh & Singh, 
2004).   
One reason why landlords may prove reluctant to rent space to Somalis is highly logical on their 
part, and not necessarily done as a discriminatory practice: because Somalis are targeted by 
xenophobic violence and property damage may result.  For instance, one respondent used to 
run his own shop in a rented space, but he was asked to leave by his landlord after xenophobes 
repeatedly targeted his shop:  “It was take a time (sic) of two months.  They set a fire [to] the 
shop.  And again, and time again, whenever I go and sleep and lock it again they set the fire.  And 
again, it takes more times.  And at the end, the shop, the landlord tell me I have to leave his 
place.  Then I leave.  KLH:  They tried to set it on fire many times?  Respondent: Yea, four times” 
(Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#9).  As one respondent in the Department of Local 
Government and Housing survey pointed out, she would not take in foreigners, but does not 
care if others do (15DNCF).  Thus, it is not always a case of xenophobia nor is it always meant to 
deny the rights of foreigners to live in an area, although as stated in Chapter 4, of the 23 
respondents to the Department of Local Government and Housing survey who were asked 












definitely had the right to stay, 10 responded that they did not and two expressed no opinion 
either way (Jooste et al, 2010). 
Only one Somali respondent owned his home and Mr. Aden lives in student accommodation, 
thus avoiding the landlord issue.  Overall, the sample group’s housing status was incredibly 
shaky –at least nine respondents were dispossessed had no dwelling at all (see figure 6.1 
below). 
Figure 6.1 Sample Group’s Housing 
Type of Accommodation Respondents 
Shack 1 
Lodging/Hostel due to xenophobic attack  4 
Mosque due to xenophobic attack 2 
Living in Shop where they work – shared with other Somalis 5 
Unsettled – hopping between friends 3 
University Residence 1 
 
The SRA did not appear to have any direct impact on the issue of housing for its members.  
However, the importance of a social network cannot be underestimated in this regard.  As noted 
above, several respondents report living in the shops in which they work – jobs they obtained 
through their connection to the SRA, network of Somali friends, extended family, clan or other 
ties.  Those who are currently without homes but rely upon the help and generosity of friends, 
also lean heavily upon the Somali network to put a roof over their heads.  Social capital proves 
to be a lifesaver outside the world of business as well. 
The issue of housing in the townships and informal settlements in Cape Town is difficult for all 
residents.  When the ANC Youth League protested and destroyed the temporary toilets in 
Makaza earlier in 2010, the Somalis felt the hardship like other residents.  This section means 
only to underscore that quality of life and the realization of rights should not come at one 
group’s expense.  Liveability of a neighbourhood affects all of its residents and violence comes at 
everyone’s expense. 
HEALTH 
Like housing, access to health services is a right guaranteed to all who live in South Africa.  
Foreign nationals may not be denied care because they do not pay into the social welfare 












so that citizens receive priority treatment.  Despite these rights, migrants often report 
differential treatment or refusal at public healthcare centres (CoRMSA, 2008; Harris, 2004; 
Landau, 2006; SFM, 2006; among others).  Only a few of the respondents in this study reported 
any such treatment, such as one man who brought a Somali lady to the clinic.  In response to the 
open-ended question as to whether he experienced any other issues in South Africa, he said he 
experienced xenophobia 
“especially in the clinic.  There is another mother, I think I took her to the hospital last of 
last week.  We rock up roughly half past three in the night and we queue in the line until 
half past three in the evening.  Nobody assisted us.  KLH:  Why didn’t they assist you?  Were 
you in the queue?  Respondent:  Yea, we were in the queue, yea.  KLH: They just took a long 
time, or?  Respondent:  NO!  They pick the people that are coming behind us simply because 
we are Somalis.  KLH: Because you are Somalis, they didn’t serve you?  Which clinic was 
this?  Respondent:  I think this one of Mitchell’s Plain, here” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
061010, B#2). 
Like the section on Housing, there were several questions in the interview schedule pertaining 
to health, but due to various reasons – the primary one being time constraints – this issue was 
rarely discussed unless it was directly connected to their experiences with xenophobic violence.  
The two men recovering from recent attacks at the time of our interview both reported 
excellent treatment at the local hospital – Tygerberg (Male, Bellville, 170910, untapped; Male, 
Bellville, 170910, A#5).  This happens to be the hospital most respondents mentioned, if they 
spoke of health services at all.  The SRA asserted that they help to raise money from the 
community to sustain those injured by the xenophobic violence, such as the respondent who 
was burned severely by the petrol bomb, but they provide neither long-term assistance nor 
regularised physical, emotional or mental health support.  
All of the Somali respondents experience high levels of trauma and are visibly affected by their 
encounters with violence and the feeling that they are constantly in danger, under siege.  This is 
the unspoken problem that so many of these men face in their daily lives, yet they are often 
unable to talk about it.  Several of the sources on refugees underscore the experiences refugees 
may have undergone in their countries which caused them to flee, pointing out that “the trauma 
experienced by Somali refugees severs families, undermines the sense of security and desire to 
form lasting relationships, and threatens general mental health” (Boyle & Ali, 2009).  They may 
live amongst the urban poor in Cape Town, facing difficult living conditions along with their 
South African neighbours, but they are different in that their previous experiences with torture 
and the on-going mental and physical strain they are under by being ‘undesirables’ takes a giant 
toll on their well-being (observed in interviews, general observations in the field and also 












Most of them spoke of the lack of safety, or how they fear for their lives, but very few 
respondents were able to open up about their mental health and internal feelings of security.  
More than one of the respondents whose interviews took place privately in English spent time 
crying in my presence – never with a fellow Somali present.  One of these men presented the 
difficulty of life away from family and friends along with the pressures of being a man in the face 
of his difficulty: 
“It is very difficult, life here, yea.  Very difficult.  KLH: How so?  Respondent: Because you 
stay away with no family, no friends.  I’ve got stress.  A lot of stress.  You are away at home.  
Just meet friends.  It is not your family friends.  Just friends, the Somalian friends.  Not your 
family.  Only Somalian, not family friends.  KLH: So it’s lonely?  Respondent: Yea.  Too 
much!  KLH: That makes life so… Respondent: Difficult.  Because when we are with your 
family, you can tell your problems, you see. But when you are alone you can’t tell your 
problems.  No one talk to you.  So you have to be like a man.  Stone face and face the reality.  
KLH: but sometimes you want to let it out.  Respondent: Yea, you need family friends.”  
(Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#5) 
Several of the respondents lost family since coming to South Africa.  One respondent was fleeing 
an attack on his own shop, seeking safety at the home of a friend when he was attacked, shot 
and watched as his host died before his eyes.  Despite an initial consult with a psychiatrist, he 
had repeatedly been treated harshly by NGOs when he sought further assistance and had 
received no further treatment.  His repeated attempts to look for help were frustrating him, as 
he explains, “whenever, wherever, whichever office you face to get the help, they transfer you to 
another office.  I went to UNHCR Cape Town, they told me to go to Trauma, I don’t know Trauma 
or what is it or where Trauma is.  The office that I went to yesterday give me a form to complete 
[by] a doctor.  What I must do?  Where I going to take this form? Even if I could take that form to 
the hospital, the nurses will ask you ‘do you have an appointment?’  I don’t!  They will tell you, ‘if 
you don’t have appointment, you go!” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#10).   Without English 
language skills, filling in forms, making appointments and other things that are commonplace 
for locals, navigating the system and accessing his rights was rendered impossible.  He was 
clearly severely depressed and unstable.45  Although he was certainly not the only one suffering 
from severe and debilitating depression, he was by far the worst case, needing immediate 
mental health care.  He was not aware of the SRA at all thus he did not turn to them for 
assistance; his case demonstrates the limits to the SRA’s support – if one does not go to them or 
is not ‘plugged in’ to their network, they cannot (or will not?) help.  This participant instead 
relied upon the Muslim principle of zakha (almsgiving) by the local mosque and shared food 
with fellow Somalis to survive.  Again, we see that it is the informal network that provides 
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Somalis with most of the help and assistance they need, with our without the existence of the 
SRA. 
The severe pressure, stress, trauma and mental torture that Somalis experience on a daily basis 
is a form of violence, and it is taking its toll on their lives.  This is more than physical health or 
safety.  Under these circumstances – even if one is never physically attacked but bears witness 
to the daily execution of your compatriots – there is no quality of life; life is unliveable.  The SRA 
is not equipped to attend to the mental or physical health of Somalis; it can only provide 
minimal support to those who need financial assistance in the short term, help with translation 
and help to advocate for members who need further assistance through NGOs, the UN or other 
bodies. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
However much the Somali Retailers’ Association or other group may try to assist or facilitate 
some aspects of the threefold integration process, integration is also a choice.  By choosing the 
distinction of transitional migrant, barely becoming part of their host nation in meaningful ways 
sticking tightly to the Somali community and forming an association of co-nationals, they stay 
separate and may lose the opportunity to reap the benefits of full urban citizenship, which in a 
more-perfect world would be available to them.  One respondent thought that perhaps South 
Africans “think that maybe these Somali stay here until they are made South African people.  
They think maybe we took something from this country... they don’t understand that if it is 
finished [the war in Somalia] we go back.  If the government is serious to scare these people 
[into stopping xenophobic violence], they can talk to the community and to these people. But it 
doesn’t talk to these people, that is why they shoot, that is why they kill, that is why they take us 
money…” (Male, Khayelitsha, 1709, A #1&2).  They are here only until it is safe to return to 
Somalia; if life here were glorious would they still desire to return to their homeland?  Without 
the likelihood for peace in Somalia in the near future, that question is presently unanswerable.  
In the meantime, informal groups (such as the SRA), citizens and government must work 
together to improve the liveability of the city for all, using the progress of those who have fallen 
through the cracks as a measure of accomplishment.  Although migration policy will continue to 
be legislated and regulated at a national level and full citizenship remains far outside the grasp 
of refugees and asylum seekers, municipalities still have the ability to recognize urban 
citizenship for all of its inhabitants and plan accordingly (Turok, 2001).  This urban citizenship 
is informal and flexible.  In the face of Cape Town’s burgeoning growth, most of it comprised of 
rural South Africans moving in but many international migrants as well, change is necessary.  An 












addressing inequality more generally and condemning to the dustbins of history the spatial 
dictates of its apartheid past, looking more at “relationships,  interconnectedness, networks and 
conviviality.  A territorially bounded idea of citizenship in a world of flexible mobility can only 
result in policies and practices of confrontation that deny individuals and communities their 
reality as melting pots of multiple and dynamic identities" (Nyamnjoh, 2006; 75).  The SRA 
works to improve the liveability where the city government has failed to do so, but with no 
funds and even less power, the capacity for improving the lives of its members is limited.  
Instead, the group is reactive instead of proactive or forward thinking as policy should be.  By 
focusing on one group’s experience of liveability in Cape Town, we see vast areas for 
improvement and potential areas for diffusing conflict between Somali and South African 













CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION  
In the closing decade of the 20th century, South Africa undertook a democratic transition from 
apartheid that will be studied and scrutinised for decades to come.  With the adoption of a new 
Constitution, the country went from being a state based on the denial of rights of the majority of 
its citizens to a country which “establish[ed] a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights” SA Constitution).  The newly democratic South Africa is based 
upon a foundation of human rights and freedom.  Equality (non-discrimination), human dignity, 
and the right to life (including freedom from public or private violence) are enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights for all who live in the country.  However, as this study and many others have pointed 
out, those rights have not yet been fully realised.  These rights exist on paper for all who live in 
South Africa and yet foreigners and nationals alike have trouble converting these rights and 
entitlements into reality in their daily lives. 
As studies cited throughout this dissertation and many others can confirm, despite the emphasis 
placed upon non-discrimination, equality and inclusion during the transition the country has 
become more xenophobic (Harris, 2001; Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2008; Nyamnjoh, 2006; 
Crush, year unknown; Peberdy, 2010).  It is generally accepted that “the obsession with national 
sovereignty... [as the] normative model for establishing the internal security and secure borders 
of states in the [African] region, has resulted in a situation of high anxiety, instability and 
insecurity” (Childester et al, 2003, 325).  Stated another way, excluding ‘foreigners’ is one of the 
main recurrent methods involved in strategies for conquering or preserving political power, 
especially when the definition of the ‘foreigner’ is ambiguous.  Being regarded as a ‘son or 
daughter of the soil’ brings privileges which are denied to others” (Tadjo, 2008; 231).  Thus, it 
was the transition and its rhetorical emphasis on nationalism and indigeneity – an 
“overwhelmingly passive conception of citizenship” (Neocosmos, 2009; xi) – where the seeds of 
xenophobia (in its current violent form) were sown.  Again, we see Mamdani’s theory at work 
here; the language and discourse of the oppressor is appropriated by the liberation movement 
(Mamdani, 1996).  Black South Africans finally obtained formal legal citizenship in their own 
country.  Then, those who were ‘othered’ and denied rights during apartheid identified another 
group to be considered outsiders and denied rights under the new system. 
With identity politics comes the urge to contrast those who belong with those who do not; to 
“detect difference and to distinguish between ‘locals,’ ‘nationals’, ‘citizens’, ‘autochthons’ or 
‘insiders’, on the one hand, and ‘foreigners’, ‘immigrants’, ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’, on the other, 
with the focus on opportunities, economic entitlements, cultural recognition, and political 
representation” (Nyamnjoh, 2006).  Essentially, as the transition emphasized South African 












South Africans, white of various European descents, coloureds of many different backgrounds, 
South Asians and others.  Despite appeals to pan-Africanism and their inclusion under the 
Constitution, the rainbow apparently does not include blacks from the rest of Africa.  While 
striving to be racially inclusive for South Africans (often missing the mark) and a national pride 
may have resulted, this pits South Africans against the rest; racially inclusive, but nationally 
exclusive (Harris, 2001). 
Life in South Africa’s cities can be rough, gritty, dangerous and unpleasant for many inhabitants.  
The realities of peri-urban life, slums, high rates of unemployment and rampant poverty affect 
millions of people all over South Africa.  That South Africans are struggling to make ends meet, 
find or create jobs, and fulfil the promises of 1994 for their own people is an issue that cannot 
be ignored.  Quality of life in South Africa’s urban areas could be considered low for the majority 
of inhabitants – particularly in the township and informal settlements and less so in the ‘leafy 
suburbs.’  Somewhere along the margins of these cities, falling between the cracks and pushed 
further into oblivion are some refugees and asylum seekers living at the very limits of the 
already marginalized millions of urban poor.  After fleeing Somalia for fear of their lives, the 
men involved in this study arrived in South Africa legally seeking asylum from the persecution 
they left, only to find that their new home can be just as dangerous as the war torn collapsed 
state they left (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B # 5; Male, Mitchell’s Plain. 121010, B # 10; Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B # 6; Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B # 3; Male, Khayelitsha, 170910, 
A # 1 & 2).  Despite the fact that refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants are all technically 
afforded most of the same basic rights as citizens, for various reasons – intentional or not – they 
are often unable to convert these into rights.  The Somali Retailers’ Association, in it rhetoric 
utilized with the UNHCR and other stakeholders, seeks to bring attention to this fact and 
perhaps in time find ways to ensure its members can gain access to their fundamental rights. 
Xenophobia is a given in South Africa and it permeates all races, sectors of society, the 
government, the media, healthcare workers, landlords, businessmen, the educated, the poor, 
whites, blacks, coloreds... Xenophobia is everywhere and it can be deadly.  After years of on-
going violence directed at foreign nationals across the country, the country erupted in 2008 in 
“an orgy of xenophobic attacks” (Hassim, Worby, & Kope, 2008; 62) or “black on black 
cannibalism” (Ibid, 205) resulting in the deaths of more than 60 people and the displacement of 
between 100,000 – 150,000 people (Argus Supplement, 2009; IOM, 2009).  Two years later after 
an extremely successful and impressive demonstration of what the ‘new’ South Africa is capable 
of during the FIFA World Cup, xenophobia again reached a boiling point and thousands were 
forced to leave their homes.  These external threats were the immediate impetus for formalizing 












minimal at best, the Somali Retailers’ Association still has the mutual support of its members at 
the heart of its mission.  Competing for scarce resources and perhaps contributing to 
'entrepreneurial overpopulation' (Jones et al, 2000) which ensures low profit margins, Somali 
shop owners are in direct, daily opposition with locals.  Whereas some academics posit that 
transnational migrants have greater and stronger networks than locals that automatically 
translates into a competitive advantage (Jones, Ram & Theodorakopoulos, 2010), this is not the 
asset that it is usually assumed to be.  Rather, from observing the activities of the Somali 
Retailers' Association, the strong network does not even balance (in financial or social terms for 
integration) the negative attitudes, discrimination in terms of obtaining legal documentation, 
harassment by police and exclusion from the community that the Somali traders face.  Without 
these restrictions refugees and other migrants may be able to provide for themselves and 
ultimately benefit the communities and cities in which they live (Jacobsen, 2006). 
Xenophobic violence is a daily reality for many foreigners, particularly black foreigners living in 
the townships and informal settlements.  Although the two major ‘flare-ups’ of xenophobic 
violence have come and gone, violent and psychologically damaging xenophobia still permeates 
the daily lives and existence of many who came to South Africa seeking protection.  The state is 
responsible for upholding and protecting the rights of all people who live in South Africa (SA 
Constitution), but sometimes it is agents of the State who directly compromise the rights of 
inhabitants (Peberdy, 2010; Khaito, 2007; Vingneswaran, 2007b; Harris, 2001; CoRMSA, 2008).  
In the past twelve years since the Constitution came into effect, the Constitutional Court has 
upheld these rights and their application to non-citizens in multiple cases.  According to Crush 
et al, “the flowering of a human rights culture since 1994 has been enhanced by the high profile 
activities of the TRC, watchdogs such as the SAHRC (South African Human Rights Commission). 
Public Protector’s Office and Commission for Gender Equality and the judgements of an activist 
Constitutional Court” (Crush et al, 2001).  However, this often does not flow down to the lowest 
levels of society since legal or human rights on paper do not necessarily equate with the daily 
exercise of those rights.   
What is the use of having such an open and free, rights-based legal regime and society if the 
rights of those who most need protection are trampled?  In realising the vision of 1994 – a 
society free from all forms of discrimination – refugees and asylum seekers need the space to 
realise their basic liberties; not all responsibility rests with the government.  In addition, this is 
where the Somali Retailers’ Association comes in – utilizing their social capital, an extensive 
network, moving from passive victim to agent and raising their voice.  Giving refugees a voice 
and say in their lives, in the cities they call home for now – allowing for these human beings to 












members and in turn, helps create more liveable cities for all who inhabit them.  Instead of 
being perpetual victims of torture and violence (in the country the fled or their place of ‘refuge’) 
in their own minds or in the perceptions of others, these men find ways of serving each other, 
their own Somali ‘community’ and the broader communities they inhabit.  From providing 
introductions and assistance to get started in business or paying for burial and assistance to the 
families of victims of xenophobia to participating in conflict resolution meetings with 
authorities, the Somali Retailers’ Association is making strides and actively intervening on 
behalf of its membership.  As we see in the preceding chapters, the overall impact may be 
minimal at best and at worse it could be fuelling additional conflicts internally within the Somali 
community and externally with South Africans who resent foreigners (particularly Somali 
business owners).  From this limited study it was impossible to determine or measure the 
overall impact of the SRA in the lives of its members or in the community at large. 
From August – November 2010 I conducted 18 semi-structured intervie s with male Somalis 
involved in business in Cape Town’s townships to develop a better understanding of what this 
organisation is, how it works and what kind of impact it has on the lives of this select group of 
forced migrants.  A great deal of literature exists about immigrant associations, network ties and 
even Somali-specific entrepreneurial networks.  What I discovered is that this organisation, 
despite its name, is only nominally about business and primarily a mutual support network that 
advocates and asks for their entitled rights from various institutional actors. 
For this group of Somali in Cape Town, their answer on how to make their lives more liveable in 
Cape Town was to form an association – the Somali Retailers’ Association – to “speak with one 
voice” against the violence, raise awareness of their plight, negotiate peace settlements with 
local citizens and call upon institutional assistance to access their rights.  These Somali 
entrepreneurs in Cape Town formalised their pre-existing informal co-national network ties. In 
doing so, I argue, they were actually mobilising existing social capital, exercising their agency 
and attempting to realize their legal and human rights.  Without social membership within the 
fabric of the city of Cape Town or their local South African communities, these men are 
generally unable to translate their political rights into claims or entitlements; they live half-lives 
at best, always waiting for some kind of disaster and their existence is in a constant state of 
insecurity.  The SRA helps to raise awareness and lobby for action by the police or NGOs, but the 
overall impact on the lives of Somali traders is, at this point, still nominal. 
Somalis are a highly networked group with complex internal social and cultural dynamics 
(Horst, 2006; Ram, Theodorakopoulos & Jones, 2009; Harris, 2004). In countries all across the 












Horst, 2006; Ram, Theodorakopoulos & Jones, 2009; Harris, 2004; amongst others for examples 
of Somali networks in other countries).  While these ties – local or transnational – and their 
social capital may be primarily converted for business in other refugee receiving countries 
which require self-reliance, in Cape Town a small group converted this capital into a mutual-
support network.  While the SRA attempts to support members of the Somali community and 
help to access their rights, it is only a small organisation with limited resources and reach.  Too 
often, the SRA is responding to incidents of xenophobia and violence against Somalis rather than 
getting ahead of the game and enabling access to their guaranteed rights and freedoms.  This 
not only exposes the limits of the SRA’s mutuality, but also brings us back to Evan’s point that 
without political power or empowerment, as an organisation, the Somali Retailers’ Association 
does not have the traction to make significant changes (2002).  With the formation of the SRA, 
they are able to ‘speak with one voice’ and better access their rights by approaching the 
government, UNHCR and other bodies and bring attention to their plight through the media.  
Despite their efforts, the overall impact on the lives of Somalis in Cape Town’s townships is 
minimal at present.  Organising also has some unintended negative consequences, which 
include stirring up intra-Somali resentments and conflicts; ‘speaking with one voice’ in a highly 
diverse population like the Somalis have inevitably means that some voices are silenced. 
Routinely during the course of this research, I watched, listened and heard the rights of 
participants being trampled.  My translator – not a member of the SRA by choice – was arrested 
and beaten in jail; the officer slapped his wife during the arrest and his seven-year-old son was 
hit with the butt of an automatic weapon.  Each time I returned to the township with my 
translator of Mr. Aden, I heard of another attack against Somalis.  Even in the most democratic, 
civil and well organised societies, there is still a need for groups to lobby for change and 
protection.  These men are using their connections and networks to promote resilience amongst 
Somali traders and possibly improve the quality of their own lives in the face of overt, violent 
and damaging xenophobia and a government that is not fulfilling its obligations to all who live in 
South Africa.  Although it may not be an ideal organisation or the most effective mechanism for 
the Somalis to press for change and the realisation of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, it 
is their way. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 While this dissertation is limited in size and scope, the aims and objectives were too far-
reaching from the beginning. As the scope of a mini-dissertation is limited, it was impossible for 
me to undertake a study of the entire network of Somalis in South Africa or even a fully 
representative study of network ties in Cape Town. By narrowing the subject to one semi-formal 












develop an in-depth understanding of a single group of forced migrants in Cape Town. Resolving 
conflict and healing fissures at a community level requires many levels of analysis. It is my hope 
that the in-depth understanding of one group’s experience contained herein, when coupled with 
the responses of ordinary South Africans who participated in the study conducted Jooste et al, 
will help to shed some light on the subject. Further work is necessary before these findings can 
be truly policy relevant or they can inform conflict resolution strategies and healing processes 
at a local community or municipal level.  
In addition to simply expending the scope of this study, another potential aspect for further 
research could include a look at how immigrant associations affect how readily those groupings 
are ‘othered’ by the South Africans. Do they fuel the process or does their work help to 
familiarise the community with their members? This would involve additional research with 
other associations – perhaps multiple Somali associations or other nationalities – and 
interviews with South Africans.  
 
Several respondents spoke about Somalis’ general tendency to move as they all have history of 
nomadism, which is consistent with Horst’s observations and research in the Dadaab camp 
(2006) as well as previous research conducted by this researcher for UNHCR in 2004 on 
secondary movements of Somali refugees. In this group of respondents, Tiebout’s hypothesis 
does not hold true as he posits that individuals will continue to move from one community to 
another in order to maximize personal utility (1956). This select group does not prove his 
theory incorrect; it is just that this small group may not represent the greater Somali 
community well in this way.  Since very few of the respondents reported living anywhere other 
than Cape Town during their stay in South Africa, it was not possible to ascertain the liveability 
of Cape Town compared to other cities where the SRA is not present. This could also be an area 
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APPENDIX 1: INFORMED CONSENT & BASIC INTERVIEW SCHEDULES  
Questions for Mr. Abdi Ahmed Aden, Somali Retailers’ Association 
Spokesperson 
Original Date of Interview: 
Date Revised (if applicable): 





Make a short résumé of the research: I am a Master’s student at the University of Cape Town in the 
Politics Department.  I am conducting this survey as part of my Master’s dissertation.  Specifically, 
my dissertation investigates the network or structures that hold together the Somali community in 
Cape Town, particularly in the context of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 & July 2010.  I want 
to understand how the Somali Retailers’ Association responded to  and dealt with the conflict back 
in 2008 and has continued to respond in the last two years.  I am also looking at the degree to which 
your community has or has not achieved integration in Cape Town and the levels of the city’s 
‘liveability’ that you experience in the city. I want to provide information and evidence on the life of 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Cape Town and to improve our understanding of the reasons 
that might help or hinder your integration in South Africa.   
As part of my research, I would like to ask a few members of your association to take pictures of 
their everyday life in and around Cape Town.  Those who participate in this part of the research will 
also help me produce a map of their movements around the city or perhaps Sou th Africa in general.  
Participation in that part of the study is also voluntary and will be done separately.  If you are 
willing to participate in that part of the study, I will ask for your phone number and write it 
separately from this form.  I will randomly select four phone numbers for participation in the photo 
narrative from the list, so your selection is not guaranteed. [Ask for his thoughts on this part of the 
research?] 
All answers to interview questions contained in this questionnaire are strictl y confidential.  [KLH: 
Make sure to emphasize and ensure that the interviewee understands the total confidentiality of the 
conversation and the independence of the research and researcher from any organization or 
government body.]  As one of the leaders of the association, it is up to you whether or not you 
would like to maintain anonymity for all or part of this questionnaire.  Please let me know if you 
would prefer your identity to be concealed, or if you prefer, let me know as per each question.  The 
identity of all other members of your Association that I interview will be wri tten and included in my 
thesis and any subsequent writing by using a code.  For example, if I interviewed “Mohammed” in 
Mayfair on 15 July 2010, he would appear in my writing as: [Male, Mayfair, 15-07-10].  Should you 
wish to withdraw or no longer participate in this research, you may let me know this at any time 
during the interview.  If you change your mind after I leave and do not want this discussion to be 
included in my research, you may simply send me an SMS (provide interviewee with my mobile 
phone number). 
 
Discuss with the person being interviewed how he thinks it would be best to go about talking to members 
of the Somali Retailers’ Association.  How can contacts be obtained?  Will they have time for interviews or 
should I do a few group interviews?  I would like to have about 40 participants, but that may be too many.  














[Leave the interviewee the possibility to ask questions.]  
Do you understand the purpose of the study? Y/N 
Do you consent to participate?  Y/N 
Do you consent to use the present translator (if applicable)?  Y/N 
Do you consent to being taped (if applicable)?  Y/N 
 
Name (actual name): 




What part of Somalia are you from? 
Current residence: 
Level of Education: 
Profession prior to arrival in RSA: 
Profession in RSA: 
Position/title in RSA: 
Where are your family members: 
How many people do you support with your income? 
Is any money sent overseas? 
When did you leave Somalia? Less than 6 months ago, 6m-1year ago, 1-3 years ago, 3-5 years ago, more 
than 5 years ago 
Under what circumstances did you decide to leave Somalia? (Try to grasp the sentiments of the person in 
the period preceding the decision to escape) War, Famine, Family, Insecurity, Poverty, Other 
Did you receive any assistance along your journey to RSA? Y/N  If so, please describe that assistance 
How long have you been in South Africa?  Less than 6 months, 6m-1year, 1-3 y, 3-5 y, more than 5 years 
Reason for coming to South Africa: Peace, Promise of a better life, Family/friends here, Many Somalis in 
RSA, Democracy, Seeking refugee status (easier to get permit here), Hoping to go elsewhere from here 
(where?), Other 
Do you have legal documentation/status in RSA? Y/N 
If so, what type of documents do you have from Home Affairs?  Section 22 Asylum Seeker 1 month, 
Section 22 Asylum Seeker 3 months, Section 22 Refugee Status 2 Years, Passport, UN Refugee Document, 
Study Permit, Other 
Can you tell me about the process you have undertaken to get these documents or any you previously had 
(Did anyone help you with this application?  With translation or just to give you information on the 
procedures? Probe here) 
Did you know anyone before arriving in South Africa?  Who did you meet upon arrival? How did you get 
connected with other Somalis? (Probe here) 
How long have you lived in Cape Town?  Why did you choose to live here? 
Where else in South Africa have you lived & for how long? JBG, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, 
Bloemfontein, Other 
Why did you leave the above stated city? 
How do you experience living in Cape Town?  Probe here. 
Do you plan to move again within RSA? Y/N 
If so, where & why? 
Do you plan to stay permanently in South Africa?  Y/N 
If not, why?  Where do you hope to go next? 
What does “integration” mean to you?  Do you think it is possible to achieve this in RSA?  Cape Town 
specifically?  Would you want to achieve this? Probe here. 
 
The Association & Xenophobic Attacks/Rumours 
How long have you been a member of the SRA? Less than 1 m, 2-6 m, 6m-1yr, 2-4y 
How long have you been in your current position in the SRA?  Less than 1 m, 2-6 m, 6m-1yr, 2-4y 
How did you become connected with the SRA? 
How did you come to be in your position in the SRA? 
How do you personally benefit from being a member of the SRA? 
How do you believe that members benefit from being a member of the SRA? 
Does the SRA have a formal/written constitution or bylaws? (If so, may I have a copy of this? 












How is the SRA organized?? (Can an org chart be drawn or produced?) 
How are the leaders of the Association chosen? Elected, only elders represented, consensus, elected by 
select council, different in each geographic location, Other 
Are there any membership or joining feels? (if so, how much) 
Do members have a card or other document to prove their membership? Y/N 
Do you have a list of members? (may I have a look at the list?; interviewer only to note whether or not it 
exists, no copy needed) 
How many members are there overall? 
How many members are there in Cape Town? 
Who is responsible for maintaining the list of members? How often do they update it? 
Does the list include the type of business each person has? 
Does the SRA have any paid or permanent staff? (if so, how many & how much are they paid?) 
Do you hold meetings? Y/N 
Could you tell me about the frequency of meetings, who is present, where they are held, whay tis 
discussed at a typical meeting? (Possible for me to attend a meeting?) 
Do you have any female members? 
Are there any non-Somali in the Association? Y/N 
Do you participate in any other group or association (mosque, cultural group, union, etc)? Y/N 
If so, what? 
What kind of business(es) do you run? How long have you had this business (or other business)? 
(Including those that may have previously been impacted by community violence) Spaza/Tuk shop, 
Halaal butchery, Fabric shop, Hawker, Mobile phone shop, Other 
Do you own your retail spack? Y/N 
Do you own your equipment? Y/N 
Can you describe some of the works/functions/activities/undertakings of the SRA? Or does the SRA 
undertake joint projects? 
Does the Association provide any assistance to the Somali community? Y/N 
If so, what type of assistance? (Exacples: financial, seed money for business, hospital costs, moral support, 
translation for Home Affairs, work opportunities, contacts in other cities) 
Who benefits from this assistance? (family members, members of SRA only, newly arrived Somalis) 
What are the SRA’s motivation for providing assistance? This is what is normal/social obligations; shared 
common fate of refugees, Somalis, clansmen; Will eventually be repaid in kind; other 
Do you do bulk purchasing as an Association or in smaller groups? (probe on this one & get details of 
other cost-saving mechanisms) Y/N 
Do you have any contact with police or local government? Please describe any of these 
interactions/arrangements. Y/N (probe on this one a lot! Meetings with UNHCR, Passop, Anti-Eviction 
Campaign, Lawyers for Human Rights, UCT Law Clinic, etc) 
Were you in the RSA during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks? Y/N 
Where were you? JBG, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Other 
Do you mind telling me about that experience? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not 
impacted? Left the city? How much damage/loss? Reported to the police? Who do they believe was 
involved? Did you go to the temporary camps? Did you receive any assistance from the SRA at that time?) 
Did you hear the rumours after the World Cup about the resurgence of ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 
2010? Y/N 
How did you & the SRA react? How was this different than in 2008? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? 
Verbal abuse? Not impacted? Left the city? How much damage/loss? Reported to the police? Who do they 
believe was involved? Did you go to the temporary camps? Did you receive any assistance from the SRA at 
that time?) 
Did you receive any assistance from the SRA in 2008 or after the ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 2010? Y/N 
If so, how? If not, what could they have done? Did you hear of anyone else benefitting? What is your 
opinion of what they could/should be doing? 
What do you believe is driving the attacks on Somalis or other foreigners (and some South African 
citizens)? 
What other important or revealing information can you provide as background to the Somali Retailers 
Association, or your own personal experience with the Somali community, South Africans and Cape 
Town? 
 














Interview Schedule for SRA Chairperson 
Original Date of Interview: 
Date Revised (if applicable): 





Make a short résumé of the research: I am a Master’s student at the University of Cape Town in the 
Politics Department.  I am conducting this survey as part of my Master’s dissertation.  Specifically, 
my dissertation investigates the network or structures that hold together the Somali community in 
Cape Town, particularly in the context of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 & July 2010.  I want 
to understand how the Somali Retailers’ Association responded to and dealt with the confli ct back 
in 2008 and has continued to respond in the last two years.  I am also looking at the degree to which 
your community has or has not achieved integration in Cape Town and the levels of the city’s 
‘liveability’ that you experience in the city. I want to provide information and evidence on the life of 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Cape Town and to improve our understa ding of the reasons 
that might help or hinder your integration in South Africa.   
All answers provided in response to interview questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly 
confidential.  [KLH: Make sure to emphasize & ensure that the interviewee understands the total 
confidentiality of the conversation and the independence of  the research & researcher from any 
organization or government body.]  As one of the leaders of the association, it is up to you whether 
or not you would like to maintain anonymity for all or part of this questionnaire.  Please let me 
know if you would prefer your identity to be concealed, or if you prefer, let me know as per each 
question.  The identity of all other members of your Association that I interview will be written and 
included in my thesis & any subsequent writing by using a code.  For example,  if I interviewed 
“Mohammed” in Mayfair on 15 July 2010, he would appear in my writing as: [Male, Mayfair, 15 -07-
10].  
 Should you wish to withdraw or no longer participate in this research, you may let me know this at 
any time during the interview.  If you change your mind after I leave and do not want this 
discussion to be included in my research, you may simply send me an SMS (provide interviewee 
with my mobile phone number). 
Discuss with the person being interviewed how he thinks it would be best to go about talking to 
members of the Somali Retailers’ Association.  How can contacts be obtained?  Will they have time 
for interviews or should I do a few group interviews?  I would like to have about 40 participants, 
but that may be too many.  If possible, I would like to focus on Du Noon, if there are enough folks 
there who would be willing to talk to me. 
 
 [Leave the interviewee the possibility to ask questions.]  
Do you understand the purpose of the study? Y/N 
Do you consent to participate?  Y/N 
Do you consent to use the present translator (if applicable)?  Y/N 
Do you consent to being taped (if applicable)?  Y/N 
 
Name (actual name): 




What part of Somalia are you from? 
Current residence: 
Level of Education: 












How many people do you support with your income? 
Is any money sent overseas? 
When did you leave Somalia? Less than 6 months ago, 6m-1year ago, 1-3 years ago, 3-5 years ago, more 
than 5 years ago 
Did you receive any assistance along your journey to RSA? Y/N  If so, please describe that assistance 
How long have you been in South Africa?  Less than 6 months, 6m-1year, 1-3 y, 3-5 y, more than 5 years 
Do you have legal documentation/status in RSA? Y/N 
If so, what type of documents do you have from Home Affairs?  Section 22 Asylum Seeker 1 month, 
Section 22 Asylum Seeker 3 months, Section 22 Refugee Status 2 Years, Passport, UN Refugee Document, 
Study Permit, Other 
Can you tell me about the process you have undertaken to get these documents or any you previously had 
(Did anyone help you with this application?  With translation or just to give you information on the 
procedures? Probe here) 
Did you know anyone before arriving in South Africa?  Who did you meet upon arrival? How did you get 
connected with other Somalis? (Probe here) 
How long have you lived in Cape Town?  Why did you choose to live here? 
Where else in South Africa have you lived & for how long? JBG, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, 
Bloemfontein, Other 
Why did you leave the above stated city? 
How do you experience living in Cape Town?  Probe here. 
What does “integration” mean to you?  Do you think it is possible to achieve this in RSA?  Cape Town 
specifically?  Would you want to achieve this? Probe here. 
How long have you been a member of the SRA? Less than 1 month, 2-6m, 6,-1y, 2-4 y, 5+ y 
How long have you been in your current position within the SRA? Less than 1 month, 2-6m, 6,-1y, 2-4 y, 
5+ y 
How did you become connected with the SRA? 
How did you come to be in your position in the SRA? (elected?) Y/N 
How do you personally benefit from being a member of the SRA? Y/N 
How do you believe members benefit from being a member of the SRA? 
On who’s authority does the SRA work for it’s members? What kind of decision do you make for the 
community? How are these enforced? 
How is the SRA organized? (can an org chart be drawn or produced?) 
How many branches of the SRA are there? Are they in other provinces? Are members allowed 
to/encouraged to travel between? (lots of probing here) 
How are the leaders of the association chosen? Elected, Only Elders represented, Different in each 
geographic location, consensus, elected by select council, other 
Do you have a list of members? Y/N 
How many members are there overall? 
How many members are there in Cape Town? 
Do you hold meetings? y/N 
Do you have any females members? Y/N 
Do you participate in any other group or association? y/n 
What kind of business(es) do you run? How long have you had this business (or other businesses?) 
Spaza/Tuk shop; Halaal Butchery; Fabric Shop; Hawker; Mobile Phone Shop; Other 
Do you own your retail space? Y/N 
Do you have any employees or ‘helpers’? Y/N (if so, how many) 
Do you own your equipment? Y/N 
Can you describe some of the works/functions/activities/undertakings of the SRA? Or does the SRA 
undertake joint projects? 
Does the Association provide any assistance to the Somali community? Y/N 
 If so, what type of assistance? (examples: financial seed money for business, hospital costs, school 
fees, moral support, translation for Home Affairs, work opportunities, contacts in other cities) 
 Who benefits from this assistance? (family members, members of the SRA only, newly arrived 
Somalis, etc) 
What are the SRA’s motivations for providing assistance? This is what is normal/social obligations; 
shared common fate of refugees, Somalis, clansmen); will eventually be repaid in kind or in full, other 
Do you do bulk purchasing as an association or in smaller groups? Y/N 












Do you have any contact with police or local government? Please describe any 
interactions/arrangements. Y/N 
Probe on this a lot.  Meetings with UNHCR, Passop, Anti-Eviction Campaign, Lawyers for Human Rights, 
UCT Law Clinic, etc 
Do you know of any other Somali Association? In Cape Town or elsewhere? 
Do you interact with them? Have there been any problems? 
Were you in RSA during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks? Y/N 
Where were you? JBG; Pretoria; Durban; Port Elizabeth; Cape Town; Other 
Do you mind telling me about that experience? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not 
impacted? Left the city? How much damage/loss? Reported to the police? Who do they believe was 
involved? Did you go to the temporary camps? Did you receive any assistance for the SRA at that time) 
Did you hear the rumours after the World Cup about the resurgence of ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 
2010? 
How did you react? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not impacted? Left the city? How 
much damage/loss? Reported to police? Who do they believe was involved? How was this different from 
2008? Was it just rumours or real? Did you receive assistance, if so, from whom?) 




What type of housing do you live in currently? Rented flat, Single family home, single, Rented & Shared 
house, Informal housing/shack, Other 
Could you briefly describe your living situation in Cape Town? (establish relations with neighbours, type 
of neighbourhood, necessity for moving, etc) 
Are there other Somalis living in or near you in your current home? Y/N 
Do you have contact with South Africans on a regular basis? Y/N 
Can you tell me about these interactions? 
Do you meet other Somalis regularly? Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of Cape Town? (ask more about these, if yes) Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of South Africa? (ask more about these, where, what kind 
(phone, e-mail, letters, financial assistance, etc.) Y/N 
Have you had any additional issues with the following and briefly explain. 
Health, Safety, Department of Home Affairs, Trouble with other Somalis, Police, Official, Verbal Abuse by 
Citizens of RSA, Other 
What other important or revealing information can you provide as a background to the SRA, or your own 
personal experience with the Somali community, South Africans, and Cape Town? 
Interviewer’s notes about place of interview, any tone/non-verbal communications: 
 
Interview Schedule for SRA members 
Original Date of Interview: 
Date Revised (if applicable): 





Make a short résumé of the research: I am a Master’s student at the University of Cape Town in the 
Politics Department.  I am conducting this survey as part of my Master’s dissertation.  Specifically, 
my dissertation investigates the network or structures that hold together the Somali community in 
Cape Town, particularly in the context of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 & July 2010.  I want 
to understand how the Somali Retailers’ Association responded to and dealt with the conflict back 
in 2008 and has continued to respond in the last two years.  I am also looking at the degree to which 
your community has or has not achieved integration in Cape Town and the levels of the city’s 
‘liveability’ that you experience in the city. I want to provide information and evidence on the life of 
Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Cape Town and to improve our understanding of the reasons 












All answers provided in response to interview questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly 
confidential.  [KLH: Make sure to emphasize & ensure that the interviewee understands the total 
confidentiality of the conversation and the independence of the research & researcher from any 
organization or government body.]  As one of the leaders of the association, it is up to you whether 
or not you would like to maintain anonymity for all or part of this questionnaire.  Please let me 
know if you would prefer your identity to be concealed, or if you prefer, let me know as per each 
question.  The identity of all other members of your Association that I interview will be written and 
included in my thesis & any subsequent writing by using a code.  For example, if I interviewed 
“Mohammed” in Mayfair on 15 July 2010, he would appear in my writing as: [Male, Mayfair, 15-07-
10].  
 Should you wish to withdraw or no longer participate in this research, you may let me know this at 
any time during the interview.  If you change your mind after I leave and do not want t his 
discussion to be included in my research, you may simply send me an SMS (provide interviewee 
with my mobile phone number). 
 
Discuss with the person being interviewed how he thinks it would be best to go about talking to members 
of the Somali Retailers’ Association.  How can contacts be obtained?  Will they have time for interviews or 
should I do a few group interviews?  I would like to have about 40 participants, but that may be too many.  
If possible, I would like to focus on Du Noon, if there are enough folks there who would be willing to talk 
to me. 
 [Leave the interviewee the possibility to ask questions.]  
Do you understand the purpose of the study? Y/N 
Do you consent to participate?  Y/N 
Do you consent to use the present translator (if applicable)?  Y/N 
Do you consent to being taped (if applicable)?  Y/N 
 
Name (actual name): 




What part of Somalia are you from? 
Current residence: 
Level of Education: 
Profession prior to arrival in RSA: 
How many people do you support with your income? 
Is any money sent overseas? 
When did you leave Somalia? Less than 6 months ago, 6m-1year ago, 1-3 years ago, 3-5 years ago, more 
than 5 years ago 
Did you receive any assistance along your journey to RSA? Y/N  If so, please describe that assistance 
How long have you been in South Africa?  Less than 6 months, 6m-1year, 1-3 y, 3-5 y, more than 5 years 
Do you have legal documentation/status in RSA? Y/N 
 If so, what type of documents do you have from Home Affairs?  Section 22 Asylum Seeker 1 
month, Section 22 Asylum Seeker 3 months, Section 22 Refugee Status 2 Years, Passport, UN Refugee 
Document, Study Permit, Other 
Can you tell me about the process you have undertaken to get these documents or any you previously had 
(Did anyone help you with this application?  With translation or just to give you information on the 
procedures? Probe here) 
Did you know anyone before arriving in South Africa?  Who did you meet upon arrival? How did you get 
connected with other Somalis? (Probe here) 
How long have you lived in Cape Town?  Why did you choose to live here? 
Where else in South Africa have you lived & for how long? JBG, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, 
Bloemfontein, Other 
Why did you leave the above stated city? 












What does “integration” mean to you?  Do you think it is possible to achieve this in RSA?  Cape Town 
specifically?  Would you want to achieve this? Probe here. 
How long have you been a member of the SRA? Less than 1 month, 2-6m, 6,-1y, 2-4 y, 5+ y 
How did you become acquainted/connected with the SRA? 
Do you feel you benefit from being a member of the SRA? Y/N 
If so, how? 
What do you think is the reason that the Somali Retailers’ Association exists? Do you think that Somalis 
are organized as a community? Do they work together? How could they work together more? Do you 
think your leaders help to make things better with the South African community? 
ADDITIONAL PROBE QUESTION: Does the SRA provide any non-business related benefits to your life 
(such as friendship, social interactions, etc)? Y/N 
If so, can you describe this? 
What kind of business(es) do you run? How long have you had this business (or other businesses?) 
Spaza/Tuk shop; Halaal Butchery; Fabric Shop; Hawker; Mobile Phone Shop; Other 
Do you own your retail space? Y/N 
Do you have any employees or ‘helpers’? Y/N (if so, how many) 
Do you own your equipment? Y/N 
Were you in RSA during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks? Y/N 
Where were you? JBG; Pretoria; Durban; Port Elizabeth; Cape Town; Other 
Do you mind telling me about that experience? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not 
impacted? Left the city? How much damage/loss? Reported to the police? Who do they believe was 
involved? Did you go to the temporary camps? Did you receive any assistance for the SRA at that time) 
Did you hear the rumours after the World Cup about the resurgence of ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 
2010? 
How did you react? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not impacted? Left the city? How 
much damage/loss? Reported to police? Who do they believe was involved? How was this different from 
2008? Was it just rumours or real? Did you receive assistance, if so, from whom?) 
Did you receive any assistance from the SRA in 2008 or after the ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 2010? Y/N 




What type of housing do you live in currently? Rented flat, Single family home, single, Rented & Shared 
house, Informal housing/shack, Other 
Could you briefly describe your living situation in Cape Town? (establish relations with neighbours, type 
of neighbourhood, necessity for moving, etc) 
Have you encountered any issues with the person/business who owns your property? Y/N 
If so, briefly describe. 
Are there other Somalis living in or near you in your current home? Y/N 
Do you have contact with South Africans on a regular basis? Y/N 
Can you tell me about these interactions? 
Do you meet other Somalis regularly? Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of Cape Town? (ask more about these, if yes) Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of South Africa? (ask more about these, where, what kind 
(phone, e-mail, letters, financial assistance, etc.) Y/N 
Have you had any additional issues with the following and briefly explain. 
Health, Safety, Department of Home Affairs, Trouble with other Somalis, Police, Official, Verbal Abuse by 
Citizens of RSA, Other 
Interviewer’s notes about place of interview, any tone/non-verbal communications: 
 
Interview Schedule for non-SRA members 
Original Date of Interview: 
Date Revised (if applicable):  
















Make a short résumé of the research: I am a Master’s student at the University of Cape Town in the 
Politics Department.  I am conducting this survey as part of my Master’s dissertation.  Specifically, 
my dissertation investigates the network or structures that hold together the Somali community in 
Cape Town, particularly in the context of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 & July 2010.  I want 
to understand how the Somali Retailers Association responded to and dealt with the conflict.  I am 
also looking at the degree to which your community has or has not achieved integration in Cape 
Town and the levels of the city’s ‘liveability’ that you experience. I want to provide information and 
evidence on the life of Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Cape Town a nd to improve our 
understanding of the reasons that might help or hinder your integration in South Africa.   
All answers provided in response to interview questions contained in this questionnaire are strictly 
confidential.  Make sure to emphasize & ensure that the interviewee understands the total 
confidentiality of the conversation and the independence of the research & researcher from any 
organization or government body.  The identity of the interviewee will be written and included in 
my thesis & any subsequent writing by using a code.  For example, if I interviewed Mohammed in 
Mayfair on 15 July 2010, he would appear in my writing as: [Male, Mayfair, 15 -07-10].  Should you 
wish to withdraw or no longer participate in this research, you may let me know th is at any time 
during the interview.  If you change your mind after I leave and do not want this discussion to be 
included, you may simply send me an SMS (provide interviewee with my mobile phone number).  
 
 [Leave the interviewee the possibility to ask questions.]  
Do you understand the purpose of the study? Y/N 
Do you consent to participate?  Y/N 
Do you consent to use the present translator (if applicable)?  Y/N 
Do you consent to being taped (if applicable)?  Y/N 
 
Name (actual name): 




What part of Somalia are you from? 
Current residence: 
Level of Education: 
Profession prior to arrival in RSA: 
How many people do you support with your income? 
Is any money sent overseas? 
When did you leave Somalia? Less than 6 months ago, 6m-1year ago, 1-3 years ago, 3-5 years ago, more 
than 5 years ago 
Under what circumstances did you decide to leave Somalia? (try to grasp the sentiments of the person in 
the period preceding the decision to escape) War, Famine, Family, Insecurity, Poverty, Other 
Did you receive any assistance along your journey to RSA? Y/N  If so, please describe that assistance 
How long have you been in South Africa?  Less than 6 months, 6m-1year, 1-3 y, 3-5 y, more than 5 years 
Reason for coming to South Africa: Peace, Promise of a better life, Family/friends here, Many Somalis in 
RSA, Democracy, Seeking refugee status (easier to get permit here), Hoping to go elsewhere from here 
(where?), Other 
Do you have legal documentation/status in RSA? Y/N 
If so, what type of documents do you have from Home Affairs?  Section 22 Asylum Seeker 1 month, 
Section 22 Asylum Seeker 3 months, Section 22 Refugee Status 2 Years, Passport, UN Refugee Document, 
Study Permit, Other 
Can you tell me about the process you have undertaken to get these documents or any you previously had 
(Did anyone help you with this application?  With translation or just to give you information on the 
procedures? Probe here) 
Did you know anyone before arriving in South Africa?  Who did you meet upon arrival? How did you get 
connected with other Somalis? (Probe here) 












Where else in South Africa have you lived & for how long? JBG, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, 
Bloemfontein, Other 
Why did you leave the above stated city? 
How do you experience living in Cape Town?  Probe here. 
Do you plan to move again within RSA? Y/N 
If so, where & why? 
Do you plan to stay permanently in South Africa?  Y/N 
If not, why?  Where do you hope to go next? 
What does “integration” mean to you?  Do you think it is possible to achieve this in RSA?  Cape Town 
specifically?  Would you want to achieve this? Probe here. 
Have you heard of the Somali Retailer’s Association? Y/N 
What do you know about this organization? – what is its purpose, function, etc?  Can you tell me about 
any of its activities? 
Are you a member of affiliated with this Association? Y/N 
If so, how? If not, why not? 
What is your opinion of the Somali Retailers’ Association? Positive/Negative 
Do you know any of the leaders or members of this group? Y/N 
If so, can you tell me about them? 
Do you think that Somalis are organized as a community? Do they work together? How could they work 
together more? Y/N 
If so, can you describe this? If not, why? 
What kind of business(es) do you run? How long have you had this business (or other businesses?) 
Spaza/Tuk shop; Halaal Butchery; Fabric Shop; Hawker; Mobile Phone Shop; Other 
Do you own your retail space? Y/N 
Do you have any employees or ‘helpers’? Y/N (if so, how many) 
Do you own your equipment? Y/N 
Were you in RSA during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks? Y/N 
Where were you? JBG; Pretoria; Durban; Port Elizabeth; Cape Town; Other 
Do you mind telling me about that experience? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not 
impacted? Left the city? How much damage/loss? Reported to the police? Who do they believe was 
involved? Did you go to the temporary camps? Did you receive any assistance for the SRA at that time) 
Did you hear the rumours after the World Cup about the resurgence of ‘xenophobic violence’ in July 
2010? 
How did you react? (Probe here… attacked? Looted? Verbal abuse? Not impacted? Left the city? How 
much damage/loss? Reported to police? Who do they believe was involved? How was this different from 
2008? Was it just rumours or real? Did you receive assistance, if so, from whom?) 




What type of housing do you live in currently? Rented flat, Single family home, single, Rented & Shared 
house, Informal housing/shack, Other 
Could you briefly describe your living situation in Cape Town? (establish relations with neighbours, type 
of neighbourhood, necessity for moving, etc.) 
Are there other Somalis living in or near you in your current home? Y/N 
Do you have contact with South Africans on a regular basis? Y/N 
 Can you tell me about these interactions? 
Do you meet other Somalis regularly? Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of Cape Town? (ask more about these, if yes) Y/N 
Do you have contact with Somalis outside of South Africa? (ask more about these, where, what kind 
(phone, e-mail, letters, financial assistance, etc.) Y/N 
Have you had any additional issues with the following and briefly explain. 
Health, Safety, Department of Home Affairs, Trouble with other Somalis, Police, Official, Verbal Abuse by 
Citizens of RSA, Other 














APPENDIX 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Sampling: and area/network selection:   
As part of the 2004 Swiss Forum for Migration and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Project 
on secondary movements of Somalis, I spent three months immersed in South Africa’s Somali 
refugee/asylum seeker population in four cities: Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth.  
The findings uncovered in that study, as well as other literature reviewed to date suggest that the Somali 
community fits in well with the characterization of refugees and asylum seekers as transnational 
migrants who are frequent targets of xenophobic violence.  Considering my past experience and 
maintained contacts within the community, in addition to the toll that xenophobic violence has taken 
upon this group in the Cape Town area, selected this particular nationality as the focus of my research.  
An article appearing in the Cape Argus in July 2010 only confirmed my suspicions that Somalis were the 
easiest target of the xenophobe and would thus be a good group to focus on: “it is Somalis who occupy the 
unenviable position of being South African xenophobes' victims of choice.  As Arabs in predominantly 
black areas they look different, they dress differently and they have different manners and customs.  But 
it is appears to be mainly because they are traders and business people that they are targeted” (Powell & 
de Vries, 2010). 
To confirm this decision, I consulted several key informants, studied data on the xenophobic attacks of 
2008, 2009 and 2010 from news sources and reviewed several studies conducted by the University of 
Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Program.  Seeking out a discreet population of Somalis, I 
narrowed the target group to focus on only those living in informal settlements or townships across Cape 
Town and those involved directly in business.   
In the interest of reducing the research sample to a manageable size given the scope of a mini-
dissertation, and confining the study’s definition of “community” and “network”, I decided to focus on a 
particular and semi-formal group of Somali forced migrants: the Somali Retailers Association (SRA).  
Narrowing the field of participants, makes accessing individuals and scheduling interviews more 
convenient for the researcher, and it also provided insights into the Somali network and its role in the 
lives of its members.  This certainly did not lead to generalized findings with relevance to the entire 
population of Somalis living in South Africa.  However, by focusing on a network of retailers, I was able to 
interrogate the connections between economic grievances, xenophobia and the role that a network plays 
in the Somali community in Cape Town.  Since the Somali retailers are virtually all involved in the 
informal economy as business operators or hawkers with tenuous holds on residency in the city and 
South Africa, they are regularly subjected to violence, looting, protests, intimidation and discrimination, 
as was regularly reported though the interviews.   
After conducting an interview with one of the leaders of the Association to gather information of the 
structure and make-up of the SRA, he helped to connect me with members of the Association who operate 
(or formerly operated) businesses in and around the townships of Cape Town.  Individual interviews 
were conducted with eight SRA members in several different locations; typically these interviews were 
conducted within the shops that they owned or worked; two were conducted at a guest house where they 
were recovering from recent violent attacks.   
To increase the value of the responses and obtain information for comparison with Somalis outside of this 
Association, nine interviews were conducted with non-SRA members operating businesses in other 
locations.1  For these interviews, I approached several Somali gentlemen in attendance at the community 
meetings I attended and requested interviews.  I also went to Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre, one of many 
sites where Somali shop owners go to buy stock and, with the help of my translator, approached them at 
random to request an interview.  The selection of Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre as the site of ‘random’ 
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sampling was multi-faceted.  Several other sites frequented by Somalis for stocking their shops are 
notoriously dangerous (see examples in Philippi later in the text) and although this study seeks to 
understand violence against the Somali community, I tried to avoid becoming part of it.  Mitchell’s Plain 
Town Centre is a busy, high-traffic area near a police station with a perceived lower threat level than 
other locations.  Also, the Chairman of the SRA cited this and Bellville as the two most popular areas for 
Somalis to concentrate (interview with Warasame, 260910).  Bellville is considered a suburb of Cape 
Town and not a township like many parts of Mitchell’s Plain.  Thus, the selection of Mitchell’s Plain for 
‘random’ sampling of Somali township residents.  One member of another, recently formed, Somali semi-
formal network was also interviewed in order to obtain “outsider” and critical perceptions of the SRA.   
THE SAMPLE 
In total, I conducted interviews with eighteen Somali males, 15 of the interviews were captured on a 
digital recorder.   Table 3.1 provides the basic demographic data of the sample, organized by their place of 
residence. 
Table 3.1: Sample of Respondents 
   Khayelitsha Philippi Delft Bellville 
Mitchell's 
Plain Other 
TOTAL 6 2 2 1 3 4 
              
Male in SRA 4 2   1   1 
Male non-SRA 2   2   3 3 
              
Marital Status             
Single 2 1 1 1   2 
Married - Partner in South 
Africa     1       
Married - Partner in 
Somalia or elsewhere 2       3 1 
Unknown   1       1 
              
Age             
18-24 1       1 1 
25-30 3   2 1   1 
31-35   1     2 1 
35-40             
41-45             
45 +             
Unknown 2 1         
              
Type of Doc             
Asylum Seeker 3 months   1         
Asylum Seeker 6 months 3   1   1   
Refugee Status 2 years 2 1   1 1 2 
Undocumented     1   1   
Unknown 1         2 
              












less than 6 months             
6m - 1 year 1           
1-3 years 2 1     2   
3-5 years 2         2 
5 years + 2 1 2 1   1 
Unknown         1 1 
              
Time in South Africa             
less than 6 months             
6m - 1 year 1   1       
1-3 years 2 1     2 2 
3-5 years 3         1 
5 years +   1 1 1 1 1 
              
Where From            
Mogadishu 4   2     1 
Kismayo       1 1   
Badade 1           
Hargassa   1         
Baydabo 1       1 1 
Other   1     1 1 
Unknown           1 
 
My sample size was relatively small, in part because the upsurge in xenophobic violence following the 
FIFA World Cup made it even less safe for me to enter the townships in July as planned and I did not want 
to attract further attention or scrutiny for Somali shopkeepers.  Thus I delayed the start of my fieldwork 
by a month and a half; instead of beginning in July, I began in September which gave me less time to 
devote to interviews.  Owing to the size limitations of a mini-dissertation, the small sample was more 
appropriate than the original target of 45 interviews.  Although there are female Somalis in business in 
Cape Town, the overwhelming majority are males.  The SRA reported almost exclusively male 
membership, thus my sample group reflected the composition of their membership.  A gender bias is 
inherent and acknowledged in the sample group.   
OTHER SOURCES OF DATA 
Prior to conducting my own in-depth qualitative interviews, I delved deeply into the available literature 
on community formation, transnationalism, social networks, conflict resolution, the history and context of 
South Africa’s immigration policies, rights-based discourse,  liveability, integration, the conditions and 
implications of forced migration, and ethical research principals in forced migration studies.  Media 
sources were also consistently monitored as the rumours and incidents of a resurgence of violence 
against Somalis in the Western Cape increased in July 2010; relevant news pieces were collected from the 
better-regarded news sources (South African and international) and some of the tabloids regarding the 
May 2008 attacks as well as on-going violence. 
In addition to the above sources, recognition must be given to the vast amount of research that has 
already been or is currently being conducted in similar and related fields across South Africa.  Most 
notably, extensive research has been conducted by the University of Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration 
Studies Program (FMSP), often in conjunction with major donors and international organizations.  At the 












projects.  This request was denied, however they did provide some testimony from their Moving Voices 
series which captures the experiences of migrants in the Johannesburg area following the 2008 attacks.  
To get a feel for the sentiments of South Africans living in the townships regarding foreign nationals, I 
relied upon the Jooste et al study as again, my time and research capacity was very limited (2010).  
Although this study is centred on racial mixing of South Africans in new housing settlements around Cape 
Town, they asked several questions about foreign nationals.   
In-depth interviews with members of the SRA and other Somalis living in Cape Town’s informal 
settlements and townships were conducted only after the relevant secondary research was completed in 
July 2010.  The interview schedule consisted of mainly open-ended questions broken down into eight 
sections: personal details, family, history, the Association & experiences with xenophobia, general safety, 
housing, health and other liveability issues.  Participants were encouraged to tell stories in detail, thus the 
semi-structured interviews resembled each other, but no two were the same.  Interviews were conducted 
in the homes, businesses, temporary residences of the participants as well as in the parking lot of 
Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre.  Participants could respond in either English or Somali, depending upon 
their comfort-level.   For the interviews with SRA members, Mr. Aden the Association’s Spokesman, 
translated2.  A professional translator from the Somali community was used for the five interviews 
conducted in Somali with non-members.  All but two of the interviews were digitally recorded based upon 
the consent of the participants, although my discussions with the Retailers’ Spokesperson, Mr. Aden were 
also unrecorded.  With the exception of the two leaders of the Somali Retailers’ Association, Mr. Abdi 
Ahmed Aden and Mr. Abdullah Warasame, all of the participants were guaranteed anonymity and 
provided with coded names.  This was done both for the protection of the participants from any reprisals 
or perceived threats as well as to encourage them to speak more freely with me.   
MAPPING AND PHOTO NARRATIVE  
Originally, the study was to include a photo narrative and mapping component, however that portion was 
eliminated after my initial discussion with the Spokesperson of the Somali Retailers’ Association.  Due to 
the incredibly sensitive and precarious nature of their existence and the on-going violence in the 
townships, they do not feel comfortable with photographs or mapping.   
Below, I have included a map of the general locations of respondents’ residences; a map that includes 
branch locations of the Somali Retailers’ Association appears later in the paper.  These maps were 
digitally created utilizing the Googl  Maps API (alternative mapping services are available, but this 
platform is particularly user-friendly and does not require the use of GPS measurements in the 
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Figure 3.1: General areas of Residence for Sample Group 
 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
All interviews were conducted with the informed consent of individuals over the age of 18 and the 
researcher fully disclosed all research purposes. Half of the interviews were conducted through a 
professional translator or Mr. Aden.  At the outset of the interviews, each subject received a verbal 
disclosure of the research, the researcher’s independence from any organization, the study’s purpose, 
methods for preserving anonymity, and their right to withdraw at any time from the process.  I then 
requested verbal consent prior to recording the interview digitally and initiating the interview.  The 
disclosure statement appears at the top of each questionnaire (Appendix 1) and a note on their consent or 
refusal is recorded on all physical notes taken.  All those who initially expressed willingness to speak with 
me subsequently agreed to participate in the research and none withdrew their information following our 
discussions. 
Interviews were recorded digitally, in the case of all those providing consent to record, and I also took 
notes by hand during the interactions which include notes on non-verbal communication.  With the 
exception of the Spokesperson and the Chairperson who spoke in their official capacities, all participants 
were assigned a code based on the date and location of the interview to maintain their anonymity. 
As several experts in the field have written extensively on the methodological and ethical concerns of 
working with vulnerable forced migrant populations, all of these concerns will not be repeated here.3  It is 
important to acknowledge that this part of the research comes with some risk or perception thereof 
based upon the migrants’ previous interactions with members of the community and the police.  Although 
a few of the participants requested that I take down their names, these have been replaced by codes in all 
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 See “Researching refugees: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science and forced migration”, New 
Issues in Refugee Research, No. 90, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, Geneva;  Jacobsen, K. and Landau, L. 
(2003). “The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science 
Research on Forced Migration”. Disasters. 27(3): 95-116.; and Mackenzie, C., McDowell, C. and Pittaway, E. (2007). 
“Beyond ‘Do No Harm’: The Challenge of Constructing Ethical Relationships in Refugee Research”. Journal of Refugee 












written transcriptions based upon the digital recording.  I did not associate any names with this part of 
the research and thus, I do not have a written document with their name or signature. 
I am fully aware of the sensitivities and fear within these groups since their current status of official 
documentation may not be legal or up to date and the pervasive climate of xenophobia was critically high 
at the time of fieldwork.  There is a certain fear that immigration officials, the police or even those in their 
neighbourhood may utilize information about their physical location or movements against them.  
Although it is not for official use, it is possible that the government or other groups may obtain 
information from this study and utilize it for purposes which were not intended.  I worked at every 
possible point to ensure that the privacy and identity of participants were protected by as much 
anonymity as possible.   
As the maps are only intended to provide a visual representation of the variety of locations involved in 
the study and the scope of the Association, I chose not to take exact measurement or input the data into a 
geographic information system (GIS) database; no global positioning system (GPS) readings were taken.  
Thus, all maps included in this study depict estimated locations only.  The lack of exactitude in locational 
measurement also serves as a measure of protection of the participant’s privacy. 
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING FIELDWORK 
During the course of the first round of interviews with the Somali Retailers’ Association members, I 
realized that Mr. Aden was not representing me or my role clearly to all of the respondents.  Prior to the 
start of each interview, I gave a prepared speech about my research, my independence from any 
organization etc.  In the case of those who spoke English, they listened intently, some asked questions but 
all consented to continue with the interview.  Although I repeated the same speech with those non-
English speakers, I am not convinced that the message of my independence was conveyed clearly.  By way 
of example, I cite one interview in which Mr. Aden translated my introductory speech into Somali but 
then promptly left the room.  I was confused by his departure as I had assumed that the participant only 
spoke Somali.  However, the respondent began speaking in English as soon as I requested his consent to 
record our conversations.  At the end of the interview, when I asked if he had anything further to add, he 
asked for my assistance then went on to say that Mr. Aden had told him I was with the UNHCR.  My 
introduction was not translated accurately.  I had to immediately dispel any association with the UN and 
again ask him if it was okay for me to use the information he provided to me now that he knew I was 
unaffiliated and only a graduate student.  Although I was prepared to discard our conversation, he again 
consented to have his information included.   
Issues of translation are common difficulties facing researchers, but the misrepresentation of my study 
and research presented a strong moral and ethical dilemma.  To ensure that this did not happen in any 
subsequent interviews, I discussed this problem with Mr. Aden at our next meeting and again urged him 
to be entirely accurate in his translation as well as in his representation of me to the study's participants.  
During the next round of interviews, I added a clear, unequivocal statement that could easily be 
understood even by non-English speakers.  Thus, the statement: "I am not UNHCR" while simultaneously 
shaking my head vigorously was added to the initial description of my research.   
As an additional mechanism to mitigate the possible misrepresentation of the Somali respondent's 
original intent, I asked an independent professional Somali translator who is familiar with but not 
affiliated to the Somali Retailers' Association to review all interviews conducted in Somali with Mr. Aden 
to ensure accuracy.  He listened to all of the interviews conducted in Somali and read the transcription 
based on the simultaneous translations provided by Mr. Aden, correcting any omissions, 
misrepresentations or other errors in translation in the written transcripts.  Thus, those quotes appearing 
in this paper have been double-checked to ensure their accuracy. 












This study does not in any way represent the experiences of all Somalis in Cape Town, let alone in South 
Africa.  Nor was this study designed to be generalizable to whole populations of forced migrants in South 
Africa, but as an in-depth investigation of the experiences of one semi-formal network.  I am not 
attempting to present this dissertation or my methods as statistically representative either, particularly 
due to the small sample size.  As with other studies conducted on Somali transnational migrant 
entrepreneurs, I can only hope to elucidate and provide examples at the level of theory (Jones, Ram & 
Theodorakopoulos, 2010) and present the experiences of this group of men as they were observed and 
conveyed to me.  Given the lack of information about this particular network in Cape Town, this study is 
primarily descriptive -- positive and negative elements are explored.   
Without the two datasets from the Wits Forced Migration Studies Program, this narrative case study on 
the scale of this dissertation represents a drop in the bucket in contributing to our understanding and 
stopping this deep-rooted conflict.  Although the broader policy implications of these two FMSP studies 













APPENDIX 3: XENOPHOBIA – CAUSES & RESPONDENTS’ EXPERIENCES 
EXPLORING THE ‘CAUSES’ OF XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Volumes have been written on the subject of xenophobia in South Africa and this chapter does not offer 
any new theories. I am simply exploring the validity of each of the four dominant theories by evaluating it 
with primary data.  As explained above, Harris gives us three general hypotheses or categories that 
scholars seem to fall into.  Basically she explains these as black foreigners being seen as scapegoats for 
many of the country’s social problems and crime, thus they are blamed and targeted intensely by South 
African citizens and the state in an attempt to rid the country of these ills.  Reviewing several other 
scholars’ work in this area, Harris explains that the isolation hypothesis points directly to the country’s 
separation from the international community, particularly during the waning days of apartheid, as 
engendering a suspicion, fear and ultimately hostility toward the unknown.  Also, the isolation theorists 
bring in the apartheid government’s focus on boundaries as an underlying cause of xenophobia; “because 
of the creation of strict boundaries between South African citizens, as well as between the country and 
other nations, South Africans in this argument are unable to accommodate, and indeed, tolerate 
difference” (Harris, 2001).  The third general hypothesis basically puts xenophobia down to racism; it 
points to the unequal treatment of white versus black foreigners and the ease of picking out African 
foreigners because of their distinct visible and audio characteristics (Ibid).  And finally, to these three 
categories we will also look at the influence of the government and media in shaping public opinion on 
this matter, as Landau reminds us that “anti-foreigner sentiments are not only an organic or spontaneous 
response to street-level tensions, but have been shaped by politicians and bureaucrats” (Landau, 2007). 
HISTORICAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT OR THE ISOLATION HYPOTHESIS 
Many believe that the legacy of exclusion is woven into South African society – maybe even since pre-
colonial days, but certainly the apartheid regime institutionalized notions of separateness and otherness.  
In the words of Worsby, Hassim and Kupe: 
"The violence that seeks to dispossess those identified as 'Other' to the nation is revelatory of the 
unfinished and contradictory nature of the transition from authoritarian apartheid project.  A 
decade and a half after the transition to democracy, vast numbers of South Africans feel anything 
but included in the nation's rainbow.  Despite considerable effort, the post-apartheid state has been 
unable to provide even basic entitlements of safety, health and the right to secure the means of life… 
[and] the aspiration to democratic inclusion also remains haunted by the older, naturalized 
differences engendered by apartheid ideology"( 2008; 7-8).  
Both Neocosmos and Landau point out that the history of apartheid, which made foreigners out of South 
African citizens, is one of the underlying structural causes of, or reasons for the imagining of post-
transition South African citizenship based on indigeneity (Neocosmos, 2009; Landau, 2010; 219-220; 
Hedetoft, 2002).  Citizenship by indigeneity as defined by Neocosmos, is “citizenship given by territory 
and birth, not by political agency and is underlined by state power.  Indigeneity implies an exclusive 
conception of nationality and citizenship, meaning that those conceived (in whatever way) to be outside 
territorial boundaries are excluded from rights and entitlements” (2009; 14).   As the Constitution 
separates rights into those to which all people are entitled and those which are exclusively the domain of 
South African citizens (nationals), our discussion of belonging and identity must be shaped by the 
contested concept of citizenship, and not exclusively nationality.  This is underscored by the fact that 
South African citizens have also been singled out and attacked as ‘foreigners’ during the waves of 
xenophobic violence. 
Sociology, political science, cultural or diversity studies, philosophy and other disciplines all grapple with 
the contested notion of citizenship.  What makes a ‘citizen’ or conversely, how can one identify a ‘non-
citizen’?  An expansive definition, such as Turner’s, may be useful when conducting sociological debates: 












define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape to flow of resources 
to persons and social groups” (Turner (ed.), 1993).  In politics, and indeed in the South African 
Constitution, the definition is more limited to political rights (voting, identity documents), entitlements 
(grants, free speech) and obligations (paying taxes) that being born to a state conveys upon a person.  
This more limited definition is often attributed to Marshall who divided citizenship up into three 
dimensions: civil, political and social (Ibid).   
What is important here in our discussion of xenophobia, however, is more about inclusion and exclusion 
than it is about which definition of citizenship is actually correct; the distinction between citizen and 
noncitizen, those with claims of belonging and those without, or in the South African context those with 
formal citizenship or substantive citizenship – those are the crux of the issue here (Kivisto & Faist, 2007), 
but in post-apartheid South Africa where inequality and poverty are rife amongst the majority of citizens, 
citizenship of any kind is precious, particularly as most of the rights they are guaranteed, they are unable 
to access.  Defending whatever rights you may be able to claim against incursion by those you deem to be 
‘outsiders’ are highly aggressive (Nyamnjoh, 2006).   The tone and language of xenophobia being mostly a 
“generalist discourse of nativist exclusion” (Landau, 2007; 5) and "legitimate (if illegal) violence extends 
and entrenches a form of spatial control, political authority and sovereignty… Although the South African 
state has long sought to monopolize control over space in the interest of national self-realization, the 
violence reveals a population that remains active in determining the boundaries and means of control" 
(Landau, 2010; 217).  This was echoed by the sentiments of one of the participants in the study when he 
stated that "what is going on here, even the policepeople [sic] can't help" (Male, Bellville 170910, #5).   
As Shotter explains, one’s placement in society in relation to others and the psychological feeling of 
citizenship is what matters most, “for the fact is, no one yet quite knows what it is to be a citizen; it is a 
status which one must struggle to attain in the face of competing versions of what is proper to struggle 
for” (Turner (ed.), 1993; 115-116).  Others, like Hedetoft point to the various aspects, feelings and 
constructions of belonging and Andersen’s ‘imagined communities’ as areas of xenophobic exclusion 
(2002). Ordinary South Africans may not know how academia defines citizenship, but they can certainly 
tell you who ‘belongs’ and who does not: “no right to be there… They belong in their own countries, not 
here.  They must stay because they are already here, but they don’t have a right to be here” (25DSAF).   
As this argument goes, apartheid made ‘foreigners’ out of South Africans in order to create institutional 
segregation (apartheid) that made it easier for a tiny white majority to rule the majority black population, 
“so that everyone, victims no less than beneficiaries, may appear as minorities” (Mamdani, 1996; 6).  
Which “meant, on the one hand, the forced removal of those marked unproductive so they may be pushed 
out of white areas back into native homelands and, on the other, the forced straddling of those deemed 
productive between workplace and homeland through an ongoing cycle of annual migration” (Mamdani, 
1996; 7).  Forced to the homelands and ruled by tribal authority with no claims on political or civil rights, 
South African nationality, those who could trace their ancestry back to this land were thus denied their 
belonging.  As Mamdani then goes on to explain, the struggle against this type of rule was actually 
moulded by it and ultimately took on aspects of it (Ibid); Neocosmos takes this a step further to 
demonstrate that the transition and shaping of the new South Africa inherited this obsession with 
inclusion and exclusion in terms of access to rights and group identity (2009).  “Non-nationals are the 
functional equivalent of black South Africans two decades ago” (IOM, 2009; 16).   
Harris explains that South Africa’s history of exclusion from the rest of the world – particularly during 
sanctions in the 1980s and the self-imposed limits on immigration under the apartheid era – has been 
cited as the root cause of South Africans’ inability to tolerate or accept difference (Harris, 2001).   Most 
scholars, including Harris herself, have dismissed this as naïve or at the very least an incomplete 












RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OR THE SCAPEGOATING 
HYPOTHESIS 
The 2010 United Nations Human Development Report rankings place South Africa as 110 out of 169 – 
quite far from the bottom, yet nowhere near the top – and is classified as a  country of ‘medium human 
development’ along with the likes of Thailand, China, India, Egypt, Guatemala and Indonesia (UNDP, 
2010).  The Gross Domestic Product of the country is $276.4 billion, which earns South Africa the 
designation of ‘upper-middle income country’ along with Argentina, Columbia, Mexico, Russia, Turkey 
and Malaysia (World Bank, 2010).  Often referred to as ‘Africa’s powerhouse’, South Africa is the 
wealthiest, most productive country on the continent.  The contrast of rich and poor in this country is 
stark; adjusting for inequality, South Africa would rank 144th out of 169 on the Human Development 
Index (0.411), with a Gini index of 57.8 (UNDP, 2010) and experts say the rate of inequality is growing.   
Macro-views of the country show a dramatically different country than the one most visible from the 
ground where unemployment is astoundingly high and the average working South African makes a 
pittance.  Poverty and inequality are “distinct issues: they are not the same thing and cannot be addressed 
in policy as if they were, according to Gelb (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; 80).  While even those living in 
shacks in Khayelitsha may seem better off than the majority of citizens of Niger (ranked 167 out of 169 on 
the HDI) the absolute level of poverty is not the issue; what matters here – according to this hypothesis – 
is inequality and level of relative deprivation.   
South Africa, seen through this lens, is a nearly perfect example of the problems and conflicts that arise 
from giant gaps between expectation and reality.  The language of transition raised the expectations of 
South Africans – everyone should have a house, a job, electricity, land, indoor plumbing and an education 
among other promises and they should expect them to be delivered to all 45 million South Africans 
yesterday.  Promises unfulfilled, services undelivered and a large disenfranchised, disempowered, 
unemployed urban population – this is the recipe that revolts, revolutions and uprisings are made of.  
Nyamnjoh contends that "xenophobia explains, as much as it is explained by, poverty, underdevelopment, 
economic disparities and assumptions of social and cultural superiority" (2006; 5).  Similarly, 
Nieftagodien insists that the entire discussion about xenophobia and its roots has to be located within the 
"politics of failed development and delivery" (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; 66).  Silverman and Zack 
believe it is ultimately the housing crisis which is a cause, or at the very least a strong link, to the reason 
why these long-held xenophobic sentiments erupted in the violence of 2008 (Ibid, 2008; 147).   One 
respondent explained how he sees the unfulfilled promises from the transition and the complex issues 
around this country’s development impacting the lives of his fellow refugees.   
“I can’t blame the government because they are busy with their own domestic issues (land, TRC etc).  
The government is in transition from apartheid to democratic rule which makes it difficult to 
respond to the new refugee problem.  South Africans do not have land, property and it is difficult to 
respond here like they do in the US where they help you find a job and a place to live… we are 
fighting for scarce resources” (Male, 120910, unrecorded). 
In the words of Pillay, it was the discourse of the transition that “unleashed a socio-economic system of 
market violence against the majority of the population… The victims of this violence, unable to recognize 
or reach the real perpetrators or beneficiaries of this violence, have, as often happens, lashed out at those 
closest to them… in this instance, the convenient scapegoats were easily recognizable foreign nationals – 
particularly those with houses, jobs or small businesses” (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; 94).  This 
argument has refrains of Johan Galtung in it as Pillay cited the structural violence heaped upon poor black 
South Africans as a cause of or motive for inflicting physical violence upon another (Galtung, 1969).  
There are Somalis all over the Cape Town metropolitan area; Mr. Aden estimates that there are about 
3,000 most of whom are single males engaged in some type of business.  While they may set up stands in 












townships (Male, Bellville, 170910, A#5 & Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, B#2).  They are there, visible 
and involved in business amongst a sea of unemployed South Africans.  Harris contends that it is unclear 
why nationality becomes the determining factor for scapegoating, but in the Somali case it may be slightly 
clearer.  Several respondents repeated the refrains of the xenophobic attacks: foreigners steal South 
African money and jobs – “Because sometimes they tell you ‘you take our business’ ‘you take our money’.  
Sometimes they say like that.  Sometimes they say ‘you take our jobs.’ You see? They don’t like us because 
of that.  You see, it’s not true.  We have our own business” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 121010, B#5).  In the 
words of one respondent who had recently been shot while transporting his stock to his store: “They see 
Somalians, they see money.  That’s problem.  There’s Somalian, they see money.  I think those people, they 
don’t work hard.  They just something (sic), want something to grab from the foreigners… So, they [South 
Africans] come to the tuk shops and start to loot or rob” (Male, Bellville, 170910, A#5).  
The economic argument has to be part of the discussion since we are dealing with traders, particularly in 
the informal sector and competition over business and territory.  This study confirms the observation 
that "in every major, South African city, the informal sector is increasingly dichotomized and polarized 
between 'local' and 'foreign' hawkers, with the former organizing campaigns, marches and boycotts 
against the operations of the latter.  The general feeling, as portrayed in articles & reports in the press is 
that 'illegal immigrants/aliens' are trespassing on the informal sector and are therefore trampling on the 
livelihoods of huge numbers of unemployed black South Africans" (Nyamnjoh, 2006; 41).  In Cape Town, 
there are daily assaults on Somali business owners.  Each day of my field research, I received an update 
on the number of attacks over night or since my last meeting with either my translator or Mr. Aden.  In all, 
dozens of Somalis were attacked, injured or killed between September – November 2010 in Cape Town’s 
townships during the field research for this thesis; very few of these attacks appeared in the newspapers.  
All but one Somali involved in this study – even those selected at random – was at some point involved in 
shops, whether at the time of our interview or previously (the one exception was a sedan-taxi driver for 
exclusively Somali clientele). Five respondents owned at least one tuk shop at the time of our interview; 
four worked at a shop owned by another Somali and eight were former shop owners or workers that 
were forced to abandon their work after they were personally attacked in their shops.  When asked “what 
do you believe is driving the attacks on Somalis or other foreigners?” ten out of eighteen respondents 
specifically cited competition for jobs, money and business as the primary reasons.   
Similarly, in the Jooste et al study, whenever Somalis were mentioned, they were associated with business 
or shops almost every single time (2010).  Respondent’s attitudes to this varied between they have no 
right to be here “because there is no work, because the Somalians take all the work” (18DSCF) or “all the 
people like the Somali [shop owners] people and we communicate very nice with them” (33TSCM).  As 
business people Somalis are seen to bring commerce “they open a shops in our area, the shops we don’t 
know how to open the shops in our own areas” (2DLAM) or to undercut the prices of local shop owners 
and force them out of business (36TSCF, 14DNCM, 16DNCF, & 11DNCF).  Shop keeping leaves them 
exposed and vulnerable to a populous that is hurting economically and looking for someone to blame. 
CULTURE OF VIOLENCE, CRIME, HATE OR THE BIO-CULTURAL HYPOTHESIS 
Pointedly, there are no such things as white Makwerekwere (Mngxitama, 2008; 197), so Americans, Brits, 
Australians and other Westerners do not earn the moniker.  This essentially demonstrates the 
contradictions of xenophobia and underscores the point that xenophobia – hatred of foreigners – in the 
general sense is not the ultimate cause of the violent outbursts.  No, whites are not targets for xenophobic 
attacks, even where white foreigners live among other whites or wealthy people and compete for 
resources (jobs, houses, placement for their children in school).  Pointedly, as a foreigner living in South 
Africa for two years, I have never been accused of stealing anyone’s job although I do work; when looking 
for housing I have never had a South African turn me down because of my American accent.  When I have 
been the victim of crime, it was always crime of opportunity—pickpocketing, stolen luggage, muggings – 
and the perpetrators likely did not know I was foreign at all.   This underscores Harris’ point about the 












between groups of foreigners when you simply look at South Africans fearing the other due to the history 
of identity formation or singling out foreigners as scapegoats for inequality (Harris, 2001).   
Physical, cultural and audible differences identify Africans from north of South Africa; this also explains 
why many South Africans have been caught up in the violence: they were ‘too black’ to be South African 
and assumed to be foreign.  Nyamnjoh points out instances of people being “arrested for being ‘too black’, 
having a ‘foreign name’ or, in one case, ‘walking like a Mozambican’… the darker one is, the more accursed 
by criminality one is perceived to be” (2006; 51).  When asked if they could see who was an ‘outsider’ in 
the community, most respondents in the Jooste et al survey assumed that ‘outsider’ meant foreigner, even 
when those people lived in the community (2010).  How could they tell that someone was an ‘outsider’?  
“I smell them!  You look different, you walk different, your attitude, everything is different and that tells 
me, no, you do not belong here” (3DLCF).  In the case of Somalis, they are physically unique looking in 
contrast to South African blacks, as is their language; several Somali respondents said that their religion 
sets them apart as well.  In short, they are easy to pick out of a crowd.   
Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Commission, among others, have commissioned reports, 
undertaken studies and made much ado over the extent that physical profiling takes place amongst the 
South African Police Force as they target non-nationals for arrest and detention (HRW, 1998; HRC, 1999; 
Morris, 1998; Minnar & Hough, 1996; CORMSA, 2009; Crisp, 2004; Crush, 2000; Handmaker, de la Hunt & 
Klaaren, 2001), so that does not bear repeating here.  The fact is that using physical attributes to single 
out foreigners is pervasive: “These people from there [other countries], we are black but they are not like 
us.  As they are black but they are not like us.  Their colour is different from us and they way they dress is 
also different” (23DSAM).  “You can see that this one is not from here… they are too dark and their hair is 
different” (27DSAF).   The fact that race is an issue in South Africa, despite what Mamdani calls 
‘deracialization of politics’, is not surprising (Mamdani, 1996), and again, black African foreigners bear 
the brunt of the anger. 
Gqola insists that the violence is actually a "battle between two sets of men" to control women, territory 
and livelihood (Hassim, Kupe and Worby, 2008; 218); as two Somali respondents flatly denied this is an 
issue for them as they do not fraternize with South African women, mostly due to religious beliefs.  
However, one of these respondents, after first asserting that religious differences keep Somalis away from 
South African “chicks” then mentioned that “the Somalians (sic) people, the community, do not know 
about HIV and AIDS; especially the youth, they just go with any chick they see in the road” (Male, 
Mitchell’s Plain, 061010, A#2).  It is unlikely that the ‘battle’ over women is a major component of 
xenophobic attacks against Somalis.  The only case of inter-racial marriage mentioned in all 41 of the 
respondents in the Jooste et al was actually between a white man and a coloured lady; no mention was 
made of Somali marrying or having relations with South African women (2010.  Of those involved in this 
study, seven of the eighteen were already married, although only one man’s wife was actually in South 
Africa.  
This ‘battle,’ according to Tadjo is actually nothing more than "opportunism and the desire to get quick 
material gains from driving away foreigners" (Ibid) thereby equating it with general criminal activity.   A 
great deal has been written about South Africa’s ‘culture of violence’ (Harris cites  the works of Simpson, 
Mokwena & Segal, 1992; Hamber, 1998; Hamber & Lewis, 1997; IOM cites Knyoch, 2005 and Hamber, 
1999) as a legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle lingering; that violence was political in nature, a means to 
an end (Harris, 2001).   Township life has long been characterized by violence and it “must be seen within 
this history, characterised as it is by years of social and economic disadvantage, repressive policing, 
criminal predation and a consequent recourse to vigilantism” (IOM, 2009; 10).  Certainly there is a lot of 
senseless violence in every day South Africa which is purely criminal, but the use of violence as a means 
to an end – a legitimate mechanism for solving problems – is where violence and xenophobia cross paths.  
Explaining xenophobia as part of a wider ‘culture of violence’ is highly unsatisfactory though because it is 












understand the roots of xenophobia because it is assumed that xenophobia cannot be explained by a 
culture of xenophobia, surely there has to be a cause other than simply saying that violence is legitimate 
therefore it exists.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, immigration legislation in this country devolves a great deal of responsibility 
to communities and citizens to identify, apprehend, report and root-out ‘illegal aliens.’  In this way, there 
are, according to IOM, three ways to view the massive xenophobic violence of 2008 (and presumably that 
of 2010): 1) officially, it was crime; 2) the social construction of crime equates foreigners with criminality 
(either by being illegal or committing criminal acts) thus the community were simply taking their jobs as 
citizen law-enforcement too seriously; or 3) it was a form of or exercise of control over territory and 
nationality (IOM, 2008; 12).   The transition may have emphasized peaceful means of reconciliation as 
avenues to justice, but that message did not filter down to the lowest level.  Justice in the hands of the 
communities in the townships means retribution and redistribution (Ibid).  Looking at it from this 
perspective, the looting of Somali shops is simply the community taking what they feel they deserve from 
people who they believe to be undeserving.   
Xenophobic violence, which is not yet defined as a ‘hate crime’ in South Africa – particularly when it 
comes in the form of petrol bombs thrown into shops or other similarly explosive, highly visible crimes – 
probably should be defined and punished as such.  One respondent, who requested not to be taped, spoke 
to me four months after he had petrol poured on him and he was lit on fire.  He was burned from head to 
toe with barely recognizable facial features.  His was not the only case of burning Somalis alive that I 
uncovered during the field research.  Acts like that – again, a regular and weekly underreported 
occurrence in Cape Town – targeted against one nationality send a message that Somalis are not wanted 
and their existence is punishable by extreme violence.  On a larger scale (more than a few a week) or 
perhaps out of the townships which are written off by government and more empowered South Africans, 
this kind of violence may look a lot more like ethnic cleansing.  No, this kind of violence cannot simply be 
brushed under the rug as part of a ‘culture of violence’ even if it may be part of business competition 
strategies. 
The IOM study referred to instances of youths being ‘hired’ by South African business owners to attack 
Somali shops in Masiphumelele in 2006.  Also, a 30 July 2010 article in The Daily Voice and picked up by 
the Sunday Independent entitled “The Sinister Truth” explains that police suspected a local ‘sheebeen 
queen’ was behind the attacks on Somalis in Philippi and that she had “mobilized a small army” of youths 
to root out and attack Somali busin ss owners. No evidence of this kind was uncovered in the process of 
this research (2010).  In the course of my research, I did attend several community meetings in the 
township of Khayelitsha where the topic of discussion was intended to be conflict resolution, but 
devolved into a discussion of Somali shops.  Essentially, over the course of two weeks, five shop owners 
were given “notice” by the police and other organizations that they must vacate their shops and shut 
down because they were “illegal” or not registered with the government as a taxpaying business, as very 
few businesses in the townships are (UNDP, 2007).    The names of these shops were actually supplied to 
the police by the SRA, adding fuel to the flames of resentment within the Somali community as they see 
the SRA as a corrupt organization of people only out for their own interest or the interest of their fellow 
clan members (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 260810 & Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 061010 B#2).  Shops were 
subsequently destroyed after the shopkeepers were given ‘notice’.  Evictions like this are commonplace, 
although it is unclear how many are condoned and conducted with full participation of the government as 
this one was.   
GOVERNMENT COMPLICITY AND MEDIA REINFORCEMENT 
Another important aspect of xenophobia in this country is how far up it reaches into the arms of 
government and how these attitudes can help shape popular opinion and anti-foreigner rhetoric.  The 
state’s influence over xenophobic attitudes is not limited to the creation of legislation or policy to prevent 












bureaucratic process.  In the most extreme sense, this violence against non-nationals is seen as a 
“demonic proxy for state violence” (Landau, 2010; 217).  Both the Mbeki government – in power during 
the 2008 wave of violence – and the Zuma government brush aside the possibility that xenophobia exists 
in South Africa.  Mbeki often cited the African Renaissance, and South Africa’s connection to the continent 
to obfuscate the issue.  President Jacob Zuma has at different times remained silent on the issue and 
blamed the opposition for creating these rumours to make the ANC look bad, or downplayed the extent of 
the problem.   
The current Police Minister, Nathi Mthethwa, in a statement on Heritage Day 2010, fervently condemned 
acts of violence against foreigners and in Mbeki-style, appealed to a notion of Pan-Africanism and 
tolerance.  In the same speech and countless others, he repeats his standard position: “I don’t believe 
South Africans are xenophobic… We see that [xenophobia] as a pure act of criminality” (BuaNews, 2010) 
at other times calling xenophobic acts the work of “opportunistic criminals” (IOL, 2010).  All of this runs 
contrary to solid evidence of xenophobia’s violent manifestations that are daily levied against non-
nationals and the firm commitments made by the government to not only verbally condemn but also 
punish xenophobes and protect the rights of foreigners.   
The new tactic is to brush the problem under the rug, deny it exists and look to some other “third force” 
or simply criminality to explain the violence hailed down upon foreigners.  While it may be true that some 
of the attacks, robberies, other violent behaviour and “human rights violations perpetrated against 
foreigners are motivated by financial gain and economic exploitation, rather than ‘pure xenophobia’… the 
climate of xenophobia renders foreigners more vulnerable to such financial exploitation” (Harris, 2001; 
6).  While some of the muggings, attacks and other offenses experienced by non-nationals could probably 
just be categorized as regular crime (Sichone, 2001), much of it is overtly and purposefully directed 
against foreigners.  For instance, carjacking and muggings at traffic lights are a fairly common 
phenomenon in South Africa; 120,862 thefts out of or from a motor vehicle were reported country-wide 
in the 2009/2010 period, 35,367 in the Western Cape alone (SAPSb, 2010).  Add to that the statistics on 
carjacking – 13,902 in South Africa, 575 of which took place in Western Cape (SAPSa, 2010) – and it is a 
statistical likelihood that foreigners are occasionally the random, hapless victims of these crimes.  
However, such crimes are also purposefully perpetrated against foreigners.  The very first respondent for 
this study described the robbery at gunpoint he experienced at a traffic light in the Philippi township that 
very morning: 
“You see at that robot, it is not only me, all the Somali are robbed.  Everyone we know.  Every day 
that robot.  That robot next to Makro [actually Philippi Cash & Carry].  KLH: Are they specifically 
robbing Somalis are do they rob everybody?  Respondent: That time we were robbed and the other 
guy [in my car] is from Uganda.  He and Rwanda and these people [South African blacks] looks 
similar. So [the robber] say “oh, I don’t want you, I want Somalian.”  I think he want to kill me, he 
think that [Ugandan] guy is also the other one, because he looks same.  Especially me because I don’t 
look the same.  Me, I think he is attacking all Somalian.  He don’t target the other people, maybe he 
is only attacking Somalian.  Because I listen, he say “I don’t want you [to the Ugandan guy in the 
truck], I want only Somalian!”  It is because I am Somalian.  That guy, before he thinks he is Xhosa, 
then he say “me, I am not Somalian.” Then the guy say “you, you are not Xhosa!  Hey [he said to his 
friends] this one, this one is foreigner like Somalian.”  Then that guy he robbed his money too. But 
before they think he is a South African guy and so they weren’t going to take that money.  I think [if] 
he don’t talk they weren’t going to take the money of that guy…That guy that guy is also like 
Somalia, he is Makwerekwere.  You know Makwerekwere?  He same like foreigners.  I think they are 
attacking especially Somalian, next he attack foreigner” (Male, 170910, Khayelitsha, A#1 & 2).4 
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 The Somali Retailers’ Association has filed numerous letters with police and justice services requesting that 
the individuals who conduct these robberies at this robot be apprehended, arrested, charged and put in 












By simply dismissing such acts as merely opportunistic crimes or placing it in the same category as other 
aggravated robbery, the Police Minister makes an egregious error and shirks his responsibility under the 
Constitution and the country’s commitment to UN Resolution 52/111 which is against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.  A government that denies a problem is thereby 
incapable of properly responding to and addressing the structural causes of that violence.  We only have 
to look to the Mbeki government’s HIV/AIDS denialism to see the horrible impact that ignoring a deadly 
problem can cause.  Denying the connection between HIV and AIDS did not make the scientific facts 
disappear, nor did it help the government design and implement effective policies to combat the disease.   
Similarly, denying that South Africans have a fear or hatred of their African brothers from up-continent 
does not make the daily assaults on their rights and bodies stop.  If anything, the denialism translates into 
a culture of impunity.  It exonerates those who set fire to, beat up, shoot and murder foreigners.  It tells 
those xenophobes that they are simply common criminals instead of labelling these crimes as hate crimes 
and punishing them accordingly.  It also sends a message to the foreigners themselves, as one respondent 
put it: “the truth is, that with Zuma’s denialism of the xenophobia that the Somalis’ hearts ache more with 
that than the attacks because our lives are being denied.  Back in 2008 even, a Somali said directly to 
Mbeki ‘you kill us, Mbeki!’ because he was denying what was happening to us” (Male, 270810, Mitchell’s 
Plain).  On the other side, in South African nationals’ eyes, Mbeki’s influence on the issue of migration is 
also seen as negative: “they [non-nationals] don’t have a right to be here, okay, but we must accept it now.  
Mr. Thabo allowed it before, now we just have to respect them, finish.  It was him who allowed it” 
(3DLCF).   
When the Police Minister waves away xenophobia as non-existent, he sends the message to his police 
officers that they need not follow up on acts of xenophobia.  When police do not respond to crime, or 
follow up on the reports of criminal or xenophobic acts simply because they are reported by foreigners, as 
many respondents in this study claim, there is not only a disincentive to report crime but almost a tacit 
acceptance of the behaviour in the local community and a perpetuation of the culture of violence (Harris, 
2001).   As the IOM study points out, police attitudes are overtly xenophobic as well (IOM, 2009).   
The inefficiency and other problems that plague the Department of Home Affairs are well documented 
elsewhere and they do not bear repeating here (see Landau, 2006a; Landau, 2006b; Handmaker, de la 
Hunt and Klaaren, 2001; UCT Law Clinic, 2009; Polzer, 2008; Crisp, 2001; Peberdy, 2009 among others).  
The essence of the problem there amounts to a lack of administrative justice and denying asylum seekers 
and refugees access to the rights and entitlements that they are afforded by law.   The various issues with 
the Department of Home Affairs have been extensively dealt with elsewhere and will not be repeated 
here. 
However, it is not only the denialism and administrative discrimination exhibited by the government that 
helps to fuel a general climate of xenophobia.  Many have cited the openly anti-foreigner attitude of the 
former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but his attitude is certainly not unique amongst 
those in power.  Harris, Landau and many others include quotes from civil servants all levels of 
government who are quoted in the media with outlandish, but wildly held views that foreigners are the 
source of the country’s ills or that there are hoards rushing through the borders to better themselves at 
the expense of citizens.  One other contributor to xenophobic attitudes that was uncovered in this study 
was that of the anti-apartheid struggle language being used by politicians, presumably at the local-level, 
then repeated by xenophobes as they verbally or physically abuse Somalis.  As one respondent put it, 
“actually, they are politicians doing those things… When I’m looking those people when they speak, they 
are speak by [about] the time ANC they are fighting white. You see?  Same like this, they are speak.  
Because those people say “how many people of my family, when I am freedom fighting for this country 
South Africa?”  No fear when they are speak.  That’s why they are politician” (Male, Mitchell’s Plain, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of jail without charges each time only to return to the same traffic light and continue to rob Somalis in broad 












121010, B#3).  Again, we come back to the promises of the transition, the struggle for national identity 
and the faults of the ‘other’ which explain some of the sources for xenophobic rhetoric. 
Thus, we see that the cycle of government responses coming from public opinion or action, while 
simultaneously influencing how the public perceives non-nationals (Jul-Larsen, 1994).  One respondent in 
the Jooste et al survey explained that the government’s changing attitude toward non-nationals also 
influences how the people react: “No, they actually do not belong here.  But the government allows them 
to be here.  But in the apartheid years how was it?  They were not allowed access here” (14DNCM).  
However, it is not simply in irresponsible rhetoric and policy creation that places some of the 
responsibility for the xenophobic violence at the doorstep of the government, it is in deeds as well.  In the 
words of a South African man who participating in the University of Witwatersrand project Moving 
Voices, “it is a responsibility of the government to protect refugees because it has given them refugee 
status. Its reaction to the [May 2008 xenophobic] crisis was slow, it was uncoordinated and therefore it 
must bear responsibility for those deaths also. Because it has got the resources, it has got the 
infrastructure, it has got a military that can play that kind of role and if it mobilised. So if it started, and if 
it mobilised people in Jeppe Street, we wouldn’t have destruction there. If it mobilised its forces in 
Alexandra, we couldn’t have had the destruction” (Male South African; Moving Voices, 2008). 
The media in South Africa is not a neutral observer, but helps to create and shape public perceptions of 
non-nationals (Harris, 2001).  On the whole, the impression given is a negative one where poverty, crime 
and a host of other problems are connected to immigrants (Ibid).  Nigerians are seen and often depicted 
in the media or by the police as drug-dealers, gun-runners and organized criminals.  Mozambicans, often 
recruited for mine work during apartheid, are accused of stealing South African jobs, as are Zimbabweans 
who are also perceived as ‘flooding’ the country at present due to economic and political situation back 
home.  Congolese, as well as Rwandans and Burundians (who are lumped in with the Congolese due to 
physical resemblance or language), are depicted as criminals or people who will work for next to nothing 
in order to undercut the wages of South Africans.  Stereotypes are used as short-hand with little critical 
thought or attention to the implications.   
A quick scan through most newspapers or articles written about non-nationals or migrants reveals a 
whole host of anti-foreign rhetoric, even in the more liberal or independent papers.  The word ‘illegal’ 
appears in front of immigrant more often than not and the word ‘alien’ is seen as an acceptable synonym 
for non-national; numbers of immigrants are exaggerated or talked about in terms of ‘floods’.  In a 
content-analysis of two papers that covered the 2008 xenophobic violence, Harber shines a light on two 
perspectives in the media which are themselves mere reflections of popular sentiment – those that 
sympathize with the victims of the violence and those that reflect the anger of the powerless in townships 
who perpetrate the violence (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008).  The Somali Retailers’ Association leadership 
– both Mr. Aden and Warasame – brought collections of newspaper accounts of anti-Somali violence to 
our meetings; the clippings were full of these short-cut phrases which belittle or lump all nationals into 
categories such as ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘aliens’, ‘foreigners’ and other labels.   
While it may simply be poor journalism or businesses pandering to their audiences using the vernacular, 
it is at the very least irresponsible, and has even been seen by some as contributing to the spread of 
xenophobic attitudes and violent behaviour (Hassim, Kupe & Worby, 2008; IOM, 2009).   How the 
violence is reported influences attitudes, but it may also help to spread the message.  When the rumours 
got started as the World Cup was drawing to a close, the media reported heavily on the rumours, not 
wanting to be caught off-guard if or when violence erupted again; these reports may have helped spread 
the actual message that foreigners should go, as one respondent in the Jooste et al survey explained, “like 













As we see, there are many competing theories, most of which have merit in explaining the cause of 
xenophobia.  Who is to say what the one true cause of xenophobia is?  Those who possess these 
sentiments may be able to explain why they dislike or even hate foreigners so much that they will resort 
to violence.  As the analysis above suggests, the objects of the hatred can also shed light on the reason for 
xenophobia.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to proffer up a final answer, although based on my 
research and those scholars cited above, the cause of this phenomenon is complex and very likely 
contains elements of each theory when examining South Africa as a whole.  Individuals’ reasons to have a 
fear or hatred of foreigners are as complex as human emotions, personal histories and psychosocial 
makeup.  A country as diverse and large as South Africa – a composite of 45 million individuals – can and 
does contain elements of at least four theories.   
Whatever the underlying cause of the xenophobia is in South Africa, it presents a clear threat to the 
perceived and actual physical safety of the country’s marginalized and vulnerable refugee and asylum 
seeker population. Indeed, as Crush and Pendleton point out, “xenophobia undermines social cohesion, 
peaceful coexistence, good governance and human rights observance” (2004: no page numbers) – what is 
bad for the country’s most vulnerable is bad for the whole country.  Instead of continuing the debate on 
causes, scholars should accept the multivariate causes of xenophobia and devote future research to how it 
can be neutralized or diminished.  At the same time, these same scholars have a responsibility to continue 
to work with civil society, the government, the media and foreigners themselves to document and bring to 













APPENDIX 4: ORGANIZATIONS ASSISTING REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN CAPE TOWN 
 
African Disabled Refugee 
Organization (ADRO) 
Legal Resource Clinic The Education Support Services 
Trust (ESST) 
Agency for Refugee Education, 
Skills Training and Advocacy 
(ARESTA) 
PAX Trauma and Healing Project 
Alliance for Refugees (AFRISA) People Against Suffering and 
Oppression (PASSOP) 
The Trauma Centre 
Bonne Esperance Refugee 
Project  
Projects Abroad Human Rights 
Office (PHARO) 
Tutumike 
Cape Town Refugee Centre 
(CTRC) 
Rape Crisis Centre University of Cape Town Refugee 
Law Clinic 
Catholic Welfare Development Red Cross South Africa Sonke Gender Justice Network 
Excelsior Empowerment Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town Ikwa Kuthi Research and 
Adv cacy 
 
 
